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FOREWORD 
Philosophy is the quest for wisdom and hence it may 
share a common end with religion. Not all philosophies are, 
however, concerned with this end, nor, again 1 are all reli-
gions involved with a quest for· wisdom. There may be differ-
ent techniques and tools employed in the accomplishment of 
wisdom_, but this dissertat.ion is concerned only with the 
study of the nature and use of reason. In the philosophy of 
Plato reason is employed in diverse fields· including mathe-
matics, myths, and elaborate analogies, but when he turns to 
reason itself, then it becomes important to this analysis. 
Reason may be utilized in other systems of thought, say in 
Aristotelian, but when it is functioning as the sole or para-
mount vehicle to the Good--then it is the subject for this 
paper and its contents will be examined. In the works of 
Plato, the use of reason in this· sense is tenn·ed dialectic. 
The terms "philosophy" and "dialectic" are, of course, 
derived from the Greek. It is equally clear that a rad"ical 
change has· occurred in the meanings of these terms from the 
original formulation in the Hellenic Age to the present day. 
The primary and original meanings of these terms have been 
nearly eclipsed by modern usages and there is a confusion as 
to the basic ·meanings and content of these terms. This prob-
lem is further complicated by the tacit agree~ent that 
l 
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whatever is modern, or of late origin, must be better than 
what preceded it. ·Hence there is today a general reluctance 
to exa~ine basic origins and classic sources. Contrary to 
this belief is the concept that every real advance is a 
result of returning to the basic origins· and sources and 
redefining problems from this perspective. This work will 
base itself on the latter concept. The final object will be 
to re-examine the grounds and the extent to which philosophy 
can be termed dialectical. It is a request to reconsider 
philosophy in the terms of dialectic. 
A return to origins, in this case, is a return to the 
v 
Greeks and the terms philosophy and dialectic will be defined 
with reference to the classic philosopher and dialectician--
Plato. The Platonic concept o~ dialectic is to be utilized 
as a s-tandard and basis of judging other systems that have 
been termed dialectical. Further, the work intends to reply 
to the criticism that philosophy, including philosophy as 
dialectic, has been superseded by .religion since religion 
rather than philosophy can better insure the object of phi-
losophy--wisdom. Such a rejection of philosophy and dialec-
tic must of course presuppose a familiarity with the process 
of the Platonic dialectic as well as its scope. Thus, a 
rejection, to be considered, must d-emonstrat·e a knowledge of 
Plato and an understanding of the dialectic. A decline of 
philosophy and dialectic based upon a valid criticism would 
j 
vi 
be justified. On the other hand, it is important to discern 
the mechanism implicit in a denial of philosophy, as well as 
dialectic, in order to discern the consequences that follow 
from such a d-enial. Different systems of thought have been 
termed dialectic and those chosen for analysis will be exam-
ined to determine whether they advance the concept of dialec-
tic as defined in the thesis, and if they do not, to see if 
it is possible to assign a cause. The deficiencies and 
inadequacies of the Platonic concept of philosophy as dialec-
tic will also be shown and an attempt to correct this will be 
made by recourse to other traditions of thought. 
In the succeedine chapters, the analysis will include 
Augustine, Vico, Kant, Hegel, and Jung, as well as Gaudapada, 
Sankara, Nagarjuna, Confucius, and Lao Tzu~ These authors 
have been chosen because of their use of dialectic and/or 
because they can contribute to the concept of dialectic as a 
philosophy as noted in this thesis. There ·is no intention to 
review or appraise any part of their work, except as regards 
their use of dialectic in selected instances. The philoso-
phers are chosen to support and to illustrate the thesis of 
this dissertation. 
Therefore the task will be to define dialectic within 
the philosophy of Plato, to account for its decline or rejec-
tion, analyze some- private definitions of dialectic, and to 
correct any shortcomings or inadequacies of dialectic. 
. J 
CHAPTER I 
THE. ANATOMY OF DIALECTIC 
I. PLATO 
To understand the works of :Plato, it is first impor-
tant to fix clearly the role of Socrates, the questioner, and 
to determine the scope of his activities. The dialogues are 
records of conversations, come actuall some ideal, and they 
present many excellent examples of the Socratic method. The 
Socratic method--the quest.ion and answer t .echnique--is the 
dialectical method in the original and primary meaning of 
that word. In the dialogue the Theaetetus, there is a cl.ear 
and definitive statement of Socrates as a dialectician func-
tioning in his twin role as matchm~~er and judge, or examine~ 
of the new-born. He is presented as a ttmidwife" because he 
attends the labors of men pregnant with ideas and examines 
the result to see if it is a genuine birth or if it must be 
aborted. It is in the function of examiner that he calls 
"the triumph of my- art"l for he must see if the ttthought 
which the mind of the young man brings forth is a false ·idol 
or a noble and true birth.n2 In this lies his paramount 
Random 
ln. Jmfett (trans.), The Dialo~ues 
House, 1937), "Theaetetus," 15 b. 
2Ibid .• , l50c • 
2f. Plato (New York:. 
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intere-st. If others come who are not "pregnant,_, if they are 
"empty," then he functions in the th o er capacity of midwifery 
---a matchmaker. He "matches" them to other teachers. 
~here ar: ot~ers, Theaetetus, who come to me apparently 
_hav~ne noth1ng 1n them; as I know they have _no need of my 
art, I coax them into marrying someone, and by the erace 
of God I can generally tell who is likely to do them some 
good. Many have I given to Prodicus, and many to other 
inspired sages .3 
A-s a midwife, he himself must be barren, past gi vine 
birth to concepts of his own design, "but /JSo{J does not 
allow me to bring forth."4 Thus in the Socratic method, 
there is a questioner who is compelled not to add anythin~ 
during the birth process. Within the dialectic the ques-
tianer, Socrates, must be active in the delivery but passive 
before the activity. This is the role of the midwife; 
barren,, he remains silent, spinning no theories himself,. "nor 
have I anything to show which is the invention of my soul."5 
It might be argued that the "midwife" is only a literary 
symbol, a poetic metaphor, which is not therefore a valid 
object from which to draw logical deductions, yet the symbol 
embodies the precise laws and rules of operation for dialec-
tic. Further, in the dialogue the Theaetetus, he clearly 
states again, without ambiguity or tie to the metaphor: 
But you do not see that in the reality none of ·these 
theories come from me; they come from him who talks with 
3rbid., l5la-b. 4Ibid., 150d. 
me. I only know just enough ~o extract them from. tl:e-
wisdom of_.another and to rece1 ve them in a sp.;r 1· t fairness.6 ~ of 
The procedure is to elicit the birth of an idea from another 
and then to examine its character. 
The acting out of the role of questioner has often 
been considered and criticized as being merely dLsf:uised 
rhetori-c or empty disputes having little effec.t upon man, 
i.e., eristic; the a-sstnnption being that th-e difference 
between the dialectician and the disputer is one in which 
there is no real distinction. But Plato d-efines the differ-
J 
enc-e by accepting the account of the dialectical procedure as 
presented in the speech of Protagoras and vindicated in the 
dialogue·: 
The disputer may trip up his opponent as often as he 
likes, and may make fun; but the dialectician may be in 
earnest, and only correct his adversary when neces-sary, 
telling him the errors into which he has fallen throu~h 
his own fault., or the company which he has ·previously 
kept. If you do so your adversary will lay the blame 
and .confusion and perplexity on himself, and will escape 
from himself into philosophy, in order that he may. become 
different than he was. But the other mode of argu~ng, 
which is practiced by the many, will have just the oppo-
·site effect upon him; as he grows older, i~stead of turn-
ing to philosophy, he will come to hate ph~losophy.7 
The dialectic-ian pursues one end--the G-ood--and he believes 
that the use of reason is an avenue to that ultimate end.e 
6rbid., 16lb; cf. 157d. 7rbid., l67e-l68b. 
~rancis MacDonald Cornford (trans.), The Republic)of 
Plato (New York and London: Oxford University~ess, 1945 ' 
VII. 532, cf. p. 32. 
! 
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The immediate end is the elucidation of £alse beliefs and the 
provision of a fruitful condition for the further purs-uit of 
philosophy. 
This procedure of Plato is not often clear to many 
commentators since they often fail to recognize that Socrates 
weaves a philosophy without content, that in the Theaetetus 
there is no solution to the problem- of the definition of 
knowledge (apart from the nature of knowledge),9 that all 
views are found contradictory, that none is adequate. The 
result of the midwifery is that no view is accepted. 
Socrates states that, "I must try by my art of midwifery to 
deliver Theaetetus of his conceptions about knowledge."lO 
At the conclusion of the dialogue all the concepts of knowl-
edge are displayed fraught with contradictionsll and 
Thea-etetus is brought to realize and agree "that the offspring 
of your brain is not worth bringing up.nl2 Yet, he does learn 
something in the process; he learns to be soberer, humbler, 
and "too modest to fancy that you know what you do not know.nl3 
Consequently, this implies the answer to a few ques-
tions. Primarily, does the failure of Theaetetus to uphold 
and defend his argument preclude that someone else might have 
9Jowett, £2• c_it., "Theaetetus,n l47a. 
lOrbid., 1S4a-b. 11~., 210a. 12Ibid., 210c. 
13Ibid., 210c-d. 
J 
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succeeded~ Certainly Theaetetus was a youth, hence he pro-
vided only a weak argument, a straw-man for Socrates 1 rhetor-
ical play. What then can be the value of such activity! 
Again, does the lack of any conclusion to the dialogue demon-
strate that either knowledge is not possible or that knowledge 
is not definable? Still, it might be argued that Socrates is 
merely correcting a false .idea or notion, and :that in .some 
other dialogue he states either his own theory or agrees with 
that of another. Or can there be anything significant in the 
silence that marks the end of the Platonic dialogues? What 
is the cognitive quality in silence, in no-thesis? It might 
even ·be argued that this dialogue, the Theaetetus, is a com-
plex dialogue, and that in his better known works, the dra-
matic dialogues, he does in fact turn from the so-called 
silence and advance many theories. Hence, no valid deduction 
c-an be drawn from this one example. 
What these questions involve, then, is an analysis of 
a dialogue and, seeing that most of the questions have arisen 
from the Theaetetus., it is fitting that the defense should 
come, for the most part, from that dialogue. To meet the· 
other objections, the other dialogues will be drawn on for 
confirmation and validation. The choice of the ·rheaetetus at 
this point is obvious, since it provides an excellent account 
of the process of dialectic without being -encumbered by other 
considerations, i.e., its ultimate end or purpose. 
6 
The Straw-Man 
Theodorus informs Socrates that his pupil, Theaetetus 1 
is moving "surely and smoothly and successfully in the path 
of knowledgenl4 and this becomes an invitat·ion for Socrates 
to begin the dialectic. These opening remarks set the stage 
for the drama of dialectic. Theaetetus begins by agreeing 
that .knowledge and wisdom are one,l5 hence extends the prob-
lem while at the same time it becomes quite obvious that he 
does not understand the consequences of this identity. Wis-
dom, for Plato, is the intuitive grasp of the Good, the 
Ultimate Good, while knowledge does not have this referent 
when it is understood as relational.l6 Hence a typical 
alternative is open to Socrates and he treats it with his 
characteristic method of approach. He offers no alternative 
yiew of his own; neither does he correct by attempting to 
exchange his ideas for someone else's. He resists what would 
be an excellent pontificating opportunity. No lecture. is 
offered, for a lecture is a poorly disguised attempt at 
dogmatism. Rather than make· such a retreat from understanding, 
he starts at the level of the student's comprehension and 
permits ·him to see the consequences of \vhat he thinks. He 
offers Theaetetus a mirror to see the contents of his own 
l4Ibid., 144b • 
16cornford, QE• cit., VII. 534· 
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mind. He refrains from offering any alternative which he 
might understand even less than his own concepts. The 
student, Theaetetus, has one set of ideas that he believes he 
knows--his own--and that is his fixed center of interest and 
reference. Therefore, to offer an alternati·ve at this time 
would only complicate the process by making a twin project 
necessary, i.e., to try to understand an alternative doctrine 
when actually· one's own thoughts are arrested, or ·the other 
possibility of attempting some synthesis that w.ould either 
exc-lude or include the new idea with one's private "truth." 
For a teacher, this is always seen as the tragedy of the 
lecture method. The student's own ideas confuse the under-
standing, and thus it is always more basic to start at the 
particular level of the student's understanding. 
Socrates is fully cognizant that this youth, Theaetetus, 
"is no real match for the task that he too ·freely accepts for 
himself. Socrates encourages him to continue the examinati·on 
even after he· ("Theaetetus) .finds himself at the wrong end of 
several reductio ad absurdum arguments, and when the latter 
wants to give up the inquiry, Socrates says: 
Well, but if someone were to praise you for running, 
and to say that he never met your equal among boys, and 
afterwards you were beaten in a race by a grovmup man, 
who was a greater runner--would the praise be any less 
true'?l7 
17Jowett, 2£• cit., "Theaetetus,n 14Sb-c. 
J 
The argument shifts after it is apparent that Socrates' dis-
tinction is beyond Theaetetus' understanding. He says, "How 
can a man understand the name of anything when he does not 
kno11'r the naturE. of it?" 18 This question assmnes a different 
course of inquiry. He returns later to this same point, 
admonishing Theaetetus again and again, to no avail, nHe 
ought not to speak of the na."!le, but of the thing which is 
contemplated under that name.ttl9 
It is a request not to delineate definitions, the 
names of things, but to discuss how one can know the nature 
of a thing. Socrates makes clear the serious nature of the 
quest, "And is the discovery of knowledge so small a matter, 
as I have said? Is it not one which would task the po\'ters of 
men perfect in every way?tt20 Theaet-etus recovers his courage 
and defines kno"Tledge as perception.21 Socrates is careful 
to demonstrate that this really assumes Protagoras' doctrine22 
and Socrates draws a set of acirnissions from Theaetetus which 
renders the thes-is of Protagoras bankrupt and void of con-
tent .23 He has extended the arguments sho\'rine the complexi-
ties of the doctrine. Theaetetus acclaims that he is so 
confused that at this point he is not sure if the statements 
and opinions are indeed Socrates' O\'m or if he is only dravling 
l8rbid., 147a. 
2lrbid. 15le. 
--, 
l9rbid., l77e. 
22rnid ., 152a .. _ 
20rbid., 14Sc. 
23Ibid., 156a. 
_, 
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them out from himself.24 To this Socrates replies, restating 
his favorite thesis: 
You .forget, my fri-end, that I neither knovr, nor pro-
.fess to know anythin~ -of these matters; you are the 
person who is in labour, I am the barren midwife; and 
this is why I soothe you, and offer you one good thing 
after another, that you may taste them. And I hope that 
r may at last help to bring your own opinion into the 
light of day; when this has been accomplished then we 
vzill determine whether what you have brought forth is 
only a wind-egg or a real and genuine birth~ Therefore, 
keep up your spirits and answer like a man what you 
think.25 
As a result of this drawing-out process, the thesis (Pro-
ta-goras'} is reduced to an absurdity. But the argum-ent has 
been conducted by a boy, a youth unskilled in dialectic and 
incapable of defending Protagoras' thesis. Socrates, as the 
dialectician, aware of this, answers, 
And yet, my friend, I rather suspect that the result 
would have been different if Protagoras, who was the 
father of the first of t~,;o brats, had been aliv-e; he 
would have had a_ great deal to say on his- behalf. But 
he is dead, and we insult over his orphan child; and 
even the guardian whom he left, and of whom our Friend 
Theodorus is one, are unwilling to give any help, and 
therefore, I suppose that I m~~t take up his cause 
myself, and see j-ustice done. 
The argume-nt is taken up again, but this tim-e by Soc-
rates, and meets the same unhappy fate; the argument is still 
found to be untenable. However, this does not end the dia-
logue. Socrates invokes Protagoras and restates an argument in 
the strongest and ·most forceful t -erms as if it came from .Protag-
oras himself. Again, the thesis is rejected and they quote 
24rbid., 157c. 
from his '\'Jritings 2 7 in an ~ttempt to force the \\eak 
into its more pristine form. Hence tr-ree tr::rws are done to 
remove the "straw-mann and. the first is ~;hen Tr.eaetetus is 
refuted. Then 'fheodorus , a friend of Frota.roras, 2f i~ c.J.lled 
on to defend him, and Socrates tries "to do Justicen2S: to the 
argument by restating Protaf-;oras ' argume·nt and constrllctir.c: 
it as tight and as logically coherent as pos~·ible. Jut this 
too fails. It might a pne.::.r that this -vro ul.C. conclude the arru-
ment but Socrates rep eats that, rert~aps, U :e truth lies in 
the s.piri.t as ap:ainst the mere word: · , t hat one should see tbe 
extension of the idea and there in the spirit find the tn:.e 
proposition . Hence a logical analysis is d~cmed not suffi-
cient. The seriousness with t'lhich Socrates works in this 
task of reassessing the fau.lt)r positicm and b•..lt·tres~o·in~ its 
weak points can be judged by his estimate of the dialecti-
cian's obligations: the dialectician must use the optimum of 
his pm·ters in creating the most form·idable ~osition rri c r to 
any final rejection. Protagoras is not present to defend his 
position and Theodorus, his student, Nill not meet the chal-
lenge. 
But as he ffrotar:,orai/ is not. >'r~ t~in call~ , ... ; ::1~s~ 
make the best use of our o-vm fac~l~t-~es, sue._ a~, tr.e) 
are~ and sneak out what appears to be true •. And no one 
\vill deny th2..t there are great differcr:ces 1.n tte 
2Bibid.,. 16Sd . 
ll 
understanding of men.30 
Therefore, to meet the challenge of the stravs-man thesis, the 
follmdng can be- noted. After Theaetetus' understandine of 
the thesis is demonstrated to be weak, 31 t -he a t l. ~ rgill:lEn _ 
rebuilt,3 2 first by reference to Protagoras' worksJ 33 then by 
a logical examination of the idea. It is then extended to 
its limits to make explicit the contradictions.34 Apain a 
restatene-nt is made in ter:::1s of •·;hat Prota,eoras must have 
meant : 3 5 a shift in emphasis from the words to tl::e ideas or 
spirit behind them. Once a ga in the ~)rocesf> continues as Soc-
rates turns to the thesis and attempts to revive it by addine 
to it so that it now goes beyond Protagoras 1 oririnal thesis.36 
This last stage takes the form of a new argument on three 
separate occas-ions ) -7 They are found to be \·:ithout an adequate 
defense.JB One thing should be noted aeain: if Theaetetus 
had understood that Socrates was askinr.; one ouestion and that 
he was attempting to anE:wer another, the dialo~ue vrouJ d have 
taken an entirely different course. Socrate:.> \·;a s as kin:"" 
about the nature of knovTledge,. and \'/hen that was deter.nined 
then to attempt to define it. But since Theaetetus was intent 
30Ibid., 17le .• Jlibid .. , 165e. 32rbid., 154d . 
33Ibid., lWe. 34Ibid., l64b. 35Ibid., l67a-b. 
J6rbid.,- 17ld-e-. 3-7Ibid., 179b; 184b; 1E7b; 20lc {cf.2J 6c). 
JSibid., 210a-b . 
I 
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upon answering v.•hat he did not knm·J, Socrates could resort to 
his t•.,.rin alternat.i ves. He could eitl':.er force a point of vievi 
upon Theaetetus, or merely sit by and let Theaetetus see if 
he could define something he did not knm•?. 'l'l:e dialor;ue' s 
conclusion establishes tte pretext for the inouiry to return 
to the original prob 1 em • Theaet et us is n m-r open to the -pro o-
lem that he thourht he had solved and understood. At this 
point he can return to the object of philoso-phy--to kno"'l: the 
nature of knov-rledr;e. 
Value of Dialectic 
Turning now to the other question that was raised, 
ttVJhat is the value of this activity--of dialectic ;u ·v1e find 
it rests upon the Platonic ccncept of the soul. The soul,. 
analo~ous with the body, can be af~licted by the t~o evils of 
disease and deformity .3 9 The discord of the body is called 
disease. In the soul, it is terr.1ed vice , cowardice, intem-
perance, and injustice.40 Again , deformity of the body is 
likened to ignorance because, like the body, deformity is a 
lack of symmetry, as the soul becomes deformed by ignorance .41 
Two arts are reauired to cu~e the soul, for zs the body needs 
medicine and therapy· for the cure of disease and deformity, 
39Jo-,.lett, .22.• cit., "Sophist ," 22Sa-b. 
40Ib1·d 2~c~ d 41 Ibid _  ., 228d-e • 
. ' ... ' . 
I 
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so does the soul need cha_stise:nent &nd educ.ation.l:-2 P.m·:ever, 
a difficulty e.rnerres rep;ardin ~r, education because two kinds of 
education are knm·m--one being completely ineffectual, i.e., 
admonition techni~'.les, lectures, e.nd ~e::rmons. This ldr~d is 
called "rough." In contrast , there is the "smooth»43 type of 
education and, as can be expected, it is dialectic. Plato 
orovides a clear sta'te:-~ ent of this as \',rell as a ps~rcholor:ical 
matrix for its episte.:1olory. He says th~t dic.lectic attc:-::,..:ts 
to eradicate i r:; nora nce and c~mceit by use of the nsmooth" 
education: 
They [ciialectician.£.7 cros5-examine a r.ian ' s ':~ords , v:iien 
he thinks that b.e is s a ying something and is really sr,yint~ 
nothinr.;, -and ea.s ily convict him o-r inconsistencies in }:is 
opinions; these they then collect by the dialectical proc-
ess, and placing thc!"'l side by r.ide , shm! that. they contra_-
dict one another about the same t hings , in relatior: to the 
sn.P.'le thinps and in the sa'"'le re~ ~ ect. He , seeinr, this, is 
angry v:ith himself and r~rm·;s ' ;entle tiith o~hcrs, a.nd tL~s_, 
is entirely deli v·e:;rcd fran r;reat prejudices and harsL 
notions, in a way Vlhich is most a.'n.using to the h earer, 
and produces the most lasting eood eff ect on t h e person 
i·:ho is t l:e suoject o.f the operation. For as the physieian 
c :msi C'~ ers t : ·at t t:e body l':ill receive no benefit fror.-1 tak-
ing food until the internal obstacles have bEen recoved, 
so the P'..lrifier o.[ the soul is cor;scious that hiE patient 
1ilill receive no benefit from tl:e application of knm-:lede;e 
until he is refuted , and from refutation learns modesty; 
he must be pureed of ~1is prejudices first and made to 
think that he knows only v~hat r_e knov.rs, and no more . 4h 
A~ain he state~ the thesis of dialectic as a purifier and as 
non-respecter of a person's rank or !)osition: 
--- -- ---
42rbid., 22S':b. 43rbid., 230a. 44Ibid., 230b-d. 
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For all these reasons, Theaetetus, vle must adm.it that 
refutation i~ the greatest and chiefest of purifications, 
a~d he ~mo has not been refuted, though he be the Great 
K1ng himself, is in an aw.ful state of impurity; he is 
uninstructed and deformed in those things in which he who 
would be truly blessed ought to be fairest and purest.45 
Hence, in the philoso~hy of Plato, dialectic functions as a 
curative force--a purification of the soul in removing preju-
dice--and is thought to have a lastine effect upon man's 
psyche. Behavior has it.s roots in the understanding; its con-
tents can either be contradictory, confused, and chaotic, .or 
the converse. The irony is that if the basic ideas lie hid-
den, then it is never clear that they are themselves the 
source of the difficulties that reflect the underlying contra-
dictions and obscurity of the mind itself. The goal deter-
mines behavior and consequently the ignorance of one's o~m 
goals has an adverse effect upon the behavioral patterns. 
11Let us tell them that they are all the more truly what they 
do not think they are because they do not know it.n46 The 
case is: One can make explicit the grounds of understanding 
or remain ignorant of them. One can be ignorant of the kind 
of mental activity one is enmeshed in and not realize that it 
is subject to blind. determinism. Then, in ignorance, the world 
b·ecomes a mirror of our confusion; it is even a major task of 
45rbid., 230e. 
46Jowett, .2£• cit., "Theaetetus," l76e. 
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insight to even suggest that the cause of the trouble may lie 
within the mind. The contents- of the mind are hidden unless 
transfonned into speech,_ articulated and then examined. They 
can be the unconsci~us forces of motivation with undiscovered 
premises or th~ converse. In either case, our motivation of 
behavior can spring from this- sourc-e. The choice is -either 
to cooperate as a rational being with the pattern of true 
understanding o~ continue the folly of a disordered mind. 
There are twin possibilities, either to gro'VT towards wisdom, 
or towards folly, 
••• the one blessed and divine, the other godless 
and wretched~ but they do not see them, or perceive that 
in their utter folly and infatuation, they are grm'ling 
like the one and unlike the other, by reason of their 
evil deeds; and the penalty is, that they lead a life 
answering to the pattern -which they are growing like.47 
Therefore the unexamined mind or life is fraugh_t with contra-
dictions which become the source of evil and ignorance in 
lif-e. On the other hand, the alternative course in the 
conscious use of reason supplies a positive direction in 
society and in the quest of philosophy. 
The Structure of Dialectic 
The art of dialectic is the distinguishing mark of the 
true philosopher and his nature can be further defined by a 
47rbid., 177a. 
j 
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study of general features of dialectic itself.48 Dialectic 
has a structure and a ~ormal character exhibiting the intel-
lect's mode o~ operation; hence, at the same time it provides 
an opportunity to become aware of the philosopher's process 
of understanding. Analysis of Plato's more complex and dia-
lectical dialogues (Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman, Par-
menides, and Philebus) makes apparent a pattern of his 
dialectic m·erging with certain recurrent features capable of 
being woven into the dialectical structure. Plato in these 
dialogues recapitulates the process, thereby affording an 
excellent occasion to compare the .methodology with .his final 
summary. 
Dialectic assumes the ability to perceive relation-
ships, divisions, patterns, and unities within any field of 
discourse. The dual abilities of seeing unities and distinc-
tions are the key factors presupposed in the successful oper-
ation of dialectic. Perception of unity can be rurther 
ass-is.ted by formal studies, 49 that stress the perceiving and 
recording of distinctions. These distinctions disclosed by 
the dialectic are not arbitrary but reflect as much as pos-
sible natural models or orders. The emplo)~ent of models 
provides the origin and ground of the analogical method so 
4Bcornfordt 2£· cit., VII. 533; cf. VII~ 518-519b. 
49rbid., VII. 52e. 
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typical of Plato. It becomes the basis for making distinc-
tions and the training for the art of discrimination. It is 
as if in each dialectical encounter the first obligation i ·s 
to discover a set of natural models to base distinctions upon 
and then set these apart in isolation. The ability to find 
these connections in things, concepts, and then within dis-
course, is the pre-requisite for the dialectician.50 The 
movement between the model or analogy and discourse is an 
invitation to use insight, to sharpen intuition within the 
dialectical encounter. The bes-t example is the analogy of 
State to individual in order to find Justice.51 This is not 
only an -artistic device but a request for understanding to 
discover relations through di.scourse... Certainly, it also is 
a factor in furthering clarity and in translatine concepts 
into a simpler matrix which can then provide the conditions 
for intuition. The reverse process (that of working back-
wards from the initial intuition) is also valuable because 
the presence of a simple matrix or model will provide not 
only the means to communicate it but also remove difficulties 
and obscurities and extend the connections between concepts 
(on the one side} and natural familiar events and distinctions 
(.on the other). The use of models as analogies is one basic 
factor for the test of understanding since it is the medium 
50Ibid., VII. 537. 
l 
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to translate insights into co~~on terms and thereby discover 
and even deepen the intuition. 
This seems to suggest a natural order of structural 
similarity between analogies and reality. 
Consider the previous analys-is of the psychology of 
understanding in its relation to purification.52 It {the 
analysis) can be diagrammed to illustrate this process and. 
provide a matrix to .note the movements in the dialectic: 
l. Collecting There are Arts of dividing home crafts, 
or arts of dividing, i.e., carding, 
spinning. 
2. Und.erlying idea: implies division, separating the better 
from the worse, hence the art of dis-
crimination, and purification. 
Objects 
inanimate animate 
fulling furbishing man other animals 
body soul/intellect 
disease 
Analogy of doctory of body 
to "doctor" of soul, henc.e: 
deformity vice ignorance 
medicine will cure disease as 
gymnastics wilr-GOrrect deform-
ity or 
1-ledicine • . Gymnastic as Disease • • Deformity 
Doctor of the soul, the 
purifier of- the soul, hence: arguing from analogy with 
step 3 he likens disease to 
52Jowett, 2£~ cit., "Sophist," 228a-230e. 
Chastisement . . 
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vice "discord and disease 
are same" and deformity is 
a "want of measure as 
ignorance" hence: 
Education as Vice . • Ignorance 
Yet, says Socrates, education seems to be a subject to further 
divide and so, as we found previously, the arts of admoni-shine; 
and dialectic must have their place. Thus, starting with a 
simple idea of the arts of division, the dialectician found 
in a collection of examples, a single concept or idea from 
which he legitimately proceeded to show the natural character 
of--his di vi.s ions or distinctions • Then he arrived at a point 
from which it was necessary to invoke a series of analogies 
to justify any further d-istinctions in order to clear the 
ground for a more basic or general intuition to be recognized; 
i.e., as the body suffers from disease and deformity, so, too, 
the soul or intellect suffers from vice and ignorance. This 
return to natural order, familiar objects and events and home-
crafts is typical of the Platonic style of writing. By this 
device of purposeful analogy he sought to communicate and 
demonstrate the interrelatedness of things and events and 
reveal the fundamental unity· underlying- their various struc-
tures. The idea thus examined is concerned in a natural 
unity throughout many different divisions, or concepts, and 
precise enough to be capable of supporting differences and 
distinctions. This is the art of discrimination. The 
I 
I. 
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necessity of passing from the one idea to the particular 
number (as specific case or cases) is decisive in the dialec-
tic for without this they would be dogmatic assertions. 
Showing the grounds for belief, exhibiting the particular num-
ber of examples and attempting to exhaust them without ignor-
ing the more obvious particulars, this is the role of reason. 
What it accomplishes is to demonstrate the evidence for and 
also to g~ve support to the contention that it is meant to be 
inclusive. And attempting- to -be inc-lusive is to be vulnerable 
and open to criticism because it is an invitation for the pro-
tagonist to determine if" there -are any factors that have been 
ignored or treated lightly.. Plato t -hus spells out his use of 
dialectic and demonstrates by both examples and a concise sum-
mary exactly what he means by the dialectical method. In the 
Sophist and the Philebus he provides a very condensed state-
ment of his di-alectic: 
Then, surely, he who can divide rightly is able to see 
clearly one form pervading a scattered multitude, and many 
different forms contained under one higher form; and 
again, one form knit tog-ether into a_ sin~le. whole pe:vad-
ing many such wholes, and many forms, ex1st1ng only 1n 
separation and ·isolation. This is the knowledge of. 
classes which determines where they can have commun1on 
with one another and where not.53 
Again, in the Philebus: 
53Ib-id., "Sophist," 253e; cf. Jowett's "Parmenides," n 
19lc, 13 6b, "Phaedo," 75-79, !Ole, "Statesman," 2B6e, "Phaedres 
265e, 266a, 277. 
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A gift of heaven, which, as I conceive, the gods 
tossed among men by the hands of a new Prometheus, and 
there with a blaze of light; and the ancients, who were 
our betters and nearer to the gods than we are, handed 
down the tradition, that whatever things are said to be 
composed of one and many, and have the finite or infin-
ite implanted in them; seeing then that such is the order 
of the world, we ought in every enquiry to begin laying 
do·wn one idea of that which is the subject of inquiry; 
this unity we shall find in everything. Having found it, 
we may next proceed to look for two, or, if not, then for 
thre-e or some number., subdividing each of these units, 
until at last the unity with which we began is seen not 
only to be one and many and infinite, but also a definite 
number; the infinite must not be suffered to approach the 
many until the entire number of the species intermediate 
between unity and infinity have been discovered--then, 
and not until then, we may rest from division, and with-
out further troubling ourselves about the endless indi-
viduals may allow them to drop into infinity. This, as 
I was saying, is the way of considering and learning and 
teaching one another, which the gods hav-e handed down to 
us. But the wise men of our time are either too quick or 
slow in. conceiving pl,.urality in unity. Having no method, 
they make their one and many anyhow, and from unity pass· 
at once to infinity; the intermediate steps never occur 
to them. And this, I repeat, is- what makes the differeuc
4
e 
between the mere art of disputation and true dialectic.) 
This adds to the concept of dialectic, but it might be argued 
that the above process has only a minimum function. The issue 
is still,what has this argumentative procedure to do with the 
Ultimate Good that Plato considers to be the highest object of 
knowledgei Or, stated another way, what has dialectic to do 
with the Platonic quest for wisdom? Stated simply, the 
objection could be raised that dialectic has nothing to do 
with wisdom, and the discourses of dialectic can only report 
54Jowett, 2£· cit., "Philebus," 16c. 
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"views" and not disclose the object. However, dialectic 
includes more than the verbal. In the Symposium, Plato out-
lines a method of contemplation which joins contemplation to 
dialectic. Contemplation, in Plato, is the inner dialectic 
of the soul or intellect and, conversely, dialectic is ·the 
outward movement in speech of the inner movement of contem-
plation. In each system, the stress is on "seeing." In 
dialectic, it is the rational intuition tied to concepts.; 
while in contemplation, it is intuition of "realities, since 
he {the contemplatoi7 touches realities.n55 The end is the 
vision of the Good, and the trainine ground is both dialectic 
and contemplation.56 Dialectic promotes the recovery of 
insight and intuition by the removal of ignorance and ego-
identification. On the other hand, contemplation has the 
final task of seeing dir€ctly the Good. In the Symposium, 
the art of contemplation can be seen to have the following 
structure: 5·7 
55w. H. D. Rouse (trans.), The Great Dialogues- of 
-Plato (New Y-ork: The New American Library, 1956), n-symposium," 
2lld. 
56c-ornford, .Q.E• cit., VII. 53 2; cf. pp. J 5-3 7 of thesis • 
57Rouse, .Q..E.-• cit., 209c-213d. 
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PRACTICE 
Particular: 
Physical: 
"Love one body" 
?•lany-: "Notice that beauty of one body 
is akin to the beauty of another 
-body·" 
Effect: relax the intense passion for one body. 
Then, he "must believe beauty in souls to be more 
precious than in the body." 
Ideational: Particular: "contemplate the beauty in laws_, 
institutions, customs, and "in 
families state" 
Many: 
Whole: 
I.ntuition: 
One: 
Recapitulation: 
"to see that all beauty is oi 
one and the same kind" 
KNOWLEDGE 
"directing his gaze from nm~T on 
towards beauty as a whole" 
Again this Beauty now will be 
"by itself with itself always 
in simplicity." 
"For let me tell you, the right way to 
approach the things of love, or to be 
led there by another is this: beginning 
from these beautiful things to mount 
for that b-eauty 1 s sake ever upwards, 
as by a flight of steps, from one to 
two, and from two to all beautiful pur-
suits and practices, and from practices 
to beautiful learnings, so that from 
learnings he may come at la-st to that 
perfect learning ~~ich is the learning 
solely of that beauty itself and may 
know at last that which is the perfec-
tion of beauty. Therein life and there 
alone, my dear s·ocrates, is life worth 
living for man, while he contemplates 
beauty itself •" 58 
5Bibid., 2llc. 
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This last stage is neither the physical beauty, ideational, 
nor intuitional (in the sense of relational), for he says, 
Do you not reflect that there only it will be possible 
for him, when he sees the beautiful v1ith the mind, which 
alone can see it, to give to birth not to likenesses of 
virtue, since he touches no likeness, but to realities, 
since he touches realities; and when he has given birth 
to real virtue and brought it up will it not be granted 
him to be the friend of God, and immortal if any man 
ever is?59 
In the Symposium, the movement of the art of contem-
plation f.oll ows. the struct·ure of dialectic:: 
STRUCTURE THEAETETUS 
object purification 
collecting similar home crafts 
objects 
an underlying idea separating better 
from worse 
finding examples in body-disease and 
natural ·models def·ormity 
SYMPOSIUM 
one beautiful body 
many beautiful bodies 
beauty itself 
laws., institutions, 
customs, families, etc. 
analogical "leap" 
to clear idea 
nas" the soul has "see" all beauty 
ignorance and v.ice as one 
examoles as inclu- intemperance, stu-
si ve as possible pidi ty, etc. 
final statement education, two kinds 
hence the one over 
the other, or, dia-
lectic and not the 
admonishing disci-
plines. 
59Ibid., 2lld-e. 
directing "gaze" 
from the one to 
beauty as a. whole 
beauty not, "like-
nesses but to reali-
ities,n "By itself 
with itself in sim-
plicity." 
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Therefore, the movement of the dialectic can either 
foll01i'J the v-erbal or the contemplat.ive. The training of the 
verbal is a technique to train the mind in the ability to 
handle the idea of unity and this is translated into the art 
of c-ontemplation. This is the cro\'ming art and the end of 
dialec-tic. Further, the object is neither an idea of beauty 
nor Beauty itself; it is the Good. 
"Is not the Good also the Beautiful?" 
"Yes • "(:1.) 
The pursuit of the Good can be followed in many dialogues, 
but in the Symposium it takes the form, or _natural model, of 
Beauty, while in the Phaedo it outlines another technique of 
contemplation and purification through the mysteries; whereas 
in the Republic it has the form of the quest of Justice. 
Summary of Types in Dialectic 
Plato introduced ideas that were ne\"J and strange to 
the Greeks as well as his innovating dialectic.61 Certainly 
there were dialecticians prior to Plato, but they neither 
used his structure nor linked it with th-e Good. There is a 
large gap between the Greeks' love of conversation with its 
6oibid., 2<alc. 
6lcr-. EnTin F?..hode, Psyche (New York: Human~ties Press, 
1954), Chap. XIII; and William Ralph Inge, The Phllosophy of 
Plotinus (London: Longrnans _, Green & Goa, l9ffi, I, 71-74. 
I 
r 
I 
! 
I 
I 
' 
26 
free play of speculation, and the dialectic of Plato. Again., 
the dialogue .form was not new. Ac-tually,. in the dialogues of 
Zen.ophone, Socrates is portrayed as a cracker-barrel, or 
homespun, philosoph-er concerned almost exclusively with 
domestic problems. 
As for the dialogues of Plato thems·elves, it is ouite 
apparent that the participants function differently according 
to their role;. hence, there are four modes, or typical 
reactions. 
1. The lecturers who may or may not be cognizant of the role 
of dialectic but ~no only state their ·thesis by long 
monologues. 
2. The unskilled in dialectic. 
3. The companions to Socrates who are familiar with the 
formal aspect of dialectic but are unable to present 
or attack an existing thesis. 
4. The skilled uialecticians. 
The men can be considered -as represented by: 
~ • T :ilna eus 
2. Cephal as 
3. Glaucon 
4. Pannenides 
Dialectic-, then, functions according to the ability and type 
of participator in the dialogues. The second class, the 
unskilled in dialectic., quickly leave after the discussion 
takes a :s -erious- tur_n; thus, Cephalos leaves. 62 Again, his 
62cornford, ££• cit., I. 331. 
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type m-ay be the dogmatist who only waits :for an opening in a 
discussion and can hardly contain himself until his opinion 
is presented. If he does enter into the dialectic, it is 
quite clear that he thinks the ouestioning· activity is- super-
:fluous. He comes quickly to his point, often using poor 
examples and poor analogies per se. To engage in dialectic 
after this truth is "given" is redundant since- one should be 
spell-bound by the delivery and readily acquiesce in the 
"truth.n63 Any insistence on remaining to examine or- question 
is tantamount to doubting the validity of his thesis. The 
unskilled dialectician is usually insulted by any subjection 
to dialectic and, like his counterpart, Cephalos, would rather 
leave.64 Dialectic can only demolish his thesis by question-
ing and perhaps, as in the case of Thrasymachus, bring this 
type to humility by the destruction of his dogmatism--but 
only if he consents to stay after his presentation. 
The fourth figure, Parmenides, is skilled in dialectic 
and hence is on equal footing with Socrate-s, the dialectician. 
Therefore -his role .is to examine not just t -he first category, 
but his peers· and equals. In the example of The Parmenides, 
Socrates must be capable of seeing his o~m concept reduced to 
absurdities. But this is not the better part of dialectic, 
63rbid., I. 344: Speech of Thrasymachus. 
-
64Ibid., I. 331; cf. r. 336b-d; I. 343-344e. 
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for Parmenides must push on to the art of contemplation, the 
end of dialectic. 
Glaucon~ the third type, is very common in the dia-
logues and affords ample material for tracing the intellectual 
climate nec·essary for dialectic to flourish. Primarily, he 
takes the role of the "sounding board,n or of the "mirror" 
for the ideas of the examiner. In order to funct·ion in this 
capacity, he is usually a youth., or a companion of Socrates 
who has become aware of this proc·edure. He does not suspend 
his critical faculties, but only assents if he sees the 
rationale for same thesis resting upon a sound or riEorous 
analysis, a valid distinction or a natural analogy. It is 
indifferent to him whether he really agrees with the thesis 
or not. What does matter, however, is ·whether he can pursue 
the discuss-ion and assent to the logic of the dialogue.65 
Dialectic in this case is not used to convince another 
disputer but to demonstrate that the thesis is sound, given 
these premises-. It is interesting that the role of "Glaucon" 
is often misunders·tood by read·ers o.f Plato unfamiliar with 
his dialectic. They often assert that some arguments need 
not have taken this direction but might just as well have had 
another course of tra.vel. This is a misunderstanding of the 
use of reason within Plato an.d betrays a lack of confidence 
65Jowett, ££• cit., "Phaedo," 107bo 
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in the Socratic method. With this type or class only t\'to 
clear alternatives are available. Either it elaborates or 
extends an .idea ·to provide the general -content of the thesis 
in quest ion ( this is what I·:od erns might call the workinp; out 
of definitions), or it uses a participator as a Judge to see 
that the idea has a logical coherence with the thesis in 
general. It is usually the case that "Glaucon" cannot make 
the final judgement as to the truth of the thesis in g.eneral, 
but only in the particular ordering of propositions. His 
tongue is often convin~ed by the display of dialectic,66 but 
his understanding cannot assimilate what his type of reasoning 
is blind to. 
The first category is that of Timaeus. He is not 
pregnant with wisdom or knowledge but has a "likely story" to 
weave. Theories accounting for natural phenomena scientifi-
cally are not open to dialectic and, hence, are not subject 
to the dialectic. The cosmology of Timaeus, often attributed 
to Socrates in spite of his categorizing it as only a "likely 
story," is based more upon an aesthetic judgement than upon 
reason. It is not a set of metaphysical stat-ements; it does 
not pr€scribe to or for reality, and may even be considered a 
convenient fiction to handle facts--the- laws of scienc-e under-
stood as only the shorthand expression of a complex of past 
. 66rbid., "Theaetetus," l54e. 
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observations. Making no claim to anything but a "likely 
story," it is in the realm of opinion. 
In the Symposium, there is a suggestion of still 
another class of dialectic skill--a fifth. In the descrip-
tion of the stages of contemplation, it seems that he men-
tions the dialectical process by only a tangental reference 
when he says, "• ~ • then, to beget beautiful speech; then 
he should take notice that the beauty in one body is akin to 
the beauty in another body.n67 He advances to another stage 
where Plato again refers to the same idea,_ but the speech 
becomes more and more lik-e philosophy when: 
Next he must believe beauty in souls to be more 
precious than beauty in the body; so that if anyone is 
decent in soul, even if it has little bloom, it should 
be enough for him to love and care for, and to beget arrg8 
seek such talks as will make young people better; ••• 
and as the process approaches that stage where the student 
"will behold a _Beauty marvelous in its Nature," he says,69 
He should turn to the great ocean of beauty. and 
in contemplation of it give birth to many beautiful 
and magnificent speeches and thoughts in the abundance 
of philosophy .. 70 
It is interesting that he reverts- to his favorite metaphor, 
"beget," and if this can be asserted it would seem that one 
sign of soul-pregnancy is the love of beauty. In the 
67Rouse , 68rbid., 210a. 
69Ibid., 
-
210a-b. 
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Symposium, as different from th-e Republic_, contemplati_on does 
not follow dialectic; rather, dialectic follows contemplation. 
In this class of "the lover of Beauty," the quest of philoso-
phy -has as its prerequisite tbe art of contemplation. 
Plato has not written a dialogue presenting this fifth 
class. In ·the Symposium there are many beautifully composed 
speeches, but little or no dialectic is in evidence except 
for the supposed conversation between Socrates and Diotima 
and this can hardly be termed a dialectic. The lack of any 
dialogue demonstratine this higher dialectic is a weakness 
within his work. It is as if his works wer-e written for the 
public at large and lacked this important element. There are 
numerous references to the existence of a dialoeue ~The 
Philosopher,n71 but this apparently was never completed. In 
the Statesman he refers to three dialogues: The Sophist, 
Statesman, and The Philosopher. The first two were completed 
but The Philosopher is not now extant nor is it referred to 
by other contemporary authors of Plato. 
The dial-ectic clearly functions differ-ently in each 
dialogue: serious and playful, ironic and comic, analytical 
and synthetical. Hence, we could expect The Philosopher to 
differ again. \'w'ithout this element it is diffi.cult to ade-
quately judge Platonic diale-ctic. The dialogues therefore 
71Jowett, .2.E• cit., "Statesman," 257a. 
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suggest this schema: 
1. Timaeus - "likely stories," products of art and science. 
2. Cephalos - afraid to ent-er into dialectic, either inner 
or outer~ and remains ignorant • 
.3. Glaucon - capable of following another-'s thought but 
unable- to pursue or comprehend the conclusion. 
4. Parmenides - highly d-eveloped intellect,_ but there 
remains a question whether he can grasp the 
Good. 
5. "Lover of Beauty" - Learning dialectic through beauty, 
he knows the Good. 
In the Republic, the philosopher's training and the 
stages of his development are outlined, but it is unfortunate 
that there is no verbal or positive dialectic within the dia-
logue that sustains the hieh level of its other aspects. 
The dialectic is performed within on-ly two classes, the 
second and the third, and hence there is no evidence of a 
dialectic functioning in the last stage, as in the Parmenides. 
I·1ost of the dialogue is the systematic analysis of the train-
ing necessary to bring a sick or corrupt soul to health, from 
ignorance to wisdom; yet, the dialect-ical encounter that 
parallels this development is only with Glaucon. This lack 
of any clear evidenc-e of dialectic functioning at the highest 
capacity is a definite shortcoming. In the Republic, Plato 
includes a course of contemplation of many years within the 
general discipline of the dialectic. It is clear that to 
Plato dialectic includes (a) contemplation, (b) a positive 
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dialectic in the Tteaetetus 'V':i th tb e "midv.' ife." 11 matcr4'T:ak cr" 
and "exarJ.iner,n and (c) a neEative dialectic th<1t is critical 
throu.rrhout and uses the ma.ior form of the rerluctio ad 
absurdum. Indeed, vdthin the dialor:ues, di2lectic is never 
Sllllli";1arized "lith all of its component parts, ~nd Plato even 
mentions the difficulty of defininr; dialectic7.2 r::o it is no 
"\·mnder the:r·e is sOI:'le difficulty concerninp- tl1is rroblC?m . 
Thus , the tra.inint· in tr:e Renublic rr:ay have different stresses 
than the Symposium, but both cdalor':ue~ need more definitive 
exa'TIDles of the dialectical skill. Hence they shall both be 
treated as belonp;inp. to tbe last class, the fifth . But sir,ce 
there is not .sufficient evidence to ,iudge tf,cir differences, 
or whether their differences are sir;nificant, no new clas s 
will he invoked. 
The Dialectic of the Ren~blic 
In the Republic, one of the central themes of ]"hila-
sorbic merit is the role of reason as the intu:tive fc.culty 
for the insi f:.h t ir:to the essential nature of the Good. PJ ato 
doeE not argue for a special or new intuitive faculty . He 
holds tha t man already bns all the faculties . 73 The only 
is~ue, th·erefore, is the proper E? ..mployment o :' reason .for the 
72cornford, ..2.E• cit., VII. 533; cf. :·cause , on . cit ., 
2l0a. 
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vision of the Good. He {Plato) speaks of the necessity of a 
conversion--a turn-about--in order to insure that vision, and 
states that the soul, which already has the power of sight, 7-4 
could be turned so as to "bear to contemplate reality and 
that supreme splendor which we have called the Good;n75 then 
its journey would be complete. The Platonic concept of con-
version has little to do with a reliF,ious conversion, for: 
Any study, as we have said, will have that tendency, 
if it forces the soul to turn towards the ree;ion of that 
beatific reality, which it must by all means behold. So 
geometry will be suitable or not, according as ~t makes 
us contemplate reality or the world of change.7b 
The study of unityJ be it in geometry or dialectic, 
sets in motion the Platonic conversion. The multitude of 
everyday interests s€em to dissipate the power of seeinf the 
Good, while the study of unity can "rekindle the sacred fire." 
True, it is quite hard to realize that every soul 
possesses an organ better worth saving than a thousand 
eyes, because it is our only means of seeing the truth; 
and that when its lieht is dimmed or extinguished by 
other interests, these studies \·dll purify the hearth 
and rekindle the sacred fire.77 
It is for this reason that Plato stresses the study of 
unity, since it converts the soul and"leads to the contempla-
tion of reality.n7B The course of studies in the Republic is 
based on that one simple measure--the effect it has on reason--
74Ibid. 75rbid. 
77Ibid., VII a -528_. 
76Ibid., VII. 527. 
7Bibid., VII. 527. 
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since it can direct it either to the changing- world or 
"towards the contemplation of the highest of all realities.tt79 
It is through the study of dialectic that one discerns 
the difference between a senblance of the Good and the Good 
itself. Plato says, 
If he cannot do this, he will know neithe-r Goodness 
itself nor any good thing; if he does lay hold upon some 
semblance of good, it will only be a matter of belief, 
not of knovrledge, and he v.,rill drea.'Tl away his life here in 
a sleep 1·.rhich has no awakening on this side of that world 
of death 'll.rhere he will sleep at last forever. BO 
The Platonic Good is the ultimate--it is the basis, or 
ground , of the objects of knowledge., as well as their source 
and power, as in the case of Beauty, Justice, Virtue, and 
Truth. The Good is said to be beyond both being and becoming, 
and Plato expresses this very movingly when he 'iritest 
This, then, which gives to the objects of kno-vlledee 
their truth and to him who knows them his power of 
knowing, is the form or essential nature of Goodness. 
It is the cause of knowledge and truth; and so, while 
you may think of it as an. object of knowledge, you will 
do \"lell to regard it as something beyond truth and knowl-
ed~e and, precious as these both are, of still higher wo~th. • • • The Good must hold a yet higher place of 
honor. 
• • • and so ,..,rith the objects of knowledge; these 
derive from the Good not only their power of being 
kno\Am but t "heir very being and reality; and Goodness is 
not the same thing as being, but ev~n beyond being, 
surpassing it in di~nity and power.8l 
79Ibid.y VII. 533, cf. 527. 
81Ibid., VI. 508-509. 
80Ibid_., VII. 5J4. 
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The ability to pursue this end, as well as the. course that 
has led to it, Plato says, is only possible to tte dialec-
tician. "And also that it can be reveal-ed only to one 'rJi-10 is 
trained in the studies we have discussed, and to him only by 
the power of dialectic."$2 
Reason, as rational d-iscourse, is stripped of all 
reference to the senses, reaching out alone by pure intelli-
gence to the nature of the Good itself. Havine reached that 
lofty realm, it continues until it has grasped "by pure 
intelligence the very nature of Goodness itself. This jour-
ney is what we call dialectic.n83 All of the disciplines of 
the student are for the purpose of awakening the noblest 
faculty of the soul--reason--to the contemplation of the 
ultimate Good. It is important to note that it is not 
through thought that this profound insi-ght is achi-eved. The 
elaborate models of both the divided line and allegory of the 
cave demonstrate the different levels of operation of the 
faculties of reason. Thought functions on the second level, 
not the highest, for thought is contrasted with knowledge and 
kno\'Il-edge belonr,s to the highest (the first), 84 which is 
related to intuition or -nous. Dialectic trains the eye of 
the soul--intuition--for that ultimate vision of the Good, 
82rbid. VII. 533. _ _ , 83Ibid., VII. 532. 
B4rbid., VL. 5lld. 
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and what reason refines by discrimination, contemplation 
secures; yet both are under dialect·ic. 
II. PLOTINUS 
37 
The spirit of Hellenic philosophy that took its root 
in the .Socratic and Platonic fonn reasserted itself in the 
temporary abode of Plotinus' soul before it was finally 
eclipsed from the Mediterranean area. Regretfully, after 
Plotinus, it soon perished and it has not found another 
fertile soul in the history of all European thought. The 
great difficulty of European thought lies here (and in this 
it is so vastly different from Asian thought), that some-
thing as noble as Platonic thought germinated but could not 
be kept alive through the ages; no tradition of Platonic or 
nee-Platonic thought was transmitted to future ages. It died. 
The European countries are fond of speaking of freedom, but 
the measure of freedom is reflected in the continuity of rich 
traditions and in this sense it can be seen to have not been 
free. It lost what the non-Christian nations retained--t-he 
additional insights of men returning to the source of lofty 
thoughts and ideals and purifying those very thoughts until 
the tradition became a fusion of many individuals. It there-
fore lost a real heritage for present and future ages. 
With Plotinus, we find the last return to that partic-
ular vision known as Platonic thought. Last though he was, 
JS 
he left a mark that has not yet been felt in European thou~ht. 
The first European translation of his work was Ficine's of the 
sixteenth century, which was ignored by nearly all scholars~ 
perhaps because a large part was hardly readable as well as 
through lack of interest. When NacKenna began his translation 
there were ·no critical texts to guide him; previous transla-
tions were incomplete, while Muller's was obscure in meanine; 
and nearly illegible. The first trustworthy Greek text _has 
only recently been made available, being the joint effort of 
Henry and Schwyzer. 1-IJacKenna, who was the first scholar to 
complete an English translati~:m of Plotinus based on this 
accurate Greek text, finished his last volum-e in 1930. In 
E. R. Dodd's foreword to MacKenna's translation, he says, 
The leading German authority on Plotinus was pro-bably 
notfar out in his estimate when he observed in 1930 that 
there are today perhaps only twent_y or thirty men alive 
who can read this author after a fashion._l:55 
The assumption of a continuity of tradition from the Gre-eks 
to the present time is just a myth; and this myth \'!ill be 
·taken up at a later point in this paper. 
The work of Plotinus is vast and profound, but this 
paper can only deal with but one aspect--dialectic. 
-Plotinus begins his section on dialectic with the 
B5stephen MacKenna (trans.} _Plotinus: The Enneads 
' } · · The refer-(London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1927-30 , Po X11 • th r· t 
-ence here i _s to Richard Harder,- in the preface to e 1 rs 
-volume of his German translation. 
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assertion that the method and discipline necessary for the 
vision of the Good is dialectic. There are two stages in the 
dialectic: "as they· are making upwards," and those that "have 
already gained that upper sphere.n86 The latter stage must 
complete the proces-s and "advance \'Tithin that realm, n vrhi le 
the first must be led through a conversion from the lower 
life. Of this first cate~ory are the musician and "natural 
lover"; the technique outlined for this ascent is an exact 
statement of the c-ontemplation of Plato's Symposium, which 
has been mentioned_ previously. 87 The seco.nd stage belongs 
to the metaphysician and he, after perfecting virtue, is 
trained in mathematics and "put through a course in dialectics 
and made an adept in the science."gg 
The three parts of the dialectic are set forth by 
Plotinus when he answers the question, "What, in sum, is it?" 
He says it is a method and discipline that has the power to 
pronounce the truth upon the nature and relation of things, 
••• what each is, how it differs from others, what. 
co~~on quality all have, to what Kind each bel?ngs a~d ~n 
what rank each stands in its Kind and whether ~ts Be~ng 
is Real-Being, and how many Beings there ar~~ and how many 
non-Beings to be distinguished from Beings. 
T.he second -state of the dialectic occurs when it takes leave 
BBMacKenna, 
89rbid., r. 
87Rouse, QE• cit., 2l0a-d. 
OP • cit., 
--
1.3.3. 
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of the previous activity that is characterized as "the realm 
of sense," and can now proceed into dialectic's own special 
act·: 
It employs the Platonic division to the discernment of 
the .Id-eal-Forms, of the Authentic--Existence and of the 
First:-Kinds (or Categories of Being): it establis·hes,. in 
the l1ght of Intellection, the affiliations of all that 
issues from ·these Firsts, until it has traversed the 
entire Intellectual Rea.lm: then, by means of analysis 
it takes the opposite path and returns once more to the 
First Principle.90 
'Vhen the student has been instructed and "satisfied as to the 
b-eing of that realm" he is no longer concerned with the multi-
plicity and .has "arrived at Unity, and it contemplates." 
From this stage, Plotinus adds: 
It Ldialecti£7 leaves to another science all that coil 
of premises and conclusions called the art of rea.soning, 
much as it leaves the art of writing: some of the matter 
of logic, no doubt, it considers necessary--to clear the 
ground--but it makes itself the judge, here as in every-
thing else; where it sees use, it uses; anythi·ng it finds 
superfluous, it leaves to whatever department of learning 
or practice may turn that matter to account.91 
Dialectic has often been considered as an arbitrary 
use of reason, critical with no standards and, often, inhuman 
in its rapier-like hunt for contradictions. This has nothing 
to do with dialectic, however, for in the Platonic dialectic, 
the standards are furnished, Plotinus states, by Intellectual-
Principle and 
• • • what else is necessary Dialectic puts together 
90rbid. 
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for itself, combining and dividing, until it has reached 
perfect intellection. "For," we read, nit is the purest 
perfection of Intellection a!ld Contemplati ve-\'lisdom. n92. 
Plotinus considers dialectic to be the "precious part 
of philosophy" and it is neither the mere tool of the meta-
physician nor does it "consist of bare theories or rules." 
It r -ecognizes falsity and ignorance by virtue of its own 
truth; it does not know sophism or untruth except as some-
thing foreign to it as "it perceives a clash with its own 
canon of truth.n93 The knowledge of other schools of thought 
becomes unimportant because all that is required here is the 
vision of truth whereby the converse is reco?,nized by its 
lack. On the other hand, what it really claims knowledee of, 
• • • above all Lf~ the operation of the Soul, and by 
virtue of this knowing, it knows, too, what is affirmed 
and what is denied, whether the denial is of what was 
asserted or of something else, and whether ·propositions 
agree or differ; all that is submitted to it, it attacks 
with the directness of sense perception and it leaves 
petty precisions of process to what other science may 
care for such exercises.94 
The alliance between philosophy and dialectic is very 
close, as can be s·een in its relation to morality. Philosophy, 
for Plotinus, uses dialectic, for by it philosophy comes to 
contemplation,. "though it LCfialecti£7' originates· of itself 
the moral state or rather the discipline from which the moral 
92Ibid., I. 3. 5. Reference here is to Plato's 
"Phaedrus ~4Sd •. 
93ill£., I. 3. 5. 94Ibid_., I. 3. 5· 
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state develops.n95- Virtue turns reason upon particular 
experience as well as acts, but the virtue peculiarly induced 
by the dialectic is, for Plotinus, " a certain super-reasoning 
much closer to the Universal.n96 The reasoning in dialectic 
is centered upon morality by its concern with the moment, in 
its focus upon the propitious occasion for acts, and in its 
desire to fulfill the highest ideal in the moment.. Plotinus 
c ont.inues :-
••• for it {the reasoning in dialecti£7 deals with 
LSuch abstract ideas ai] correspondence and _s -equence, the 
choice of time for action and inaction, the adoption of 
this course, the rejection of that other:. \'lisdom and 
Dialect~c -have the task of presenting all things as 
Universals and ~tripped of matter for treatment by the 
Understand~ng. 9·1 
Yet the question could still be asked Plotinus, whether a 
Master of dialectic could achieve this proficiency without 
the lower virtues? He answers,_ 
It would not happen: the lowe-r will spring either 
before or toyether with the higher. And it is likely 
that everyon~ normally possesses the natural virt~es 
from which, when Wisdom steps in, the perfected_ v1rtue 
develops. After the- natural virtues, then, Wisdom, and 
so the perfecting of the moral nature. Once the ~atural 
virtues exist,_ both orders, the natural and the h1gher 
ripen side by side to their final excellence: or as the 
one advance~ it carries forward the other tm'lards 
perfection.'i8 
He ends hi.s third tractate with the very acute, and one could 
almost say, poignant observation of whether it is natural 
95rbid., r. 3. 6. 
97rbid • 
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virtue or the virtue through \'oTisdom: 
••• to both orders of virtue the essential matter 
is from what principles we derive th~~.99 
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The absence of any actual example of Plotinus' dialec-
tic is a serious lack, though on t he other side he does p.:ive 
a detailed analysis of contemplation. Hm'lever, since there 
are many features in common with Plato, it will not be 
examined in any detail. The lack of examples of the actual 
dialectical encounter precludes any definitive statement as 
to the question of the role of the mid\v.ife, or to catharsis 
and the movement of the dialectic. The reference he does 
give in his section on the dialectic sugg ests nunerous infer-
ences to the Platonic dialectic, but since there are no 
explicit references, any such eclectic speculat i on must be 
curtailed. The issue he does insist upon is the distinction 
between the disputer and the dialectician, the close tie of 
dialectic and contemplation,. and the goal of dialectic bei ng 
the ultimate good. 
III. RECAPITULATION AND EXTENSION 
The style of the dialogue used by Plato and .his ch0ice 
of this literary form as the vehicle to demonstrate the dia-
lectic, is no chance choice. If the end of dialectic were 
99Ibid. 
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merely to demonstrate the inconsistencies and contradictions 
in an opponent •s thesis, then the form of the dialogue '\'lould 
have been ill-chosen since a concise and not an expos-itory 
style would be indicated. It would have th.e brevity and eco-
nomical model_ of the la .... ;y·er' s :brief. Digression and tangents 
would be censored and no point_, however seeminely trivial, 
would be overlooked as a possible source of contradictions. 
The unfoldment o_f a personality behi.nd the argument would 
also be superfluous and redundant to the merely logical pur-
suit of the disputer. The individual would .necessarily be 
anonymous and the thesis would gain importance far beyond the 
originator or expositor. The desired result would be to 
quickly achieve the conclusion. Devices such as analogies, 
appeals to myth and examples ·would be sifted away as super-
fluous, prior to any critical examination. The object would 
be consistency and logical presentability; consequences from 
the conclusions would be secondary to the exhibition of eco-
nomical analysis and rapid reductio ad absurdum techniques. 
Further, the disputer would prefer not to deal directly with 
an opponent, but rather deal with the thesis in isolation. 
Clearly, the object of the disputer is the arr;urnent, r.ot the 
individual's goals or the reasons for maintaining the argu-
ment. It is sufficient for the disputer to be capable o.f 
destroying ~n argument and anything else would be deemed an 
unnec-essary indulgence. The sole goal of the disputer is to 
L 
maintain his 0\1TI status, whether it is a formal identifica-
tion with a thesis or system, or a claim to disputation 
itself; his art is incapable of bringing· to birth the con-
cepts of another; incapable of rendering explicit the 
implicit assumptions of another, and incapable of directing 
the student's thought to philosophical ideals. This is not 
meant to minimize the achievements of the lo,r.ical disputer 
nor is the term disputation meant to be derogatory--merely 
accurate--and it is important for any understanding of 
Platonic dialectics. 
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The dialect-ician, differing from th·e disputer, is not 
satisfied with. mere verbal consistency, because his purpose 
is to give a rational account of his statements and to make 
others give an account of theirs. In the elaboration of views, 
inconsistencies and contradictions may become apparent and at 
that point dialectic enters. The systematic elaboration of 
such inaccuracies, placed alongside of each other, provides 
an opportunity for the asserter to see the contents of his 
reaso·n. It is often asserted by Plato that this analysis of 
the contents of the understanding will have a. good effect 
upon the participators,lOO but this is no easy task. On the 
surface, it would appear to be merely a discussion, as 
lOOJowett, .QE• cit., "Theaetetus, n· 16Sa, 169b; 
"Euthyd," 2 75 o 
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between friends, but, thouch it must be carried on in such an 
atmosphere, its discipline and directness challenges friend-
ship itself .. The Lacedaemonian rule, "strip or depart," is 
the spirit in which these discussions are carried out.lOl To 
remain is the acceptance of an invitation to become a participa-
tor and, as such, to risk injury of the ego and its defenses. 
The disputer is invariably a defender of a tradition 
or a system in 'lrihich he has some vested interest; hence the 
rule t .hat the dialectician and the disputer are often antag-
onists. The culture that can tolerate the dialect·ician is, 
unfortunately, rare, and even when it does, it is often for 
only a brief period of time. Once the thinker is let loose 
to speculate freely, he considers nothing sacred or profan-e 
and nothing a restraint to his inquiring mind. The State and 
its foundations are challenged; and frequently, rather than 
allow the discussion to continue, a bit of hemlock is offered. 
In. the Sophist and the Statesi!lan of ·Plato's dialop;ues, 
the dialectic .performs another valuable function... Socrates 
acknowledges thi~ other goal in his reference to hireself as a 
trGadfly" who attempts to a\'raken the slumbering beast that is 
Athens.102 In the delineation of the personality and motiva-
tions of both the Sophist and Statesman, the recognizable 
lOlibid., "Theaetetus,n l69b. 
102. Jowett, .2E.• cit., "Apology," JOe .. 
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features of the Tyrant and Dogmatist assert themselves. The 
Tyrant is always in need of a mask, as the Sophist needs his 
smile, in order to continue to manipulate either the society 
or the individual members. Hence the a"mreness of character 
and motivations enables one to recognize the difference 
between the Tyrant and the Statesman, the Sophist and the 
Philosopher. Yet the continued existence of both (the Tyrant 
and the Sophist) depends upon the ignorance of their respec-
tive subjects; once the awareness of their real natures is 
manifest, they change their roles to the Despot or Dogmatist, 
or they are forced to abdicate their illegitimate claim to 
authority. Therefore, t _he second function or role of di-alec-
tic is a social function. Hence dialectic has an effect upon 
society -beyond the individual student of Philosophy in its 
demand to reflect upon customs, laws~ institutions, and 
States. The object is to bring about a more r a tional order into 
society. Because of this, dialectic can seldom function except 
in a free society. 
The dialogues are marked by the presence of leisure,_ 
which is necessary for the discovery of what reason can know 
(and it matters little if fe<iT or many words are used) • This 
central notion, so difficult to modern ears, is that a con-
cept is not an entity easily defined, nor is it a matter of 
some rapid consultation with a dictionary or encyclopedia. 
Rath-er than this, it is a private thing with many clusters of 
I 
I 
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meaning connecting it with insights, notions., and, sometimesJ 
dimly felt beliefs. The object of leisure is to afford a 
free atmosphere to investigate and demonstrate the concept 
and to s-upply evidence in the form of reasons and analohies 
so that the concept arrived at through dialectic is not 
meant to be merely an arbitrary construction,, but the fruit 
of intense thought, careful observations and reflections 
upon life. The concept that c.an be readily defined is in 
all probability a learned response with all the flatness of 
someone else's truth. Someone else' s truth is- a 1 i e i.f not 
integrated within one's own understanding and seen to be 
defensible, not by some hypothetical person, but by the 
upholder of reason. Unless this is done, it is just another 
idea living in constant jeopardy of the first criticism. It 
is no more than a contradictory piece o_f potential difficulty. 
To act upon ideas that have not become one's own is to live 
another man's thoughts, another's ideals-, and a betrayal of 
oneself. That is, if one can go so far as to assume a 
betrayed. self when the self betrayed is another's thoughts 
misunderstood. Another's truth may in fact be the absolute 
truthJ but it is not transferable. They are transfonn-ed 
and recreated by the understanding into a ne\'1 thing· -A 
new thought understood is a vast achievement. Certainly 
Plato would be the first to admit that truth is beyond 
.... . \ 
............. 
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words,lOJ but it is because of this that he can say this and 
not in spite of it. The idea of truth being beyond reason 
does in no way mitigate the truth that it can also be grasped 
through reason. This is quite similar to the doctrine of nno-
mind" in Chinese Buddhism. It assumes that th.ere is a devel-
oped mind or, stated more ironically, it presupposes a mind 
to go through. 
The catharsis brought about by the dialectic is 
nothing else than ·emptying the mind of incompatible notions 
and raising the mind to see the more embracing unity under 
one concept. As noted in the Symposium, the beauty that is 
seen in the final vision is beyond relations, eternal and 
absolute. This same beauty, the beauty that "has hold not of 
an image, but of a reality,ttl04 is, nevertheless, previous to 
that vision seen in inSitutions, laws, sciences, and in the 
ordering of states and families, as ·well as that "which is 
called temperance and justice."l05 The vision is the culmin-
ation of having realized the concept of beauty permeating all 
spheres of life that finally vindicates the entire ideational 
construction by an insight into something that is beyond all 
the particulars, being its source and life. 
1031. A. Pos~ (tr~ns.), Thirteen Epistles of Plato 
(London: Oxford Un1vers1ty Press, 1925), VII b,-p. 97. 
104aouse, QE• cit., 209c. 105~~, 2llc. 
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Certainly one can "learn" this in the manner of cra":"t-
ming for an e-xam that W-ill be fore-_, ott en in ~, the followinr, morn-
ing. But ideas cannot be learn-ed by rote; if they are not 
transformed_ by the understanding, they will exist as misunde.r-
stood notions. The confusion of such a mind is tr.e sickness 
o·f the soul. The doctor prescribes one remedy to regain a 
clear mind--to empty it of all ideas that cannot live harmon-
iously with itself. This cannot be done in solitary exile, 
but only with the aid of other critical minds sensitive to 
the difficulties of the task and capable of gently correcting 
notions and guiding the thinking through all of its conse-
quences. The consequences of the thought, the implications 
and the extensions, are the raw materials out of which the 
n-otion becomes known. The rationale for the belief and the 
source_ of its birth must be brought to light carefully and 
then placed in a discussion with the care equallinE the task. 
By bringing the-se to birth, by makinp; them explicit in the 
answering of questions, one is for-ced to turn one's attention 
upon oneself, obliged to examine the nature of one's beliefs 
and the supposed evidence for their claims to legitimacy • 
This is rendering them objective and transforming them to the 
conscious and deliberative. The idea that can be defended 
without this process of extension is only a minor achievement 
and insignificant victory. To empty the mind in the attempt 
to render its content significant is a lengthy task demanding 
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leisure and tranquillity of surroundings. Thus dialectic is 
a task difficult to engage in and even more so to pursue to 
its end. Again, a midwife, a person who himself is not com-
mitted to any view, is as necessary as the very understanding 
presupposed before indulging in the activity. The ideas them-
selves are best if they are chosen from higher, more complex 
concepts (ideals, as they are called today), rich enough to 
justify the activity and sufficient in value to have meaning. 
They should be of the nature of one's basic commitments; 
one's fundamental premises of li2e, reflectine not merely 
ideas unconnected with the reasoner, but also those to which 
he feels an attachment; the things that politicians are fond 
of praising, but denying in practice--these are the materials, 
the ideas which start the dialectical process. The dialec-
tical stage-setting of value concepts, sufficient leisure, a 
midwife, and a student in labour, are transformed into a drama 
within the drama of ideas. The concept is developed, anal-
ogies chosen for amplification, excursions into tangents and 
digressions are tolerated all in the expectation. t ·hat reason 
may be capable of finally presenting its product. In this 
sta-ge, the questions are intended to develop the general con-
cept; contradictions and ·ambiguities, when discovered, are 
removed for the further purification of the idea. Once having 
achieved this stage, the critical aspect of the dialectic 
begins. 
. t• ttt This stage is what Plato c-alls tr.e exam1na 10n ° 
determine if the birth £Or t ·he idey is a true and noble 
birth.nl06 Th e asserter must now reply to criticisms and 
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counter arguments. If he can still hold to the idea, answer-
ing all objections satisfactorily, then he can claim the 
idea, and his understanding is- enriched. 
The dramatic aspect of the encounter is reflected in 
the participators' reaction to this process, for they becom·e 
the players in the dialectical drama. Some are eager to enter· 
into it and find they cannot sustain after the "first fall" 
and are quick to depart. Then, too, such as Ademantas and 
Polymarchus, stay only to hear themselves deliver an oration, 
seldom desiring to remain long enour,h to listen to the criti-
cal examination of ~heir theses. Or, from the other side, in 
the critical role {as with Simmias and Cebes), they carry 
their argument through to the end, all the while offering 
objections and rebuttals. Yet they are unable to accept the 
conclusion.l07 Their i .nability to further cr..allenge brings 
them to silence, but they still confess that they still can-
not accept or believe the conclusions. This is the case of a 
participator who can follow the logic of the dialogue and 
agree to its cogency and yet feel he must refuse the conclusion 
without being able to offer any additional contradictory 
106Jow.ett, £E• ~., "Theaetetus," 150c. 
107Ibid., "Phaedo,, 107b. 
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evidence or criticism. He has, as it were, reached the limit 
of his own understanding. This is not to suggest that there 
are levels of truth, only levels of understandine of the 
participators in the dialectical encounter. To pursue this 
further would require a very careful analysis of the person's 
beliefs to find just what is so repugnant that its disclosure 
or admission would mean the cancellation of another more fun-
damental belief. It would. be an attempt to locate t ·he notion 
which precludes the admission of the tested concept, and,. 
without the removal of the hidden notion, all else would prove 
fruitless since it is a bar to £urther understanding. The 
idea of removing a concept that has precluded further devel-
opment simultaneously as.s umes tr~e value of other concepts. 
The· idea reduced to an absurdity does have a curative effect 
and so, too, does the n-el..rly acquired idea. 
Part of the dialectic is an upward movement revealing 
the value of ideas and another segment is what might be 
called a downward movement--demonstrating the relative status 
of the id·ea. A ne\..r understanding of the concept of Justice 
may gather many diverse notions under one general concept, 
allowing the holder the freedom to see consecuences in rela-
tions that he might never have envisioned with his previous 
understanding. The larger the area, the less distinct the 
concept; the broader the horizon of the thour-;ht,. the less it 
can be distinct and differentiated; and when it is finally 
1 
L 
seen to necessitate the Good, so, too, the less it has a 
definite, precise referent. However, along t!ds route tr.e 
student must first arrive at def1"n1"t-e · concepts 1n order to 
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proceed further in the dialectic. This stage should not be. 
minimized because the foundation of the dialectic presupposes 
a developed mind b-efore it can profitably enrole in the nega-
tive quest$- The arrival of a new concept is the result of 
seeing a new arrangement between a set of facts or ideas • 
. 
Its arrival is often accompanied by a sudden feeling of 
elation. It is the exercise of the intuitive faculty. In a 
recent publication of the Harvard Cognition Project, it is 
stat·ed, 
The attainment of a concept has about it something of 
a ouantal character. It is as if the mystery of a con-
ceptual distinction were able to mask the preconceptual 
memory af the things now disti.nguished. r.~oreover, the 
transition experience bet"'i'teen "not having it'' seems to 
be without experiental contentw From the point of view 
of the imagery and sensory stuff the act of graspine a 
co.nceptual distinction is,. if not unanschaulich or impal-
pable, to use the language of the VJurzburg investigators, 
at least unverbalizable. It is:, if you will, an enig-
matic process and often a sudden proce·ss. The psy-
chologist's "aha experience" sinr.les out this suddenness 
as does the literary man's "shock of r-ecor;nition." Some-
thing happens quickly and one thinks one ha~ fo~nd.some­
thing.. Concept attainment see:-ns almost an 1ntrlnslcc;lly 
unanalyzable process from an experiential point of v1evr: 
ttNow I understand the distinction, before there was 
nothinp;.1. and in between was only a moment of illumina-
tion .. niv8 
lOBJerome S .• Bruner, Jacqueline J. Goodnow, and George 
A. Austin, A Study of Thinking (New York: John Wiley &. Sons, 
Inc.~ 1956), p. 50. 
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Quite naturally this must be correlated w1·t~ th · · h 
· · jj e 1ns 1~ t 
experienced when on the wrong end of a reduct· d b 
_ 10 £...__ a surdu:n 
argument, for at the moment the concept is found to be unnec-
essary, it comes as a sudden shock--a shock of embarraseed 
recognition. The t~ro parts o"f the dialectic--the midwifery 
and the examination--correspond to these ·t-vw processes. The 
student proceeds in the entire proces::, hopinr. in the end to 
have bettered as a result. 
Dialectic is a movement of the underst~ndin~ towards 
the Good. It is first tested and tempered objectively by the 
disciplined discussion. The twin methods, the concept att~in-
ment and the. reduction of concepts, are the initial stap:es of 
this dialectic. However, it soon outstrips this early sta~e 
in the search for unity, number, and infinity, and reaches 
out to the essential reality. There, after much persever-
ance, by the aid of pure intelligence the very nature of 
Goodness itself is grasped. Thi.s dialectic fuses into con-
templation. The object of the contemplation has been purified 
of any image or outward appearance and carefully examinect to 
justify the ownership. The object of conte~~lation, if one 
can legitimately term it as "object," is not another's con-
cept, for the essential feature here in the dialectic is that 
the student himself must d~~onstrate his possession by fi~ht-
ing through all criticism, opinions, and appearance. 
the idea must not be left outside but must be made one 
"Eence 
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identical thing with the Soul of the novice so that he . ·finds 
it really hi.s own. nl09 If he fails in this task, "he will 
kno\>1 neither Goodness itself nor any p;ood thing.nllO The 
object is actually beyond being and is considered as even 
beyond truth and knowledee. This object, the Good, is con-
templated and culminates in vvisdom. 
When it arrives at this stage of contemplation, it 
leaves the coil of premises, conclusions, and lor,ic, finding 
th-ese now superfluous. Plotinus considers dial-ectic to be 
the precious part of philosophy havinr.; nothinr; to do with 
theories and rules. These became superfluous because once 
having arrived at Unity the student contemplates. But con-
te~plation is not a separate activity from the dialectic, 
since it is the outward move~ent of the quest for Unity. The 
inner and the outer dialectic are different. Plotinus expres-
ses it well in his term "a certain super-reasoningnll1 marks 
the inner dialectic. The particular virtue induced by dia-
lectic is its affinity with the Universal. Its similarity 
has been stressed previously in its similar s-tructure, but 
its affinity is much closer in that the vehicle is the 
intuitive activity in both cases. 
10 ~'IacKenna., oo. cit._, III. 8. 6. 
110cornford, 
.21?.• cit., VII. 534· 
lllMacKenna, oP. cit., I .• 3. 6. 
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Dialectic is marked by its abhorrence of a merely 
speculative understanding 
- , for it is in effect a method 
d~~andin~ the intuition of its object. In both the concept-
attainment and reduction, the entire procedure is undertaken 
to awaken insight and bring about that illu•ninatinP" ex•)c rience l _1 t 
known as intuition. -Even in the formal discipline such as 
found in Plato's Republic, the object is in the percertion of 
unity. The intuition is experienced when what a~neared as 
separate and unrelated elements are seen in a nevr order or 
unity. Hence, Plato's remark that perc ei vinr: relations is 
the natural gift of dialectic. 
The shift of emphasis from the outer to the inner dia-
lectic is only distinguished by its vocal aspect. True, it 
.soon outstrips even this distinction, but not the- process of 
seeking Unity among the dualities. Again, the dialectic is a 
process in which immediate awareness as an intuitive experi-
ence is the feature of the recognition. In essence it is a 
demand for discriminatio_n, a discrimination sharp and concen-
trated enough to transform the understanding--hence, con-
sciousness itself. 
A criticism of Plato would be that although he provides 
ample evidence of dialectic as distinct from mere di.sputr:ltion, 
as does Plotinus, the inner aspect--the conte~plative--is not 
as clearly drawn~ In fact, he only outlines it and leaves a 
tenuous tie to the outer movement. Pl-otinus, on the other 
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hand, makes this connection more ri r..: orous, without, however., 
any improvement u pon the dialectic as a contemplative act. 
CHAPTER II 
THE DECLINE OF PHILOSOPHY AND DIALECTIC 
I. FOREWORD 
At this point, it should be appropriate to return to 
Plato's rule for the operation of the dialectic- and _apply it 
to this thesis itself. He says, 
. I think that you should go a step further, and con-
S1der no~ only the consequences which flow from a eiven 
hypothes1s, but also the consequences which flow from 
denying the hypothesis; and that will be still better 
training for you.l 
And later he adds, 
In a word, when you suppose anything to be or not ·to 
be, or to be in any way affected, you must look at the 
consequences in relation to the thing itself and to any 
other thing you choose,--to each of th~m singly, or more 
than one, and to all; and so of other things, you must 
look at them in relation to themselves and anything; else. 
you suppose either to be or not to be, if 2ou would train 
yourself perfectly and see t .he real truth.~ 
Thus, to Plato, the argume-nt in favor of the dialectic 
would only be one part of a real dialectic. The other aspect 
must be to develop the idea of what would be the conditions 
if dialectic were reje.cted. It would include drawine out the 
fram_ework to see if the den·ial is justified_ or if it is 
itself _fraught with errors, contradictions, and ambiguous 
assertions. Following its development, we would be meeting 
lJowett, QE• cit., "Parmenides," lJ6a. 2Ibid., lJ6c. 
I 
J 
60 
the Socratic rule and would also throw a bit of light on the 
curious problem of why the flower of Athens withered without 
ever seeding. 
However, to comply with the Platonic request in all 
its aspect·s (for tracing the consequences fron the rejection) 
would be a too lengthy task to be adequately t ·reated within 
this more limited study. 
There are two possibilities- -either the conseauences 
from the denial could be stated dogmatically, or illustrated 
with the aid of an actual case of a repudiation of Philosophy 
and Dialectic. On the other hand, it should be investigated 
to determine if the alleged repudiation is in fact groundless 
eith-er because of the typical "s·traw-man argument" or through 
lack of critical reflection. If the dialectic- has actually 
been validly shown to be in error, then its present disap-
pearance should be welcomed. Therefore, the requirement is 
to find those thinkers who have claimed a victory over 
Philosophy and examine their arguments. 
As large as even this reduced task is, it has been 
somewhat lightened since there is material available· as a 
result of Christianity's denial of Philosophy as an end in 
itself. Hence, with apologies to Plato, it will suffice for 
our purposes to restrict the denial to an examination of the 
reasons and arguments for Augustine's claim that Christian 
~hilosophy has superseded pagan philosophy and therefore 
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eliminated the need of d1."alect1.·c. E ·r th ven 1. e ar~uments are 
found imral·id, it will accomplish a measure of service by 
revealing the thought proc-esses, rationalization,. and com.~it­
rnents implicit in a denial of philosophy. To illustrate the 
consequences of a rejection of philosophy and the restrictions 
imposed upon reason is a study of dop,matism. The word dog-
mat-ism is a·ften used as a derogatory term, but in this work 
it is understood as a result of belief exceedinr, the cogni-
tive grounds for belief. 2a The selection of Aueustine pro-
vides an example of a rejection of philosophy as an end in 
itself and also illustrates the mechanism of dogmatism. 
It is often remarked that religion and philosophy, 
faith and reason, are bit·ter opposed concepts and if the side 
of religion-were to lose ground there would be a corresponding 
developm.ent. of reason and a decline of dogmatism. Granted 
that there is a c-ertain measure of truth in thi.s assertion., it 
is actually one-.sided.. The retreat from reason--dogmatism--
can take a modern form that has no direct theological connection 
and yet may have just as much emotional comnlitment and exc-eed 
the cognitive grounds· of belief as much as that of any religious 
appeal. The modern denial or rejection of philosophy will be 
examined and demonstrated to be a continuation of the- process 
of seeking "certainties, indubitable truths, and clear and 
2astephen c. Pepper, World Eypot~eses: ! Stu~y ~n . 
Evidence (Berkeley a..'l1.d Los Aneeles: Un1.versJ..ty- of valiTornJ..a 
Press, 194e}, p. 105. 
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distinct ideas." This modern rejection of philosophy is the 
pursuit of History. Therefore the s eco.nd part of this Chapter 
will be review of the claims of History and will demonstrate 
that the same processes i nvolved in the rejection of reason 
or philosophy by religion contain the same elements as those 
by the modern exponents of History. 
Therefore the use of reason in a philosophy as a 
dialectic has been outlined in the First Chapter and in this 
Second Chapter the rejection is examined and the conse-ouences 
traced in order to better understand and judge the merits of 
both claims. 
The salient features of this analysis will be assumed 
-for further sections of this paper, and therefore will greatly 
reduce the need of repeating certain key arguments. The con-
elusions are equally binding wherever similar arguments are-
maintained and therefore it is taken in a more archetypal 
referent and not meant to be exclusively an attack or criticism 
of Chr i stianity as such. 
Naturally, the truths of religion may not present phil-
osophical probl_ems for the believer and it would not be 
denied that insofar as devotion is the central element -in 
religion, philosophy is unneces s ary. It is only when reli-
~ion enters into the field of philosophy that these state-
o 
ments are pertinent. It may be that -J. H. Newman is cor-
rect in his view that "those higher Truths have been 
revealed to us for devotion and, for dev-otion, the mystery 
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presents no difficulty.»] 
II. AUGUSTINE 
It has often been asserted that ~hilosoohy was born on 
Grecian soil some tvienty-fi -.,e hundred years a .o:o in the City 
of Athens, but wh ether this can be contested or not is of 
small importance"$ V.That does matter is ·that from her many 
progeny sprang Plato who was bold enourh to introduce into 
philosophy the highest ideal and goal of Ultimate l;Jisdom. 
Whatever success he did a chieve can be seen by the herita~e 
he left future a~es. They fell heir to a Persistent oroblem 
that was to remain a continual source of difficulty for some 
time. It was in fact an Achilles' heel. The problem or 
question reasserted itself and took the form: "1\'as Christ 
necessary if Plato found a way to the Ultimate Good: If 
Christ came with an exclusive truth, what of philosophy?" 
This crystallized into the no,·! familiar problem of the proper 
roles of reason and faith, but before it took this aspect it 
was kno"m as the classical dichotomy betvreen philosophy and 
reli ;-: ion. 
It is argued tha t the Ctristian mess age relegates the 
p~etensions of r hilosophy--and t ~1 erefore dialE.·ctic--into 
mans, 
3J. H ... Newman (trans.),. St. Athanasius (London: Long-
Green & Co., 1903), Vol. II, p. 317. 
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obscurity by the utilization of the new organ--Faith• And in 
the very same way as it resolved the philosopher's thesis, it 
also S\·lept away the tragedian--condemned by being in posses-
sion of an inadequate and nartial view of truth. It is 
obvious that ther€' c .::n be little content or drarna fo r a 
Christian in a Gree~ Traredy, or any tragedy, if in the final 
moment of the hero ' s fate, his moira, he can claim s.al vat ion 
by an act of faith. Throur,h the act of faith, one exchanges 
the two kingdoms and makes superfluous the one by contrast 
to the other. To the Christian, there is only one myth, 
h€'nce only one drama, cne hero--there!'ore one prototype . 
Thus, he can conclude that both Classical drama and philosophy 
have beer. s u perseded by a nm·1 donna comprehensive enough to 
resolve problems of philosophy and fate. (But rat.h.er than 
resolvinr, the problems of Classic philosophers, it absolved 
them.} They ask, what need now for philosophy at all? Ter-
tullian retorts in a famiJiar passaee: 
So, then, where is there any likenes~: between ·the Chris-
tian and the Fhilosopher? between the dic:cipline of Greece 
and of Heaven? the man \'-rhose object is fame, and v1hose 
object is life? betwe cn the talker and the doer? between 
the man v-Jho builds up and the man -v-1ho pulls dovm? b·et\,Ieen 
tee friend and foe of error? betv.reen one 1t:ho corrupts the 
truth, and one ,.,ho restores and teac}:es it? betv-JeEm its 
chief and its custodian?4 
4-rertullian, ADolop,y, trans. The i1ev. S. Thelv-.rall 
(Vol . III of The Ante-tdcine Fathers., ed. Roberts & Donaldson. 
10 vols.; New York: Charles Scribners, lS:lB), Chap. YJNI , p . 51. 
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This is tf:e funda.::mmtal breach from w~:i ch the v;estern \\'Or1d 
has not yet compl et£:1 "'J' extricated its elf. I · d · t 1s an a mis~1on 
of the r,ap between a c omm itment of faith and that of reason. 
It is an acknowledgement that the articles of f:tith are for-
ever outside the realm o:' reason, inaccessible to reason, ar.d, 
further, affirms an opposition between reli<i .:n a: :d phiJ. os o;-hy. 
It is fundamental to the understandinr: that U :is is in f:1ct 
the case because vrhat developed later in Europe \':as an abor-
tive philosophy having little in comr~:on 1.-:ith that of Plato's 
Athens. Tertullian states the doctrine of inc2.rnation and at 
the ~ar:1e time defines an attitude thn.t has beconC' the :!=reval-
ent mood, which is at bottom a rejection of the claims of 
reason: 
The Son of God vms crucified: I am not asha"!led 
because men must needs be ashamed, and t:!'1e Son of God 
died; It is. by all means to be believed, because it is 
absurd. And he was buried; and rose a~a in; the fact is 
certain, because it is impossible.5 -
An appeal to an authority ie the altar on which reason 
is sacrificed. Christ becorr..es the only avent~e to Truth. 
A tt ent.ion is shifted fror.l the demands of rear, on to the meaning 
of Jesus' life. The ne\\· objective for reason is to represent 
the essence of the .scripture and outline the need for sal va-
5Tertullian, On the Flesh of Chr.i.st, ~rans. Dr. Holmes 
{Vol. III of The Ante-Nicine Fathers, ed. Rooerts & Donaldsono 
10 vols.; New-rork: Charles Scribners, 1918), Chap. V, P· 525~ 
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tion and eternal life. It mi~ht be argued that these state-
ments of Tertullian_ reflect only the early teachings of the 
Church and, as yet, do not contain t~e full truth, because 
later Augustine wrote, "Can paganism,- I ask you, produce- any-
thine; ec:ual to ours, the one true ?hilosophy?1'6 A-ugustine 
believed that he had in his possession a true philosophy 
superior t o the non-Christian. It is not a new religion _in 
competition with philosophy, but a new relic ious philosophy 
t -hat stands above all other philosonhies. If this is so, one 
can expect the shortcomin,r:s of Plato and his dialectic to be 
resolved in Augustine . At tr.e sruae time, however, Auf.Ustine 
accepts the role of faith. How then can it be an irr..provement? 
Essentially what v.ras accepted on faith"i Both Athana-
sius and Ambrose elaborated the consequences of the Council 
of Nicaea into a creed which took its name. They became the 
orthodox interpretation of John XX 31-2 Peter 1; which in 
turn became the cornerstone of Christian apoloretics and the 
6The Contra Iulianum (Against Julian) is not l _isted in 
Farrar and Evans, Er_:--_lisr~ Translations from J.:edieval So~~-, 
nor is it listed in t~e Cnion Catalogue of the Library of 
Gonp;ress . In the translated vmrks of Augustine {both the 
\'Jritir.{~s of St. Augustine and the Hicine and Fost-Nicine 
Father~ of the Christian Church), it is listed in the bibli-
ography but not included among t~-e translated v:orks. '!'here-
fore, it has been necessary to c1te this secondary source. 
Latin text reads, ttobsecro te, non sit honestior philosophia 
gentium quam nostra Christ:Lana, quae una est vera philosophia . 
IV .14. 72n translated by Charles N. C_~chrane, Christianity in 
Classical Culture (Ne\1 York: Oxford UniversityPress, 19441, 
pp . 231-2)2 .. 
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article of faith~ It is sirnificant that Ambrose's statement 
of this dogma also contains a succir:ct viev.r of tbe function 
of reason. Augustine shares this vie'lr; in hiB statement that 
arguments and differences of view or interpretations on this 
subject, or fer that matter any subject of creed, are to be 
.resolved by reference to the Scriptures and the writines of 
the Apostles. 7 Reason, hence, was not a jucige nor was s·he to 
be utilized without restraint, but became ~assive--accepting 
premises which she should neither discuss nor judge.S. The 
Nicaean creed, the concept of the Trinity, provides th.e basis 
for Augustine's thought. 
But the transition from Plato to Augu-stir.e is not just 
a movement from one system to another; there is a profound 
gap separating them r-Jhich is only apparently joined by the 
comt1on terms they shared. Yet, these very terr.Js changed 
their content so radically that any attempt to see then within 
the same referent would miss their essential differences and 
obscure the vastly different goals they set for themselves. 
August-ine set a ne,·r note, a nev-! key, which for centuries 
remained the basic motif of European -ohilosophy . The confu-
sion was compounded by using the same terms in totally differ-
71.:arcus Dads (trans.), St. Augustin.e: The City of God 
(New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1946), XIV. 7. 
$Ibid., X. 23 ... 
-
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ent contexts with vastly different meanings. Primarily, 
Augustine's quest was for certainty; yet, so too was Plato's. 
The difference, however, lies in what they expected as their 
certitude. The object of Plato's philosophy was the Ultimate 
Good, the mystic vision of Reality, as he himself freely 
acknowledges.9 On the other hand, Augustine's quest was 
certainty, based on the acceptance of a principle, a concep-
tual ·framework., which would resolve his dilemmas and tensions. 
The highest ideal for Plato was the Socratic dictun, "I know· 
that I do not know" and "know thyself," while to Augustine it 
was the acceptance of faith and the belief in the principles 
of the Christian Church. .In Europe, the ·tradition of philoso-
phy continued the quest for certainty and indubitable truths, 
and abandoned the quest of wisdom. It chose Augustine rather 
than Plato--the certain, not the dialectical. 
To August·ine, knO\'t'ledge· is defined as "certissima 
ratione" but he is cognizant of the fact that not all elements 
ar·e knowable in this sense because it is obvious that man 
accepts a vast field as knowledge based upon authority. Re 
believes that the matrix of human relationships would collapse 
if this confidence in authority wer€ undermined: 
If this faith in human affairs is removed who will not 
mark how great will be their disorder and what dreadful 
9Jowett, ££• cit., "Phaedo•" 69. 
confusion will follo\'1?10 
and he adds: 
•• ~ therefore, when we do not believe what we 
cannot see, concord wi ~. 1 perish and human society 
itself will not stand firm.ll 
Yet, on the other hand, it is manifest that the authority 
assumes, or demands faith in order to be operational. The 
restriction of belief on :.y to what can be seen is ridiculed 
and, "many examples can be cited which sho:v1 that absolutely 
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nothing would remain intact in human societ,y if we should 
determine to believe only what we can ,e:rasp by perception.nl2 
In the acceptance of authority, knowledge is possible. 
Therefore, to Augustine, authority must precede reason and it 
must also b e incumbent upon him to assume that faith is the 
very condition of understanding. 
Not have knowledge and believe, but "believed. and 
known." For we believe in order to kno ....  r, for i£ we 
wanted to know first , and then believe~ we s h ould not 
be able either tc know or to believe.lJ 
. lO]ifarcus Dads ( ed.), The Writings of St. ~-us~.t~~ 
{New York: CL~a Publishing Co., 1947), On Faith in Things 
Unseen, trans. Ray J. !)eferrari and I,·:ary Francis l~'icDonald, 
Vol:-fi, Chap. 2, (4), P• 454 
11Ibid., Chap. J, (4) ., PP• 455-6. 
12Dods, .Q.E.• ill_., The Advanta~e of Believing,. trans. 
Luanne Heagher, Vol. II, Chap. 12, {2 } , p . 427. 
lJPhilip Schaff" ( ed.), The Nicine and Post Nicine 
Father_£ of the Christian Churcii.-n\ew York: Charles S;,_ribners~ 
1903)., On The Gospel of St. ~n, Vol. VII, Chap. XXVII, (9J, 
p. 177. 
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Thus faith need not entail the blind acceptance of a Ter-
tullian, and the rejection of reason is not thought by 
Augustine to be the prerequisite of ·faith. Hence, he thereby 
attempted to return reason to the field; but he carefully 
adds, nyou ought not be taup-ht by reason first and only then 
by faith.n 1 4 Augustine inherited a tradition that asserts 
two things di_fficult to reconcile, and he has attempted in a 
masterly way to blend harmoniously these twin aspects. 
First, 
Beware that no one deceive you through philosophy 
and vain deceit, -accordinf, to the elements of the 
world.l5 
and, again, the assertion, 
Because that which is knmm of God is manifest among 
them, for God has manifested it to them. For His invis-
ible things from the creation of the world are clearly 
seen, being understood by the thines 6which are made, also his eternal power and Godhead.! 
In Augustine's task of the reconciliation of reason and faith, 
he sees his work as superior to the Philosopher's. That is 
to say, he delineates the role of reason within a Christian 
framework and concomitantly he sees philosophy as th~ possible 
14nods, 21?.-- cit., The Advantage of Believing, Chap._ 
( 21, 2 2 } , pp • -418- 419 • 
l5nods, The City of God, 2£• cit., VIII. 10, quoted 
from Col. ii.8. 
16Ibid., VIII.IO, auoted from Rom. 1.19-20. 
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arena of deception ~..,r'1ich only reiterates the suspect status 
which philosophy has to those of strong beliefs. Yet, the 
other q-uotation, noted above, provides the basis of the c on-
cept of Natural Theology. To these t\·.ro approaches, Au,r;ustine 
seeks a synthesis by arising to the notion tha t in Christian 
philosophy, one can even g o beyond the natur:1l philosophers 
by encompassing their -vmrks while at the sa:rre time demonstrat-
ine their limitations. He recognizes the three parts of 
natural theology. The natural is seeking ~the cause of exist-
ence," the rational as "the ultimate reason for the under-
standing," and the moral--"the end in reference to v1h ich the 
whole life is re~ulated.nl? In the analysis of the natural 
philosophers, he sees that "it is evident that none c or.1e 
nearer to us than the Platonists."lg In his statement of the 
Natural Theology, incorporating the three aspects, he discovers 
in Plato's works th8t the love of the Good eauals God: 
~ • • but the true and highest Good, accordi~~ to 
Plato, is God, and therefore he would call him a 
philosoPher who loves Cod; for philosophy is directed 
to the o~taininz: of the ~lessed life, a~g he v;ho loves 
God is blessed ln t he enJO)~ent of God. ~ 
Hence, he adds ap;ain that nthe philosophy 1r:hich has cone 
nearest to the Christian fc1.ithtt is that of "Plato himself." 20 
If this is true, t hen it is important to discern clearly 
17!£1£., VIII. 4. 
19Ibid., VIII~ 8. 
18Ibid., VIII. 5. 
20Jbid., VIII. 9. 
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their differences with regard to reason .since, if it has been 
assumed t.hat in Plato reason can lead one t..o the Good, what 
need then of faith or Christ·ianity: Augustine, althou~h he 
eives this high estimate of Plato, assigns no epistemological 
role to reason as dialectic. He ~ays: 
And, as the study of V!isdom consists in action and 
contemplation, so that one part of it may be. called 
active, and the other contemplation., --the active part 
having reference to the conduct of life, that is to the 
regulation of morals, and the conte..."Uplative part to the 
investigation into the causes of nature and into pure 
truth, --Socrates is sa.id to have excelled in the active 
part of that study, while Pytha~oras vave more attention 
to its conternplati ve part, on which he brought to bear 
all the force of t.is ,"Teat intellect. ·To Plato is given 
the praise of havin£ nerfected Philosophy by combining 
both parts into one .21 
In this statement of the philosoph;r of Plato, it is hardly a 
fair or accurate su.11mary . It lacks all of tr.e essential 
features and, in fact, Augustine's general statement could 
just as \vell be attributerl to other philoso-phers as well as 
Plato. The distinguishin;; feature of Platonic philosophy is 
the double role of dialectic; the outward and inner. In 
A usus tine's -a-nalysis, it apnears he did not utilize the 
Republic or the major dialor:ues. Further, many of his state-
ments attributed to the Platonists are not only misleading., 
but often can be seen to have no relation to Plato. An 
interestinr; examyle is vrhen Aug:ustine states that the Platon-
73 
ists knew of the none true God" but "thour>:ht that sacred 
rites were to be performed in honour of many Gods .n22 There 
are numerous stateQents such as these, but it is not the pur-
pose here to correct or to point out all the errors in Augus-
tine's thou.<rht, but only to examine the use of reason by this 
sa-called exponent of Nee-Platonism in Christianity. It is 
clear that in his statement of the philosophy of Plato he did 
not see the ethical side,23 but his analysis suggests that he 
had few o:-iginal \Wrks of Plato at his disposal '"i th v-;hich to 
dravi an accurate conception of Platonic philosophy. He. says 
that the wo::--ks· he did read were translations from t t e Greek 
into the Latin;24 hence it is novr obvious why his concept of 
Plato and of dialectic was so inaccurate, as only a ~mall part 
of Plato's works were transla ted into Latin. 
Assuming then that the central doctrine of Platonic 
thought is contained in the t1vin disciplines of contemplation 
and dialectic, then the issue \'Jith Augustine is much sL-npler ... 
V/hat works did he have access to? Were they basic and essen-
tial for the elaboration of these disciplines? Did he know 
enough Greek to read them in the originals, if they \'lrere not 
translated? It is asserted by Au~ustine that he did not have 
22Ibid., VIII. 12. 23Ibid.r VIII. 2, 3, 4. 
24Ed\'lard B. Pusey (trans.), The Confessi.ons of Saint 
Au.~ustine . (Collector 1 s edition; Nel·T York: Pocket Books , Inc., 
1951), VII. 9e. 
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this facility with the Greek languar:e~25 hence, the ouestion 
is, vrhat texts then were available to hi:n for his est L11ate- of 
Platonic thought': Primarily there was a translation of the 
Timaeus by Chalcidius, which, if really translated by A. D. 
350, was not quoted by authors of his time, nor did Ausu.st~ne 
quote directly from this work. Then tf:ere were- references in 
Cicero's works and passat::es in Seneca 1 s letters, the fifty-
eighth and sixty-fifth, and only casual references c cmt~ined 
in Aulus Gellius. Some references were in Haximum' s collec-
tion of Facts and Sayings, and, of course, the works of 
Appuleius. There were some other references in Macrobiu3 1 
Saturnalia as well as a com;1Jentary by him col!lparinp; Plato 1 s 
and Cicero's philosophy (whic h is of doubtful value}, towards 
a delineation of the dialectic. Of the translated works of 
Plato into Latin were the Meno and Phaedo by Aristippus. 
'l'herefore, it is clear that the central doctrines of Plato 
referred to in this thesis vrere not translat c:d into Latin a~~d, 
accordingly, Augustine ~ust have drawn his references from 
secondary materials withot~ benefit of ori~inal sources or 
translat.ions. He had no direct contact \·Iith the Symposiwn, 
Republic, Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman, and other major 
dialogues. 
A more decisive :udgement can be ~ade without retreat-
25rbid. 
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·ing into "historical evidence, '1 for this is at best a merely 
provisional proof . Augustine mentions his contact with 
Platonists and, hence, he might have ~etten his knm--,rled~e 
through these contacts as a verbal tradition. Even if this 
is assu.11ed, it would fol :. O\-.' that eiti:cr thev did not teach 
~ 
a complete Plato, or he f.:J.iled to C()mprehend its :.1erits. 
Whatever the reason--it is manifestly clear th~t Augustine 
never mentions the 'Platonic doctrine of purification throup;h 
dialectic, the dialectical catharsis, nor '\>las he cor.;nizant of 
the central concept that the Good is knowable . 26 Further, it 
is evident that he does not distinguish bet~e en Plato, Pla-
tonists, and neo-Platonists ... He assumes they all speak from 
the sa,;-ne tradition and thE!.t they can be the spokesmen for 
what he considers to be Platonic doctrine. This is the source 
of all the confusion and errors in his estimate of philoso~hy . 
H~s principal source appears to be a nee-Platonist of rather 
dubious merit who authored the "Golden Ass. n Ee ouotes him 
nearly exclusively27 and draws nearly all his references fror:1 
"The God of Socrates"--or, as it is sor.1etines called, " The 
demon :p o ... Socrates." Had Augustine the works of Plato, he 
could have seen that this work bears no relation to t~e 
Socratic Demon which .is mentioned in the Apolot::Y . Therefore, 
26nods, The City of God, ~· cit., X .. 29. 
27Ibid., VIII. 13-22. 
. . · ....... 
it is an injustice to attribute these references to Platonists 
when all the evidence he had to conclude from was that the 
Christian doctrine opposes Apuleius' concepts and apparently 
can succeed the Apuleian doctrine. It is unfortunate that 
"The God of Socrates" is no longer extant but, nevertheless, 
Augustine's references and quotations demonstrate the classic 
example of a "straw-man arp.;ument" in philosophy. He thought 
he was arguing against Plato and Class.ic Greek philosophy, 
while all he was objecting to was a writer who was really 
outside the Platonic tradition. 
Augustine's attack upon Apuleius affords him an oppor-
tuni ty to establish the heart of Christ.ian doctrine: In support 
of Faith there is a basic claim that Christ is the mediator 
between man and God. The necessity o.f a "Christ" lies in the 
concept that since man is mortal h.e is also miserable, 28 and 
therefore he is not capable of enjoying true blessedness29 with-
out the intervention of one who, by the mortality of his body and 
immortal righteousness of his spirit, can give divine help in 
cleansing and liberating man)O Hence a. man who is also divine 
"remained heavenly even while on earth," providing the prin-
ciple of the logos incarnated in man.31 The Platonic principle 
of the Logos assumed in Christianity a human form32 "cleanses 
2 Bibid., IX. 15. 
Jlrbid., x. 24. 
-
29Ibid., IX. 14. 
32Ibid. 
3°Ibid., IX. 17. 
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the soul and flesh of believersn33 from this i~ born a new 
act-- fai th--'\·.rhich by the act of belief cleanses and purifies . 
Augustine finds this the answer to his uncerto.inty, o:1t he is 
seriously puzzled by the- Plat onists r- reluctance to become 
converted to the Christian Faith \"i_hen they so readily r:rant 
the concept of the Lo~os (or nous). AddressinF, his remark to 
Porphyry, he says: 
You say, indeed, that i~norance, and the numberless 
vices result in:'; :rom it, cannot b c r E:.:.ll !J'l ed by any 
mysteries, but only by the--~trikes no~s--tnat is, the 
Father's mind or intellect conscious of the /ather 's 
·will. But th~t Christ is this mind you do not believe .3 4 
He is firm in his conviction that this c oncept of Ch:::-ist as 
the incarnation ::>f the Lo{~os is not ~~ust another v:a.y to the 
Good, or to God, but is the "only true principle which alone 
purifies and renews human nature. n3 5 If so, ,.;hat then of the 
Platonists who assert ultimate wisdom is kno~·;able and v;ho at 
the s arne time do not affir:rr this uni (1Ue cba rllct er to Christ 'i' 
Aug ustine admits that the true philoco ~her is a lover of God 
and that -v-:isdom is God, since it is a ttested oy divine author-
ity and truth, 3 6 yet he still holds that Christ is the unioue 
and sole avenue to God.37 The issue is, then, v:!:ether Au~us-
tine grants that the nurification of t he soul, as ta'J.r;ht by 
the Platonists, can regulate the life of man tov-Tards that 
33~. 34-· "d !.Q.:L•' 
J6rbid.-, VIII. 1. 
x. 28. 3 5rbid., x. 24 . 
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vision of the Good~ He says that the Platonist Prophyry does 
not recognize Christ and "understand by this third LPerson of 
the Trinity the soul of nature," adding, "he spoke acco!"dinr, 
to his light, or as he thought expedient" and that ·philosophers 
"do not scruple to offend religious ears, "3$ which of course 
to Augustine is an act of impiety. He thinks it more cred-
ible and probable that so long as man is mortal, he is miser-
able and cannot attain wisdomJ 9 and, therefore, blessedness. ~D 
This is only to say that he can more readily accept that 
Christ was both mortal and divine than the assertion that 
some philosophers can attain to wisdom41 (which to anyone but 
a believer seems more improbable and incredible). Therefore, 
to recapitulate thus far, it can be said that Augustine did 
not know enough of Plato or the Platonists to judge them, and 
that the "one true philosophy" of Christianity is not only 
inferior to that of the philosophers, but also that there is a 
serious question as to its "truth." Further, Augustine's 
judgement of the natural Fhilosophers is inaccurate and based 
on inconclusive evidence. His ·unfamiliarity vdth the actual 
works of Plato and, hence~ the lack of knowledge of the 
3 Bibid. 39Ibid.~ X. 29. 40Ibid., IX. 14, 15. 
41Ibid., X. 29. " ••• in accordanc·e with the opinion 
of Plato you-make no doubt that in this life a man cannot by 
any means attain to perfect .,.;isdom. "--one can only .... -onder what 
he would have thought had he really read all of Plato and 
Plotinus. Cf. Cornford, .QE• cit., Republic IV; 4 76, "• • • 
that the perfectly real is perfectly knm<Table. 
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import 'Jnt proal f:m 1 e.ft is , to':< he uncl er-::: t ooct " tho:· e f:--: c t!:; 0 f 
v:tich ~-;e llave s::id ell r:;.inds have '·:r1o•. :.lcdr:-:e c onc \:rn:!..r:· · tLr:-:: -
selves ::11c. -.. ,·rllcl: nre induui t.J. ble . n42 .::t 
Since a ouest for certainty, !br ·.nd·lbitoblc truth , 
has beco::1e tr,e dL:tir::uisilin;~ mark of ;·:uc ~: tl:· ct :'.s c."}.llul 
philo[: r)ohy in Europe, a c .::t.rcf,11 sc r utin:.' o: t! .~ fnthE!"' ') .: 
t~~is C<lncept v:o:.1ld be ::'.r o ;·i t ;_;_b l e . 
ated: conviction und :ud~c1cnt . A p~onasiti. an ~~y ~c 
asserted ·vdt~ conviction but!~ his doc :::- n:Jt c.-: C "f'ct the c'"ln-
,~urlp;ed to be certain addf: nothinp t o it.s co_'"""n!.t.ive C'.)n ·:.r;r:t ; 
is ~t i.lJ_ onen and an avai! :~ble ~ub;icct .for 2!: eY:""Jii::. ::ot i o n a f 
about it . 
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relegate it outs-ide the domain of verification. The concept 
of certainty, therefore, involves the concept of the self-
evident. Naturally, the certain and self-evid-ent are meant 
to preclude analysis of their coenitive justification by any 
other measure than the criteria of certainty and the self-
evident. This is the common breedinv grounds of do~atism. 
Therefore, whatever degree of belief may be attached to a 
proposition (some "X"), it must always await the iiTpartial 
analysis of its cognitive justification before any cred-
ibility can be assigned to it. Needless to s-ay,_ this is 
not asserting that at times, usually for practical or ethical 
action, one must act as if one had all the knowledp:e suf-
ficient for practical judgements. Whatever subjective atti-
tude of belief there may be- attached to some "X," it is 
still of dubious merit until it can be determined just what 
evidence there is for the assertion. The main contention is 
that conviction is an attitude that does not actually seek 
justification amon~ cognitive criteria. Doubtless AuF,Ustine 
is ~Titing from the perspective of a Christian, a religious 
seeker, and it is common among reli~ious thinkers and dosma-
tists that they often c-onfuse appeals to belief with cognitive 
justificat:ion in its o'\'m right. 
Aside from these considerations, there is a more basic 
flaw at work here. Belief provides the very conditions 
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necessary for devot icn--it r-·rovides an ob ~ec·t . '.~he reli ,:~ ious 
vocation can function to the degree that its object becomes 
ideal and absolute. l .n its abs;:>luteness, it furnishes an 
appeal to an authority that affords the believer a feeling of 
r:rotection , thereby takin~ the responsibility from the indi-
vidual. The p erfect fi ,?"ure bccones the object of its belief 
and devotion. Dut t his ic an unholy peace if the mtnd is at 
all active. If it once be~ins to doubt, it becomes strangely 
vulnerable. To p:uard. ar.ainst t his ev·entuali ty, it seeks to 
hide the flc.vl by an appeal to certainty and indubitability., 
In findin~ this certainty, it rests, feels a~sured of its 
security, and allows the devotional side free play without 
the distressing element of doubt. Yet, the "xn in which the 
certainty is found does not gai~ anythin~ on the co~nitive 
side by its conviction. It does not remove by some gratuitous 
act the resnonsibili t y to find just what is certain. On the 
other side--even if it is in fact credible, it adds nothing to 
the content of ler.itimate belief by being asserted as ttcertain" 
sir:ce its claim Ii:ust sti~l rest uron its. cognitive justifica-
tion. Again, a further element of suspicious content is that 
the principle itself is never advanced as a criterion because 
it i:·:ould follo"I that there is nothin,r.: to preclude conflictine; 
claims to different and r.mtually contradictinr; certainties. 
Hence, it is usual th:1t the asserter clai::!S the unicue nature 
of this particular nx." This is of course nothinr:; else than 
' · 
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an appeal to faith. 
In Augustine's quest . .for certaint1', he souf;ht for an 
indubitable truth which would be impossible to doubt and 
""hich would presuppose consciousness itself; the quest was 
for certainty itself. He sought for "something that is true" 
and not a vision of that truth. He demanded that reason 
present her own structure for examination; that consciousness 
display her fundamental elements, which, as such, would 
have to be accepted. It is a reouest for infallibl-e knowl-
edge and certain truths. To secure this, he begins a phe-
nomenology of the human mind which, he believes, is induhit-
able simply because it is knowledge by the experiment of him-
self. Whether this can be actually claimed as "truth--
indubitable truth"--is a point to be examined later, but it 
is important to note that the answer or solution to this phe-
nomenology would be some assertion about the constituent 
elements of the mind, or an interior anatomy. "Reas.on" then 
looks for its own presuppositions and when they are found, it 
acclaims them as certain knowledge. These in turn become the 
building blocks of his philos~phy. For Plato, the only object 
of knowledge is the Good. It is the onl y thing that is really 
knowable because it is perfectly real. It ·is not given tn a 
c.lass of statements which are pre--zupposit ions, or for that 
matter in any clas.s of statements. 
First, then, what is it that is indubitable in Augus-
tine's philosophy? He replies that: 
The question being the nature of the mind, we must 
dismiss from c ;}ns·ideraticn all not ions accuircd from 
outside throu~h the bodily s~nscs and pay the most 
careful attention to those facts of which we have said 
all minds have knovJledr:e concerninr: the.111s elves and ,.,.hich 
are indubitable.. I·:en have expressed doubt as to whether 
the pm.rer of life, memory , intellif.!;ence, volition, 
thouGht, knowledge and judgment is a function of air, 
fire, brain, blood or atoms, or of some unkno•r:n body over 
and above the four elements, and as to whether it is 
Nithin the power of some concretion or arranf;ement of our 
flesh itself' to uerforr.1 these onerations; and some have 
ventured to assert one tteory, some another. But who is 
tbere to doubt that he i.s alive, ru.1emaer~ , understands, 
viish-es, thinks, kno'ltrs and ;iudges? Since even if he has 
such doubt, he lives; for if he doubts he thinks. \'~hat ­
ever doubts he has, tb ereforc,_ rer;ardin,n: other thin;:,s, 
he ou~!':t not to have doubts re.r:ardin g all the~e; for if 
he did not exist, he co'.lld r..ot have doubt r er:arding 
anything. 43 
Here then is the argument f0r clear and distinct ideas, be it 
fro:n Descartes or Augustine , which asserts tbe c·riterion of 
obvious self-evidency. Two approaches are nos~ible : first, 
one to examine the criteria and, second., by the content. But 
to examine the criteria of indubitability would mean contrast-
in{'; this particular .state:7lent of certainty v:i th others which 
may either disar:ree "Vlith it or may, indeed, offer an alterna-
tive. If so, the princi~le itself would be abandoned since 
all would b-e self-evident and, if not, vrhere '::auld their 
self-evident character lie?--unles~; Augusti ne would go .so far 
------ - -
4JJ. Burnaby (trans .), Later ~.-iorks of St. Au,r:ustine 
(Philadelphia: \'iestminster Press, 1<;145), .p. F5 (fr om the 
"De Trinity" X.lO .14.) 
as to admit of contradictory self-evident truths. On the 
other hand, if it were as.serted and then argued, it would not 
be self-evident since its certainty would depend upon the 
ac·tivity of the defense; therefore, its certainty would be 
credible if, and only if, its rational cogency were termed 
valid. But that again would be to abandon the principle by 
turning to common-sense appeals by depending on the logic of 
argumentation. The content of the certainty has this for~r: 44 
1. All minds- have knmdedge concerning them-
selves which is indubitable. 
2. If he doubts, he lives. 
3. If he did not exist, he could not have a 
doubt regardinr, anything. 
This is the origin of Descartes' dicttun, "I think, therefore 
I am" and contains the same error. The activities mentioned, 
including the doubting, do not in themselves require evidence 
of any "doubter" or any "he" apart from the activity of cogi-
tation. If this is an inference which asserts a "doubter" 
then it cannot be indubitable since it need not be assumed .• 
Again, this ~ppeal to indubitability cannot assert the neces-
sary connection between co~itat·ion and the cogitator any 
more than Descartes could join the extend_ed and the unex-
tended as his basic el-ements of consciousness and the world. 
Descartes had to insert the Pineal gland to tie this connection 
44Ibid. 
I 
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but this only leads to tl:.e furtl:.er inquiry as to what ti·es 
each with the third, and so on to an infinite regress. 
3ut Augustine believed it was not an inference and 
also not p;iven through the senses: 
• • • but it apprehends itself with direct and 
immediate awareness ••• as it apprehends that it 
lives, remembers, knowe and wishes.45 
Clearly· then, it is not understood by him as any inference 
from cogitation to the "thinker, tt but direct apprehension. 
The mere fact that an exa'Tiination. is offered to discredit 
ttis principle of certainty argues tha t either there is not 
corru~on knowledge of indubitable truths, or tte objector is 
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pervertinr: his ov:n intelligence, or it must be made clear by 
soJ11e other technique tl:at it is really certain. Nevertheles·s, 
the only real argur!lent is that of "perversion," yet it is 
found that one need not admit. that the existence of tl:e 
doubter is anythinc but an inference; therefore it \'.r ould have 
to be maintained that a retreat into logical analysis is 
itself a perverE' ion of tte inquiry. If so, it demonstrates 
that the pos ition is outside of lor;ic,. its "certainty" rest-
in[ somewhere other tha n within "all minds": the first 
assumption noted previously. Therefore, it is contradictory. 
The elements that are certain, Augustine says, 
It is beyond question that I exist, and that I know 
and love that eyistence. In these truths there is 
45Ibid., p. 80 (nDe Trinity ," X.lO.l5-16.) 
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nothing to fear from the argument of the Academics: ''/hat 
if you are· mistaken? Since· if I am mistaken, I am. One 
who does not exist cannot possibly be mistaken. Thus if 
I am mistak~n., tl':is "'!ery fact proves that I am. Because, 
therefore, ~f I am m~staken, I am, how can I be mistaken 
as to my existence, f or it is certa in tha t I exist if I 
am mistaken. Accordingly, since I must exist in o~der to 
be mistaken, even if I should be mistaken, it is beyond 
doubt that I am not mistaken in this, that I know myself 
as knowing. It follovrs, then, that I could not be mis-
taken as to the fact that I know myself as knowin~ . For, 
as I know myself to exist, so, also, I know this, that I 
know. And to these t\"ro, since I love them, I join that 
love as a third element of equal value to those things 
which I know.46 
Here Augustine asserts the sub.stantiality of the conscious-
ness of the self.. His elements are Being , Intelligence, and 
Love and they are self-evident and certain. This triad 
prescribes the character of indubitability by the experience 
common to a11 men. H.e f'urther adds that these three are one, 
embracing one life, one mind, and one essence.47 Before pass-
ing on to other considerations, it is curious that Aur;ustine 
should be engaged in a spurious problem. He says, "ffi"hat is 
ther~ to fear from the Academics: What if you are mis-
taken?" The possibility of bein& mistaken must take some con-
crete form; a poss ibility to be such must be explicit since 
even a hypothetical poss ibility is still expl.ici t • A possi-
bility of be·ing mistaken_, to be a consideration, must have 
sone form; a possibility to be such must be explicit since 
46nods The Citv of God~ QE• cit., XI~ 26. 
, -----
47Burnaby, QE• cit., p. 88 ("De Trinity," X.llol$} • 
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even a hypothetical possibility is still explicit. A possi-
bility of being mistaken, to be a consideration, must have 
some fonn and no.t a mere Possibility of nothinp:, void of con-
tent. If on the other hand, it is purely rhetorical, it can 
be answered by a similar play of rhetoric. 
Asserting ·this triadic form of conscio:1snes!:: consti-
tutes prima-facie claim to divinity butl alonp; side of t his, 
he is still cognizant of man's misery . This extends his con-
cept of the need of man 's assistance by the mediation of 
Ghrist for salvation. It also l.ays claim to the concept of a 
"natural Christian" because the Trinity is 1nirrored in con-
sciousness. As a result of this fomulat"ion, he can criticize 
the claim of Pelagius that man must initiate the movement to 
the divine.48 Therefore, to Augustine, God intercedes for Man 
in the world to give grace or assistance on the path to divin-
.... l~Y· A God who operates in time and history is the· working 
of his divine will for man's salvation. 
Augustine's search for certainty, therefore, involves 
the acceptance of an infallible authority in the savinr, grace 
of the belief and faith in Christ, and the indubitabili~y of 
propositions he believed self-evident. In his C~nfessions, 
it is quite apparent that he nev er discovers that the li~ita­
tions of philosophy necessitated an acceptance of the Chris-
48Ibid., p. 197 ("De Spiritu et Littera," V) • 
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tian religion since he had utilized flatonic philosophy itself 
in a way that resolved philosophic -nroblems· that stood in the 
way of his becoming a Christian. He found he could not accept 
the Christian faith because he t-tas torn by the dilerruna of t he 
I-:anichaeans--that Good an:i Evil are universal princ iples and 
that Evil has a substance no less real than the ~;ood. He dis-
c overed in the Platonic writinp;s a solution.,. 4S; and was able to 
overcome the obstacles to his c om:n. i tment to Christianity. 
Other men might have pursued Platonic philosarhy furthe-r, hav-
in.f!, discovered this muc h o r value, but he was solely u s inr- it 
to become a Christian. Furth er, it is clear that he WctS 
searching for a Christian conversion, but not throur,h a philo-
so~hic discipline--if one can assert he knew even this much 
about the Platonic, or philosophic, conversion. Ee utilized 
his rationalistic facil i ties tor esol ve his intellectual diffi-
culties along pagan phi l os ophic l i nes-, yet retreated into cer-
tainty, self-evidence and indub i table truths in the construc-
tion of his o~m Christian philosophy. If he could have read 
the Theaetetus of Plato, one v:onders ho..,~· he mi ;ht have 
ans.,·:ered: 
••• And v:hen she lthe mind or c o nceivi!l£:.7 h.as 
arrived at a dec is ion, e i -:her pradually or o:r a sudden 
impulse and has at ln~t.agrced, a n d does n ot doubt, 
this is called her op lnlon.50 
49Pusey op. cit., VII. 22. 
'--
50 Jovfett, 2.£.• cit., "Theaetetus," l <;Da. 
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Therefore, to Plato, all of this surety of thou~hts, t h is 
self-evident doctrine, \t>IOuld be termed opinion. The test to 
Plato is the ability of the unde.rstandinr.; to be· able to de:n-
onstrate its certainty by recourse to the t :: inp;s that are 
certain--viz., the real or the Good. The certain in Plato is 
in the vision of the Good , but t his does not have a content 
that can be structured into dog.Ja. Aur,u~tine' .s purpose '\'!as 
to secure a place for reason so she could be fettered and 
·kept fror :1 doubt. The furthest he could allow reason \'las in 
borrowin?-; co-ncepts from another philosophy and, at the sa.."'le 
time, restrictinp; its further movement to a closed system . 
The final test of reason is whether she is ca pable of cleans-
inz the mind and ourifyin~ the intellect for a vision of the 
Good . The existence of a mediator (in Christ) is not to 
extend reason, but for devotional purposes. He admits 
that if one does not m.ake that act of faith in the Christian 
creed, the teachinp::s can be reduced to nothing: 
••• Those who hold it do so as a consequence of 
faith; for. those v:ho d? not hold it by faith, . it ~~maiDy 
a matter e1ther of douot or of contemptuous d1Sbe ~ 1ef.5-
Yet, the issue to the philosopher is, is there a need incum-
bent upon reason to reco~nize the uniaue truth of Christian 
dogma? But it is obvious that there is not, since philosopr.y , 
particularly the Platonic philosophy, contai ns what to the 
5lnods, The City of God, QE.· ill·' IX. 17 .. 
] 
' 
.f 
I 
:i 
~I ! 
i 
.. 
• 
90 
Christian is a basic .flaw· of impiety: that it can ga.in -.,.:isdom 
\·:-ithout faith in Christ. The security offered by indubita-
bility silences doubt that might have had as its object the 
very figure of the infallible authority and, this would 
recreate the initial fear that the commitment of faith meant 
to resolve; it is a retreat f'rom the rational. But far more 
important than these limitations of appeals to certainty and 
their cognitive criteria is the fact that any such acknovr.l-
edge~ent of "certaintyn results in the severe restriction of 
reason to pursue dialectic. Once the acceptance of any "cer-
tainty" is P:r anted , reason can only function in a logical 
capacity from that point of certainty. It follovw that reason 
would merely have only one object: the working out of the 
implications from such a point of certainty. The cathartic 
element of purifyin~ the intellect from all opinions would 
necessarily be curtailed and arrested, at least on one point 
--the point of its certainty. 'l'o the Christian, the est.ab-
lishment of an infallible authority stops his ouest for Truth, 
since by faith one can be saved. He is now free to speculate 
about other matters with the only res·triction that he does not 
contradict any of the sacred teachings of the Church. His 
soul saved, he can think--secure in h~s belief that further 
philosophic inquiry alons those lines is unnecessary. This 
is t o sa.y that he keeps his thinkin~ Hithin the con::'ines of 
theological belief and dop:ma. He might think out new defenses 
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for his faith and belief, but not construct alternative 
systems that could remove the neces~ity of' faith. !ie l:as 
saved his soul; the only other realm open to inouiry is 
nature. God is secure; only nature nm·r awaits the mind of 
man. He only lacks a tool to handle nature and when that iE 
discovered, he will atte!npt to capture her, as t :e did \d th 
God, within a set of certainties. 
'\':hen the Christian turns to nature, to the f'Lm·; of 
time, he conceives it differently than tho~e befo:--(' him; I.e 
must see it as a Christian. The new element is t~1c doctr i n e 
of the embodied Lop;os, Christ, \'-rho came once and for al~- tl<Jc. 
The concept of this uniaueness is the bas i . .s o !_" the be'.. ief t.r .. "lt 
the creative principle discloses itself rro~ressively in ti ~ e; 
hence, time must be lineal and not cyclical. The a:-rumen'.:.s 
for the theory of lineal time are nowhere ~iven; on t~e con-
trary, Aug ustine says reason cannot refute the cycl ica2. vievr 
of time: 
••• Even though reason could not refute, f~li tL '.-: ould 
smile at these ar~u"!lentations, \\'ith which thE:: r:odle~E: 
endevour to turn our sir.rple piety froi"1 tr:e ri ~::1 t \",'a:·, tr:at 
we may walk with them "in a circle. n52 
The theory of lineal time is analor.:ous to his knov:ledp:e 
of God, but what precludes his deity orderin~ a universe c ~r.­
tained in itself~ This alternative he does not en~age directly 
52Ibid., XII. 17. 
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since it could be handled by deduction fro~ his embodied 
Logos. He traces the concept of cyclical ti~e to: 
..... For what specially leads these ·men astray to 
?refer the~r Oi'm circl.es to ~he strair~ht path of trutL, 
1s, that tney measure oy the1.r m·m human, chanp.:eab:!.e, 
C"l 
'-
and narrow intellect the divine mind, \·:l ~ ic!: is abso::_u .. Jclv 
unchangE:!abl e, infinitely capacious, and, \d thout succes- · 
sion of thought, counting all things witL out nUP.10er. )J 
Or, stated in other terms, the cone ept of lineal t h le c :; n be 
smiled at 1tthen a Christian conunitment is accepted on .:~ai th, 
but without this convictio.n there are no reasons t ·:) deny o r 
refute it. It is indeed curious that anothe::-- ir:i.iic :~ ti ~) !l ~,f 
his certainty--of 'Nhich he can:1ot doubt--is p;iven in thi~ 
probler.t of cyclical ... . "' :une ... Ar: noted above, he a ! !J :-~i ts no 
ttreason can refute" this concept of time. He says : 
••• Of this, too , I have no doubt, that before the 
first man was created~ there never had been a ~an at 
all, neither this .same man hi!TIS elf -recurrinf by I know 
not what cycles, and having made I knO\·J not hpw many 
revolutions, nor any other of similar nature.J4 
His appeal to certainty is no other than an act of faith in 
8hris.t having come once and for all time tha t esta i"J lishes a 
principle which necessitates a new conce?tion of time. l
: C> 
. -
cannot doubt it because to do so ·would be to doubt the uni ou.e 
existence of Christ. This is also the foundation of the 
Christian concept of the personalit:r. It s ~-;.ares tte S[':::...rne 
f ,h · · · t c:h"re t'~-.1e lineal cone e::t of unioueness 0 v,r10t , s1nce 1. ~ n S 
54I.bid., XII. 19-20. 
-
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time, and v;e find he asserts this nev.' conceflt vtith the sa:-.'le 
dogmatism as the lineal concept of tine. 
Time is conceived as havinr a beginninr: and an -end; 
,.,;hat of the end? He says: 
93 
!he conversion of the Jews, the rei~n of the Anti-
chrlst,. the -~econd coming of Christ, the last judr:e:nent, 
separat1on of the good fro~ the evil, the conflarration 
and renewal of the world • 
• • • All of 1::r: ich we are bound to believe •·rill 
c ert a i nl y come to pass • 55 
This is the readinr:: into i~istory Christian v :J. lues he is 
"bound to believe" since it is the actin~ out of divine 
urovid-ence. "Everythinf,," Auf:us.t ine v.'ri t e:., "must be refcr1~cd 
to divine providence."56 
III. VICO 
The Christian concept of history involves common 
features with its philosophy.57 Apart fro~ the concept of 
lineal time, it added a new kind of assertion to history--
universality. The early histo~ians, Herodotus, Thucydides, 
and Polybius, never made such claims. Theirs ...,.;ere moral, 
ethical, and prap;matic s·tu.dies, and v'lith Polybius, genealor.ic . 
The c a ncention of universal application of the histo~ian's 
skills ·Nas a foreign cone ept to any but r..he G-hrist ian 
55rbid., XX . ]J. 5 6r· . d ,, c 11"\ ~ , .. .,· . \.). 
57Henreich Emil Brunner, Revelation and Heason, trans. 
Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: ~estminster Press, 1946}, PP· 22 f. 
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historian. It is v:ith the rise of Christinnity that r.ist8ri-
cal methods are interpolated for dor;mat ic t cleolor.;ical and 
nrovidential orderinp o ~ the entire course of time. To the 
Christian, God disnlays the timeless , pat ter-n" of his bei~g 
in the flow of temuorality. The record of his actions and 
intent are the evidence of his V?ill. 1'r.e fr a.'Ti €\·!ork is the 
Biblical account im~osed unon history . Au~ustine's ~ of 
God outlines the six ar_es in history develop ed in his Uible 
and the actual history of the providential in the v:orlct .5 6 
However , as the opposition to the Church's metaphysics ber;an 
to be felt, there t·rc. s a return to !··istory, int er~Tetins it 
along non-theolor:; ical values. Thoup:h it lost this tie to the 
Church, it still ren ained true to its 11 certai nties"--lineal 
theory of time and t!'.e as~u.r:. '8t·ion that certain !mO\·:lcdEe can 
actually be found in this activity. Machiavelli, Eobbes, 
Vico, Herder, and Hegel ~1ark the reversion to Prafjno.Jtic non-
Christian historical vvrit ine;s . Tl:e element thn.t f!er~ is ted, 
however, was still Chr istian--the belief that man's existence 
can be viewed i n a c ontinuity, riving his life an added force 
~hich without this g ift would leave man alone to face tte 
infinity of time--fror::l the vast be ::' ond t:J t:;e ecually ~nys teri­
ous future. From suc h ori.r; ins came tte concept o:f r ror.; ress • 5S· 
5 ° G ct · .... " 1 r ·J X'JT cD ods ,. The City of ___Q__, on. ~ ... , .JOOK ·. -~ j.J • 
59John Bar:nell Bury, The Idea of Pror-ress (l<e\o·I York.: 
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By becomin~ historical, man acouired a d~ · 1 
. .;.~enSlQn aLt, o::e 
should add. without breadth. It mo d h · ·· 1... • 
.. , ve ~ln 1ron clS rE.mote 
r.ast and Sv./ept hi::.1 i.nto the present a s the r:eir of all that 
came before, and insured hi.n a oromise of the future. CO In 
this sinr,le concept, man found an arw.or of security in the. 
certainty of history. It provided somethin .. "': .~·ar ~: orr:.· itJ.?Or-
tant, or insidious , depending upon the per~nectivc, ~nd that 
was a "foal." History , alan~ lineal conce~tiun, moves 
tov!ards a goal, and t::erefore, if t ::: is end is '·:nov:n , one car. 
consciously cooperate 1•rith it and find jus t i i'icati (; n for his 
actions by such alle,;iance . :3ut the par.ticul.--.r evt:nt loses 
it~ ·:r: eaninr; to the extent th,'J.t it is ::1easured by such a ;·:y p::- -
thetical r:oal; tbis is t.l:c arctetypal forr:1 o .:· the ic.) ea of 
sacrifice . "P.istory ju~t ifies us," is the cr:r of every 
dor:matist. It is of little consequence whet1-:er it is oeir:r.; 
asserted by ·the :!.evolutionary ;·.:arxist or t :1 e Christian Inqui~: ­
itor, for the sa.":Je structure is beir..p; er.1 ployed by b ~th. Fos -
sessin:~ their "truthtt via the .route o: cert ;:.~i nty, i'if.tory 
functions as a vindication of their acts . It does not ~atter 
if the final appeal is oade to a divine authority or to the 
The r~·~acmillan Co., 1932.), "-Progress i~ a natural a~ :.l neces~r.:.~'Y 
e·ffect of the conGtitution of the hl.ll7lan mind. 11 ~ · c? . 
6oibid., p . 92 , cf". pp. l ·:JS: and 126. "The ~ ound 'J in·,:s 
f . 1 ] --t- 1 m. en in di.Lf'l"erent ~8neratior.~ ,.;ill c r; r.tir.ue o lnt e .... .. ec ua_ 
to add U")'J ." 
~ J 
•j 
: I 
:I 
I! 
;I 
II 
.I 
·· ..... .. 
~ 
/ 
f 
L 
self- evident truths o:' tho mind, ~ince both 2~nenls ay-e 
retreats fror1 reason h:t8 dor:rnati.sm . Tl:e knmdedr·e s<litled by 
thi~ procecure secures t ;·a~ aue>!":t oi' the troubled ~·oul . It 
po~sesse·.s an infallible method carable of "truth beyond 
question, " as Gianbat t ista Vi co ·-v:ri tes: 
• ... • But in the ni r:bt darkness envelopinp: t be 
earliest anti('ll~ ity , so rc:: ot e from ours cl ves , there 
sh5.nes U:e eternal and ncver- f<':.ilinr li ··ht of a truth 
beyond ouestion tL.'l.t. t} ; L ·.·o!·lrl of civil societY bas 
certainly been :nade b~:/ men, and that its nrinciples 
are tr:er~~ore 6v, be f ound •t:it h::.r: the 1~: od i ficat ion of our ov,n n.lnd . 1 
Vico ' s ne"\~ science is , of course , history . He arr,ues 
thi'l.t sir:.ce civil .societ}' is made b~,r man , the trut.hs of soci-
ety can be knoi<rn by recour.:· e t~ the historical metLod along 
the lines o~ his nev,' science . I!e arrues th2t it is by tl:e 
examination of tte nature of !:tan that certair: ~:nm·;ledr;e can 
be found , since governnents must confor·~l to tr:e nature of 
those governed . 62 ~te error cf the ~hilosopters, he goes on 
to state, lies in that they " consider man as he r:hould be and 
so can be of service to out very fe\·: -v:ho v:ish to live in the 
61Giambattista Vi co, The ~:m·: Scienc e , tre.ns . from the 
third edition (174h) by 'I'L0s2s G:>dciar(;_ :3errin and ~.ax Earold. 
Fisch (Ithaca : Cornell University Press , 194e) , Book III , 
Sec. 331 ; c f . Book I , Sec . 349 • . " For tbis ~s the f i rst 
indubitable princiole above 90slted that th1s ~orld of 
nations has certai~lv been ~ade by men, and its ~~ise must 
therefore be found vrithir. t~ : e mo:lifications a: our m·:n human 
mind • 11 
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aepublic of Plato and not f.:: ll back into t:-:e C!'Cf:S of 
:lomulus, tT while it is- t :1e lcr, islators v;ho 11 C,lns-ider rr.an as Le 
is in order to turr: hir.l to r:ood uses in hu.rr.an E"ociety." 6J 
The historian turns rro:n the ?hilosoPhic nurf;uit to the cer-
tainty of hietory and f!nds his repose in such certainties 
for "tLeir ,.,rills at least rr:ay rest on conscience ." (;4 In con-
trast to philosophy, he po~es philolo?y viliich "observes the 
auttority of human choice, Nhen.ce comes the c or.sciousness of 
the certain. n65 He adds : 
• $ · • This axiom by its second part defines as philo-
logians a~l the g ranr1 arians, hi::.:torians , critics, v.rho 
have occupie-d the,..:'.S elves \,ri th t! 1e study of the Janr:uaGes 
and deeds of people; both their do~es tic affair~ , suet 
as customs and la\·Js, and t h eir E'xternal affair~, :::;uch as 
-v.rars, peaces, a lliances , travels and c or·;J:c-::rce. 
This sa'"1e aziom sLo·.-:s j-. ::·\1/ the :.-hilo~· o-:-:·l: e .r-s f ailed by 
half in not J~ivinE certainty to tl:eir rcar0ni:tr· by ap!-eal 
to the authority of t Le ph:.lolofians a~.d liket,·:isc Lm·: the 
latter failed by half i~ not takin~ care t 0 g ive t h eir 
authority the s a nction of truth by ap~eal to the reason-
inr--:s· of the ~~hiloso~hers. If t~1ey tad both dor.f' th is 
they ;:auld have antic i rated us in cone ei ving t : : i~ 
Science.66 
In findint; certainty, any additional inquiry \·:ould be 
redundant and unnecessary. If t~is is so, t~ en the cathartic 
activity of reason in dialectical rhilosor.hy is foredo·:::>rned to 
f:Jilure. No cathartic or purifying function can be anythinr-
but an illusive and a ~istaken task if rea~on ~u~t hnlt her 
6Jibid., Bk. I, Sec. lJl. 64rbicq, Ek. I, Sec. 132. 
65Ibid., 
-
Bk. I, Sec .. 13 7. 66Ibid., Bk. I, Sec. 13 s·-4:; . 
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restles~ journey before such indubitable truthE;. Their 
existence are thernsel ves !1aramount oroof o ;· the absurc~i ty of 
the ~hilosophic ~uest along dialectical lines. If there is a 
valid intellectual activity to ::istory, if ~~ .:story c.::1n in 
fact justify her claims and at the same time illuminate those 
dark corners of ipnorance instead of addin~ to its onacity, 
then it has succeeded to philosoohy and c an justly lav claim 
to her mantle. Vico 1 s scope ~iven to history has becon1e the 
European standard of education. There is a. historicnl method 
to all intellectual studien. Vico supplif~s a foundation and 
a lofty goal to all the culturists; the anthronolorists, 
sociologists, lin~uists, and cultural analysts; it is withi~ 
such studies they claim certainties and truth. This is the 
nev.r Science--History. 
The tacit a~Yurnption at work here is the same: as that 
'·:hich is so -creve.lent today , v:hich is that a thing is true if 
it can be· reduced to something more certain than the object 
of in~uiry, i.e., the reduction theory of truth. The assu:nr:·-
tion predicates a sharp cleavafe between kn8~ledge and reality 
and hence exhibits a scepticism as to the validity of t he 
philosophic ouest that posits direct knO\ded r;e. History, 
includinp; the philosophy of history,. is an exainple of this 
criterion at work. The object is to find apodictic certainty 
in a conceptual matrix. If knm:ledpe is seen as an existen-
tial act not about somethin.g, but _sornethinr; in itself, then 
, ~- -~· 
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it precludes the reduction theory of truth as beine anything 
but a convenicmt .!:'icti0n. That '1 ~ o~-~ethir.r: " is .:1eality and 
that knO\'lledp;e i lJ-w:1es the knov:er ns rcali ty. Eence from i l 
'· tbis perspective, ~'hilos onhy has nothing to do v:i th history·. 
FhilosoPhy does not use ~:i~tory--history is a secondary 
method of cor.municatinr: idear: to readers who do not come into 
the main stream of \vork~~ thcrr.s elves. Eistor:.', like auto-
mobiles, Must be contir,u<1.Uy rcdesir:ned to fit the f2.shion of 
the day. Gibbon, Eerder, Lessing, Vico, and Marx are dated 
and need restylin~ to meet the newer fashions. 
A fe\•T cursory rsrnu1·ks, of course, cannot be C.eemed 
sufficient justification to reler:<:l.te history into Limboo 
Hence, an analysiG of history is necessary because, ironi-
cal1y enour,h, a history of f.i5tory yields a r-oor harvest. 
The documentation of a vmrk, r-r.ilosophic or not , is a 
nrocedure v;hich it is assumed gives continuity anJ background 
to correlate 1.-·:hat, ~resu":"!~nly , \·wu2.d other.-:ise be too difficult 
or ir.:nos~ible to cor.1T.Tchc~cl. 'I'he re01~lt has been to return 
thinkers to the c erta.in and sure uomnir.. of "facts , hard and 
:--ude." \'le have become acct:.!:-t0r.1ed to doubt th~ validity of 
metar:hy~ical tbir:ki r..r.r , a<> ,,.;ell as any procedure for· the use 
of cone epts not 1rounded m~on sense data. This is a result 
of a rationalisl7! that t:20 no+:, 8ecn thcur;ht throu.r:h to its 
logical conclusion. It is based on Vico's distinction between 
L 
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the certun and the com.~, 67 and is a belief that philoso r hy 
is in the realm of tte abstract and common, and therefore 
lacks appeal in t he certnin. 
Tr. e abstract leads away frot• the security of the 
familiar and hence it lacks certainty~ A return to history 
is a return to the concrete and comf'ort of the certain. In 
considering a work, it is as if one is under a stranr,e kind 
of obligation to see it within a historical settinG and it is 
this frame·work that lends it its autl:enticity. 68 The histori-
cal settinP.; is sou,P:ht as- if there were an historical a priori 
form of the understanding, and \'l·hatever truths that :night 
sift down as a residual product must first, accord in ~ to 
these rules, be vouched for by the historical method. The 
insights must, it is arp,u.ed, f al l back U'!'JOn that realm of the 
certain, i.e., the culture into which the vwrk has b een born 
and from which its intelli~ibility has its source and stren~tho 
Indeed, a culture ttat has not developed her quota of histor-
ians is considered as "unhistorical" and this observation has 
become a criticism. To be unhistorical is t o he naive and 
backward. 
The distinction between the certain and the abstract, 
67Ibid., Bk ... I, Sec. 137 and 144-145. 
68cr. Vico, The Nevr Science, op. cit., B.ook III, 
"Discovery of the True HO!ner," especially Sec. E82-8 f 8. 
101 
as well as the validit--y of such a dichotomy, aE:stunes a philo-
sophical positiont hence, to be judged as other assertions, 
i.e., its cognizance and consistency. The primary task then 
is still a ~hilos o~hical analysis. Yet, the his torian adds 
universality to h i s cla ims. His claim is not just ~ra~atic, 
but demands the sa~e audience that her sister discipline 
claimed:--the same universal ap plication as universal mathe-
matics. It is not an accident that this form of disci pline 
arose at the same time a s the. growth and d evelopment of 
mathematics. The rise of symbolic techniques ~ave vast 
applications to mathematics, but left t h e particular, the con-
tent, bare and alon e . History vtas cast in t he r ole to fill 
this gap. The historica l approach is t h e dominant pedagogical 
tool today. There is a historical meth od a pplied to all 
branches of kno'\'Jledge--this is its additional claim to univer-
sality. It O\'res its existence to a sixteenth and seventeenth 
century distinction of rather dubious philosophical merit. 
-At any one time, there are an unendin[ nurnbe-r· of inci-
dents, yet, not all things that happen are historical~ No 
one could record al l the events in any one day, much less 
c over a period of time that history seeks to embrace. A rule, 
measure, yardstick, or, if one prefer, a selection is assumedo 
This princiPle of selection is a value judgement. Indeed,_ it 
might be argued that the historian is not cognizant of con-
sciously choosing value judg~~ents, but nevertheless, it is 
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clear that there is one at work. Sir Keith Hancock, the 
historian 's critic of history, states that tte historian can-
not .succeed in refr.aining from judgement, "tLey simply succeed 
in concealinf-: from themselves the vrinciples on which their 
judgement is based.n69 vJhatever judr;ement is favored, the 
conclusion follm·ls with mechanical rapidity. The selection 
of facts is determined by the value judgement and the idea 
seen in history is read into history by the selection of 
facts. A historical fact is a product of a fancy, or, if one 
·prefer, a phantom. History justifies whatever thesis it 
first presuc~osed in its selection of fact~, and conversely, 
the facts justify the scale of measurement. The utilization 
of the value judgement separates events into the historical 
and the unhistorical. The unhistorical are conveniently for-
gotten for they are the precise elements v1hich do not lend 
themselves to the tr1es is nor tte choice of _;udgernent . The 
historical work then is a speculative pronouncerr..ent derived 
from a value jude;e;Tien.t not defended on the basi.s of an explicit 
analysis, but s eeki n,Q; to assert its thesis by an immense 
accumulation of facts '::hich , as if by mere force alone, 
sr,outs 
the thesis. It is an appeal, like all dogmatic appe.als, 
to 
something outside of reason and lor.;ic, to the arena of tbe 
69sir Keitt Hancock, 11 ll·~achiavelli in 1'-Iodern ~ress"-- (~n 
Incuiry into the Historical J-.·Iettod ), Journal of H~st ory,. XA. 
( 193 5 )., 100 • 
I ; 
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c·ertain, the obvious, and the unouestionE!d assum!")tions of the 
readers. Dante's view no less ttan St. Aupustine's is a 
matrix of symbolic interpretation in '\<.•hich man's fate is read 
both in his soul's course and in history. Eistory is man's 
path written lar~e. This history is lin~al. There is no 
return, no cycle. The beginning was creation, the fall, tte 
cominr: of Christ, th2.t unique point that changes the succeed-
ing course of history and is followed by the .second cominp; 
that drops the curtain upon the drama of God's mastery into a 
cast of the saved and the damned. Chr·istian history and 
metaphysics are int ert\·Tined. 
The Bible 1r-:rites metaphysics as ttou.c:h metaphysics 
were history. In other words, in the Bible God is not 
the most abstract and comprehensive universal but the 
Abs olute Singular·, kno•,,rn not by speculative deduction 
of the attributes from the pure idea of him, but by 
meditation upon his recorded deeds in history.70 
Karx utilized this same sche:'lc to lay the foundations of his 
own system and in that sense he still renained true to his 
Judaic heritage. In underst~nding this time-continuity, he 
caine into contact v.rit.h ·the lost realm o.f' certainty that 1tras 
once the armor and protection of the laity of Christian 
?OJ. v. Lan~~ead Casserly, The Christian in Phi~o~~phy 
(New York: Charles -Scribners & Sons, 19511, p. 142. Cf. 
T • • ?2 f tl It . Bru:.rmer Revelat1on and "1-eason, QQ• c1t., pp. - ., l.S chara.c··t~ris tic nf the Biolical idea 0f revelation that it 
cannot be expressed as an abstract idea . Tt~ 3ib~ical idea 
of revelation cannot be separated from the.h~s~or1cal facts 
• • • for ttis very ~eason an abstract def1.n1t1on of revela-
tion is irn;Jossible." 
104 
the O~)V.;Oll~ t ' r. ~ o-,.·d · ··- :r· 
.... ... .. .,_ • -- , J - \._ '-' ' ~ .... ; • J... ~' 
Yet , even if the concor.-t of cont.inri1.y v-' er€ ~ .. , be 
the ~~·isT,orie.r "' T l~r: C'"~ .. c- le.,...l.· .. ~ .. - ~tel·r ;rl'' "' l' -· e 
- 'l,.. \. h ...... - .,.os,._ L, , -- ':. : .. , ..6 '' - ~... -- · ... .J.... ~ • ... .. 
:_' ~-~·ectly . 
l.-,.. ~· t::c test o~~ trut:-: . ~+ ... - """C"-~ .. ·-- .... ...~ ...... , 
' • c-.~:·· .('.:. "· .l ...... , .~ •. t .c c \. ..... , ,..._ ~ .  1 •.. :: !"""- ~ '""'Y)_ • ' 1.~ fv· 1 s ....  ·. -~ ~ t, c:-:: -.)c.~-u~ i.r..~: t :) o c rr·)vcc~ ; · - ~ -- .J - -- -
'h ..._, l ' ·.' .. _-:"' r-:-l·_ ..... , ).·C..,_, ro. ~_]nrtin ... r. U' ..'~r: . -..1..- ... l-~C ~f . r~s.sea .. y vne ac .: - _.:. · <;;. " -- - -
~ t re-1 1 ~· t> . ..,,, ,-1--.t rc·.~ .. air.: _ _ .; __ l .. 1l.l!"~VC . 
·. :hat !!~e::-1 :J l a distcH1 a (":C -·-:.;. .L; _, ·.n ... , - -"- --
]~ 
ill I ~ I 
L 
105 
Drea.:ns and ideals in a dead man r·.s head are hardly the acces-
sible property of investip:ators. But one thine is "certain" 
and that is the institutions that were left behind, for one 
can infer much fro~ these tansible re~ains. They were certain 
that the thought of the· past as;e must be embodied. The new 
thou~ht can be seen mirrored in the institutions much like 
geological deposits read by the geolo~ist. These arc the facts 
that are unarguabl·e... From these firm facts one can build a 
structu!'e by virtue of whicb all else c?.n be sesn as radiating 
lines from a locus· of points. If a nroblem j_s raised, the 
task is to revert the process and see it within the li~ht of 
the age's institutions and traditions molded in the firQ 
stuff of objective certainty. This is the field of the histor-
ian. Exa'Tlining institutions and their effect upon PJan 
includes the work of th·e anthropologist, sociologist, and 
culturalist. The test of this, the historian's hyootheais, 
would be quite simple if there were in fact a oositive cor-
relation between the pro~ress of man and his institutions . 
Assuming this correlation, social man or hi~t~rical man is con-
sidered as a function of the tradition and institutions within 
his culture. He is not just influenced by th.em but is molded 
and conditioned ·by them. Thev become in fact the collective . 
wisdom of the race and culture. Reflecting the \-faT;, in 1..rhich 
man has resolved his proble.11s, they·, ra~her than man, become 
the objects of knowledge. Conditioned by society, his 
L 
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thoughts are a function of this process and it fall m·;s t.r,at 
a lesser role must be relep,ated to him rather than to societv 
J 
or th-e state. Both Locke and r·,~ill sought an alternative in 
their conceots of natural la'\'1 and natur.al ri ::;:ht \'!hen c-Jn-
fronted with this obvious conclusion. They sou.~ht to protect 
the individual and preserve the right of a constant criticism 
of institutions without man sufferin~ fran the absolute state. 
Not being able to predicate where such criticis?:-J or insights 
mi,Q:ht have thei-r- source, none, they thoup:ht, should be 
excluded by any arbitrary rule. This latter tradition 
advances the concept of natural man affectin~ institutions 
and not they he . The ori~in of this concent owes itself to a 
reluctanc·e to advance dor:matism in the face o.: their ad:.Iitted 
thesis of only probable knowled.r:e c.. On ~he other hand, if man 
as a historical being was to espouse other theories, he would 
seem to oppose the wisdom and history of the race. Jlence, it 
is not an accident that the deduction from such theories 
necessitates the state to be untouchable and man a servant and 
a.n obedient one at that. 'The moral as-pect of t .his thesis 
needs little exposition. Yet, the alternative in natural man 
places a value on thought and moral conduct precisely because 
it may affect society by changing and redirecting it . So 
again universal status was now given to natural law and 
natural right in order to insure the purifyin[ nature of rca-
son as crit i cism. This conflict between natural man and 
1~ 
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social man, or man's oblip.:ation to himself as his ideals and 
t .hose imposed U!Jon hi:n by society as duties, only point to a 
basic antinomy. Rev,ardless, the issue is no lonr,er obscure . 
Both concepts view man in relation to society and his effect 
upon it... The initial concept is therefore the same. They are 
twins each assertin.r: the sa:ne thint;, but utilizin1~ different 
perspectives in applying the consequences. The society in 
both is the ideal whether the change is made by man or by the 
institutions . Philosophy, on th-e contrary, starts t':ith a dif-
ferent approach. It starts with man and endE with him. If 
i:1 t he course of phi losophy unfoldinr;, the society is altered,. 
so be it• but this is outside of its L1nedi.1.te concern. 71 TLe 
philosopher acts and if others seek to mirror hi.s actions, then 
undoubtedly society is changed, but it is not inc~~bent either 
upon society or the philosopher that it must do so. There is 
no collective catep:orical imperative in the offerin[. Society 
mi~ht indeed reject the philosopher, as- it so o£'ten has, but 
it still matters not. The institutions of society may indeed 
chanr;e in the lip:ht of the irnpact of ohilosophy, but a g:a irr it 
~hould be stressed that this does not re.flec·t any :Jriority 
for man as a social or natural man . It is in the strictest 
sense indifferent to fictions held by society. In the indif-
ference lies the 1:dsdom. Philosophy starts ,..;ith the chanp;e 
7lcorn.ford, .£2.• cit., IX, 592a •. 
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in the particular tn3n l'il::.ich result ~ fror:! tLe diE:ci~line of 
philo~ophy not ~:::;r the st<:.t r. , society, :)r :i.r-.sti0ution~, :):..:t 
.for himself . Thi.~ do""·!'> n r-- t "Y'l •. reel'' ':, e t r-•. :-_ ,· ~- - :... 2·"' ~1 · 
.___ , I .... . _  "'""' J...:. . :lcnces E:OC:L-
etv 
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for if the ner-1:J£') rs o.\ society beco!,:e philosorhers tLen 
society as a v1hole chc.mee~. The out\·:ard ci: ::m r.~e of r.1an by 
·.; virtue of a change in his institutions does not insure any 
.. 
philosophic change. It may leave ~an as b : i E: , no different 
than before except for a chane;e of plumbinr . Like\·.'ise, 
chan~ing institutions by criticism and rc~c iJ'ecti o n v:iU:ot.:t 
the individual undcrcoinr; a basic non-conditioned chanr.e is a 
chance of dress v;J:'.'ich mir-ht be attro.ctive 'r;ut leaves :r:an 
naked underneath. 
P erh~pE it r:Ji ,rrht be inquired, ,:rhy thiE analysis,. this 
effort to lay bare ::md rcrudiate the methodolor:y o f the 
historian? Grantinr: that philosop!-:y and history cr-m 'be seen 
as antagonistic ir:tellectunl rursuits, 1·.rh;).t ::-ur:0 se ,-;o',Jl.'i tr:is 
adv::nce if the thesis is a.t once accepted'~ Or, e:xtcndinr~ the 
arg:ument further, even :'::r ;: ntin[ tt.c asc-u -:-:P ":.i c n :Jf its irrec ~m-
cilable c-haracter, \·That fol"\ov.'-G that justifies the crit:.r;ue"i 
Pr~arily, \·that is a.cces~iblE: t0 ~eas-::>n rr.n~t be treated 
by reason solely ,,rithin the realm of reason. "1'! .. , e autho r, 
,... 
..:..s 
tine , his influer:ceE, and tis ~sycholc~ica~ charac ter a~e of 
no im portance. The '\·.rork or tl:e idea is tr.e on.ly concern and. 
it mo..tters little if he, the autl:or, did or did not v:ri te or 
t t- +-'ne to""e "'"·rom evl.'dence t0 e _;:istence is ilJ.e_~itir1ate . u .... er ..., _ _. ·"' - · 
-- ........... 
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If the concept is obscure, contradictory, and il~o~ica~, so 
the conclusion follm·:s. 
It might be argued that this philoDophical analysis is 
one thing, but the historian's cone epts are tJ:-.e tools, 
respectable tools, and hence must fashion his work. The 
other side answers that historians arc also critics o~ them-
selves and were it not that criticism plays a les~er role in 
this culture than d-rea"':''S, there \trmld be little to s ay for it 
a::-:~d it "t·:ould have been dispelled lon~ a go . 
Tl~e concept of \•!estern Civilization "TlOvinr.; in an 
ordered straight line carryinp: idth it all the vte:.!lth of t!'ie 
ages and depositinp: it alon .. c::.: the shores of the -,:recent is t! ,e 
main and most basic concept of the historian. It takes the 
name of the "Western Continuity" an,; asserts the indigenous 
character of western society--nothing; of value cane fro:--:! the 
outside, all that is of worth can be seen to have been 
derived from the Ancient Hellenics, the Romans, tr.e Dark Apes, 
the Renaissance, to the Kodern Age~. If there was, on the 
o~her hand, evidence to support the contention that the con-
cept of \;:estern Continuity is a myth and that there in fact 
v.'as no .such connection betv:een Greece anc. :t or.Je, 72 MUch less 
721\icolas Berdyaev,. The ~-.earring of Eistorv (London: 
Geoffrey Bles , Ltd., 1945), P? • lJt-9. Jerdyaev ' !:.· roir.t is 
that J.enaissance Platonism bears but a sli[."'ht resemblance 
to that of the Ancient ~jorld and "s·uch rcse::1b lances as exist 
are merely superficial and illusory." 
11 
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between Greece, Rome and Europe, it would be recornized as a 
myth. It is interesting to see the conclusions of the 
scholars at this point, i.e., the r.rasters of ~: istory examin-
ing the concept of Western Continuity.. C.harles Homer Haskins, 
looking back on time, attempts to fix the ori~ins of the 
"I··Iodern Age" and he advances the belief that the source can 
be traced to the Sicilian Court of Frederick II where the 
Jyzantine and Islamic influences were stron~ly felt. 73 Turn-
inr.; to Burckhart, he se·es the rise of the discovery of man in 
the Renaissance and asserts this is "really" ,,.,.~ere t h e founda-
tions of \'!estern Civilization has its roots. But the rd~tor-
ical techniques and scholarshi~ oi' 3urckhart have been care-
f ully re-vie1..ved and sub j ected to careful scrutiny by Jan 
Huizinga and in this careful analysis, he demonstrates the very 
noor scholarship and biases of Burckhart .74 One can readily 
understand why he chose to argue that the r.1odern a g e has its 
roots in the Renaissance since he is a Catholic historian v>~ho 
naturally feels it incumbent u~on himself to mirror a theo-
logical belief in history. Again, one ne ed not sjn_r>:le out 
Huizinga, for Dr. Coulton does a similar analysis on Ca~dinal 
73charles Homer Haskins , Studies in tl'. e ristary of 
r<iediaeval Science {1/ol . XXVII of Harv-ardUniversity h istorical 
Studies. Cambridge: Harvard University Pres s , 1924), P· 58. 
74Jan Huizinga, The Waninfi of the ~iddle ~- ( Ne\l't 
York : Doub leday, 1954)o 
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Nev.nnan ' s "Gothic l:ian ," the transmitter of the Greek-R oman and 
Christ·ian heritage, and finds the same scholarship and biases 
in Ne1rm1an as in Burckhart. 75 The example of Oskar Halecki 
should be noted since he demonstrates the untenab le distinc-
tion involved in fixing the limits of v:estern Civilization 
sl::m·rint; that this prejud·iced judr;ement shov:n itself in the 
elasticity of tr_eir very boundaries as tl-.ey sl:ift from the 
Rhine, Elbe, Oder, Vistula, and the Pyrenees.76 Or, the 
course of reading may turn to 3arraclour·t \".'ha finds himself 
in a quandary in his inability to define ,.;Lat he racans by the 
familiar concept of \'/estern Civilization. 77 Hence v.rhat is 
asserted as without m·erit by a brief philosophical vie\·/ is 
seen by historians themselves as questionable. Thus, among 
historians, there is little accord or ar:reement , even ar.1onr: 
the masters, since their conclusions dance as the premises 
s1: ift. 
Even if one \'v"ere to retain and define· adeouately t Le 
distinct.ions necessary· for hietory , the nroblem \·.rould remain, 
75ceorGe Cordon Coulton, EuroDe's Apprenticeship 
(London and Ne~·T York: Thomas Eelson and Sons, lS·40), P• 7'C . 
"Cardinal Newman's vision of the ;:ediaeval :.;onk as a clas s ical 
scholar is largely ima~inary." 
76oskar Halecki, The LLmits and Divi~ion of EJronean 
History (Nelrl York and .London: Shced & ~·iard, Ltd., 1950 }, r' • 
77ceoffrey Barracloue;h, l1 ist ory in a .Chanp;inr; .: orld 
(O·xford: Basil I3lach...,.Tell, 19551, PP• 3I="4t>. 
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i . e ., hm-,r to choose amon g c onf1i ct in:'· autl~ ·:ri t i Gs • Cons i (. er 
th<!t if history could b .e predictive , a true history, a trar.i c 
f1av.r v.:ould ners i~ t, becaus c by b einr.: -predictive, it must ~ :rc-
SUD, ':'·O.C: ·8 nO ne'd factor. 'I'l.-. "'re l'OU1 d ' ' -" ' . t _ - r ~ ,c ,.., ~ oe a r,cr.c. J.Or <1 nls ory 
of the history 1 s effect upon hh·tory, and 0 ;:. on t o t .. he 
in.:'inite regress frorTJ. Khicr1 Aristotle fled . 
Returnir:g now, it can be seen that for ~hilo~:orhy , the 
as:·ur:1 ptions of history must i.'irst be provcrl true ·nrior to 
tLeir 6i1Jnloyment : univers<Jl applicnticn. It ::: i p!~t be better 
to suqp.est readinr; history for its dr<...mat ic irr.port, for 
entertainment, or as a device to order salient fact:.; for 
other purposes . This noint o~ vie,:: is a1~o expr-essed by 
Ferdinand Schevi11 v.rhen he says that I!istory belom"::-; to the 
v : o~1d o-f Art: 
• • • History still in the main, is v~hat it has be£-:n 
since Herodotus invented the form. T!:e :-:-tajor chanr:; E:s 
are (a) the recent advc.mces o f subject r'1<1tter o.ncl (b) 
the recent severity of scholarly method . This h ~ ~ mi~led 
many to call it a science. You may, i f you \·:ill , c<:.ll 
its method scientific~ but the finished f. roduct belonrs 
t:J t:-1c v:orld of art . 7 · 
7EFerdinand Schevill ~ _tistorians (~hicar:o : 
University of Ch icago, 1956~, Notes on Histor1ography , P· 201 . 
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CHAPTER III 
MISAPPELLATION AND CONFUSION OF DIALECTIC 
I. FOREWORD 
Kant, Hegel, and Jung use the term dialectic, but it 
seems that the only ·thi~ they share in common is their 
disagreem-ent as to the scope and end of dialectic. The 
term "dialectic" now includes so many different meanings· 
that the examination of these authors should be undertaken 
to det-ermine what, if any, usag.e is consistent with the 
original Platonic. 
This does not imply or suggest that the private 
vocabulary of philosophers -should be abandoned;· merely that 
the new terms to cover new processes or concepts should not 
be presented in terms otherwise well defined. 
The conclusion to this section can readily be seen 
·from what has preceded, but since these philosophers have 
employed a similar ·term--dialectic--the eY.ercise sr.all be 
attempted. The examination will not advance the concept of 
dialectic, but it is justified as an example of how the 
concept of Dialectic has undergone a radical chanr,e since 
its original. formulation. 
, ' I 
- - ... 
The mucr. C..i E cu ~ sed on:' os·i_ ti :)n oe r,-.. t; r··. • •• : :.1 . 
relip:ion in European thotwi· t actu··, 11 v . 
. . • • • r , ( : V( ' r v ... ,: .. ·.·1t..:. ;:: ; , : · :1 
conflict nor cou:!.d it be c 0r.0ice rf: ·.: :: ~ . . ·.; .··t .- ... _1· .-.. - -! · ~;!.!~t.- : i ~c l ·. 
battle between eternal f'oes . TJ:e nhil o~o : l:er~; ir. r:c.<( ! · ~i : · r. 
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epistemological side • 
. ing thei:c salvation vdthin Chrictian t· :-r-:Lo lf.: . ·;·:. c~· a r!n: ~c c.~ 
the very same eoiste~clo :: y and structur ' a~; t :. ( : r n or : ;: ~:.~::. ~ :r. 11· 
for they retreated into c erta i.nt : , indu b it ab :.c t~·11'.-!'.: · , .1-:-.J 
appeals to faith. 
conquest of natur~4 The cor~cuEst oi' n :~ t urc , ... .-~ ~ r, o :. , :. ~ ·.- · c:cr-, 
cone ei ved as suc 1~ , for nature 'll':as tl: e :·.at cr .i;:! 1 t . L::m~~~;. ,._.;,:..cr: 
certain knowledge co · ..tld be atta'i:;ed , el.:::~l:: ·:J cc ::.u~e ~<::_ -.,~. t.i .~ r. 
\'Jas thought as separate and di~tinct ::r·o; : 'v~. c ~t:c·~: t :::> : :·L:;..,..-; -
edge. Salvation throup.b fv.ith <Jssur-ed t=-:e ~J'.l~ a.-:-. f: :. car-e 
from tte inferno. 
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science and mathematics . There men f:. oup:ht t 1-: e new k 1 drr 
- " .. now e c·e 
under the model of self-evident and certain mathematics. 
As '\'rith Descartes, their systems of thou~~ht ';.;ere 
meant to indicate that the nevf science could be a source of 
knowledge and yet, at the same tir.1e, need not de.'71and a mecha-
nistic concept of nature, i.e., theirs was actually an apolo-
getics for their intellectual life and, in its appeal to self-
evident truths, a defense a~ainst disturbing theolo~ical 
beliefs. True, Hobbes failed to do this; yett he didn 't 
offer an alternative to Christian salvation. !-!is work was 
primarily c·ri tical • 0 f course these thinkers v-rere '·Ie 11 
enoup:h aware of the r.enlir.;hteninr," force of the CLristian 
Inquisition not to step too far . Descartes himself withheld 
the publishine; of his Y<:ork for three years because of the 
Galileo affair.l In order to secure a philosophical f oundation 
for the new science, Descartes hypothesized two metaphysical 
entities--the extended and unextended--but this brought ·with 
it nrunerous problems. The rationalists and empiricists chose 
the unextended and extended respectively and accused each 
other of foolishness. Hume criticized both for not beinc 
a~are. that certa inty cannot be had concerninr, either ideas, 
facts, or lor.ic. He, like others of the e~pirical cchool , 
had drifted into scepticism and even denied the possibility 
of inductive inference. Hence some- .European philosopters, 
e:>."tending the issu-e, thou:-.:ht they could even get by VJithout 
l d T "' • ..... ch Il ene Deccartes , Discourse .Qll I:etho, , t!' :ms. L' • r.,e l.v · 
(Chicaf::o: Or--en court Puhlishinf, r_;o.~ Chap. VI, PP · 64- 0 5 · 
l . 
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the hypothesis of God. Concurrently with this, the growth of 
science was increasing in spite of these philosophica1 con-
versations and it app·eared that a completely detenninistic 
universe could soon be demonstrated. God, Free Will, and 
Immortality could be viewed as unnecessary concepts. Kant 
sought to .reintroduce these concepts, define their scope, and 
also to re-establish the thesis that one could still be a 
Christian, a scientist, and a philosopher, simultaneously. 
He did not construct a system of thought towards a God; he 
offered no alternative to Christian metaphysics; rather, he 
intended to perfonn two services: :One, to deny the claims of 
"·speculative" reason to transcendent insight; and two, to 
restore the ethical force of practical reason. "I have there-
fore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make 
room for faith."l But speculative reason stood as an obstacle 
to the employment of practical reas-on; in fact, it extended a 
thesis discounting its value. Therefore, Kant attacks the 
claim. of speculative reason and attempts to reintroduce th·e 
regulative s·ide of reason--morality. However, the point at 
issue here is not to recapitulate the rise of Kantian philos-
ophy, nor chart the general rise of European philosophy. The 
point is that Kant claims to employ dialectic and therefore 
lNorman K. Smith (trans.}, Immanuel Kant's Critioue of 
Pure Reason (New York: The Humanities Press, 1950), Preface. to 
Second Edition, Bxxx, (p. 29). 
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the question is simply: (1) define ·its nature and scope of 
activity, and (2) examine Kant's contribution to the rol e of 
dialectic. Primarily_, his \•:ork i .s not a dialogue; it offers 
no dialectical technique, no personal envolvement, no "risk" 
in any Jungian sense: it is a monologue. Its subject is 
reason itself. The attempt is to deal with it in its uni ver--
sal character--the conclusions binding on all mankind$- He 
says of dialectic: 
In former times dialectic \'IG.s studied with r:reat 
diligence. This art presented false princirles in the 
semblance of truth, and sour,ht, in accordance v:ith these, 
to maintain thinr:s in ser1blance. Amonr,st the GreE.:ks the 
dialecticians were advocates and rhetoricians wh o could 
lead the populace wherever they chose, becaus~ the popu-
lace lets itself be del,~ded with semblance. Dial r.ctic 
v1a$ therefore at that ·time the art of se1~1blanc e. In 
logic, also, it was for a lonr: time treated under the 
name of the art,_ of disputat.i.Q.!:!, and durin r:; thc:J.t period 
all logic and philosophy was the cultivation by certain 
chatterboxes of the art of semblance. But nothin~ can 
be more unworthy of a nhilosonher than t he cultivation 
of such an art.· Dialectic in - this form, therefore, must 
be altogether suppres sed, and instead of it t t ere must be 
introduced into logic a critical examination of tr.is 
semblance. 
We should then have two parts of logic: the analvtic, 
..,.rhich will treat of t!:e formal criteria of truth, and the 
dialectic, v-rhich will contain the marks and rules by v:bich 
·we can kno\AI tl·.at something does not a r.ree with the formal 
criteria of truth, although it seems to a gree v.:ith th~. 
Dialectic in this form would have its use as a cathart1c 
of the understanding.2 
Aside from Kant's i~norance of the theory and history of dia-
lectic, it is clear that he has employed a special use for 
2Norman K. Smith, A Cornmen~ 2Q Kant's Critioue of 
Pure ::leason (Ne\·1 York: Humanities Press, 1950), PP• 1 TJ-74, 
quoted from Einleitung~ by Kant. 
llt' 
this tenn. Kant says that in regard to knowled _r~e of f' orm, as 
opposed to its content, the criterion of truth mu~t be !'ound 
in lo.~ic because there the univ·ersal and necessary rul e s of 
the understanding are found. Hence, 11~'J hatever contradicts 
these rules is false. li'or the understanding viould. tl: ereby be 
made to contradict 'its ovm ~eneral rules of tf:ou~ht, and so 
contradict itself.") This is the General Lo~ic--the prin-
ciples of all logical critic ism--and is therefore entitled 
the analytic. If the log ical form is valid, the c ont cnt c a n 
be examined to determine its validity: 
We must first indep endently of lo~ic, obtain reliable 
information; only then are we in a pos ition to enouire, 
in accordance with logical laws, into t he usc or tLis 
infonnation and its connection in a cohere nt vd:ole, or 
rather to test it ·by these laws. There is however·, 
something so tempting ·~n the posses s ion of an art so 
specious, ttrough '\'Jhich 'ttle give to aJ.l our kno,.rledr-;e, 
however, uninstructed we may be in rer-ard to its c ontent, 
the form of understa.nding, that general lor;ic v1hich is 
merely a canon of jud~~ent, has been emnloyed as if it 
were an organon for the actual production of at least 
the semblance-of objective assertions, and has thus been 
misapplied. G-eneral logic, when thus treated as an 
organon, is called dialectico4 
In the employment of reason, c-ertain concepts may be u~ed 
which have their origin i n and through tt:e em nirical or ptenom-
enal '\'Torld and no difficulties are encountered until they are 
utilized beyond this specific domain. If these concepts--v-;hat 
3smith (trans.), Im~Januel Kant's Cr-iticue o f ~ 
Reason, op. cit., B84, AflJ, {p. 9S} • 
4Ibid., A61, B$5, {p. 99) • 
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h-e calls the categories of the understandin?;--are e'Tl!Jloyed to 
characterize reality, then they have recourse to terms which 
are binding only in tt:e phenomenal \·:orld and hence they are 
misapplied. If tte categories of the understanding are never-
theless used to apply to reality itsel~ to what he calls the 
noumenal world, then it is invalid--not lo.r:ically, hovJever, 
since they may indeed accord with the formal rules of loGic. 
This misapplication of the categories of the understandinr: to 
reality itself, the noumenal v1orlci, is sim~ly an error of 
judgement, since tr:.e terms are valid only phenomenally... To 
demonstrate this spurious character, a crit icisrn is applied, a 
technique of eliciting their error; hence, ·this is the function 
of the transcendental dialectic. The arguments in which these 
categories of the understanding are misused have all t~e formal 
aspects of a valid argument, but they are nevertheless illu-
sions. The function of his dialectic is to make explicit t his 
illusionary character~ Therefore the important controversy 
between Platonic and Kantian dialectic at t his point is .,.;!:ether 
the ultimate is capable of being reached, or, in Kantian terms, 
if the transcendental dialectic is able to resolve and dissi-
pate the illusion so that the real, the noumenal, can be seen. 
In Plato, the dialectic is a discipline lead~n~ to the Good; 
while in Kant, the dialectic can merely d~1onstrate t~at the 
categories of the understandin-g are valid only Phenomenally 
r 
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and therefore must be confined to experience.5 It does not 
by that very insight, however, in any way remove its force--
the illusion remains. The dialectic, in Kant's presen~ation, 
is rest-ricted to detecting the illusion of transcendental 
judgements. It exposes them; it does not destroy it: 
••• That the illusion should, like logical illusion, 
actually disappear and cease to be an illusion, is some-
thing which transcendental dialectic can never be in a 
position to achieve. For here we have to do witt a 
natural _ and inevitable illusion, which rests on 
subjective6principles, and foists them upon us as objective. 
It is one thing to say that reason, or the transcendental 
dialectic, is incapable of overcoming the ·transcend-ental 
illusion, and completely another th i ng to assert that it is 
therefore forever outside the grasp of man. It is obvious 
that man reasoning, thinking thoughts, will not by that very 
activit-y experience a state of not thinking thoughts. Or, 
again, the habitual modes of conceiving the world will not 
lose their function by thinking new thoughts. To know the 
w-orld as it is, the noumenal, the thin?; in itself, presupposes 
that man knowing and experiencing must first remove the veils 
and projective devices- that pennit reality to become assim-
ilated, finite, and thereby understandabl-e to _reason. The 
5rhe term "experiencen is used strictly in the Kantian 
reference. 
6smith {trans.), Immanuel Kant's Critiaue of Pure 
Reason, on. cit., A29 e, BJ55, (p. ]00). 
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real issue to philosophy is whether reason functioning as a 
cathartic tool can re~ove its own impediments to that vision 
of reality. To ack.nowled~.e that reality is beyond reason, 
supra-rational, is possible either by a dermatic statement 
or by a discovery through reason realizin{'; its own limita-
tions by the intuition, or nous, ~oing beyond reason itself~ 
With Kant_, it is a doV!Jatic assertion, hence it may still 
work towards skepticism and ant·i-rationalism. Kant, of 
course, escapes the skepticism because the lack of certain 
rational proof provides the grounds for the committment of 
faith; but if one is not a Christian, it may conceivably 
advance the cause of skepticism. 
The illusion does have a vast popular appeal. Kant 
acknowlede;es that it furthers speculation and has practical, 
or ethical, ramifications.? This human disposition to specu-
late beyond the legitimate employment of empirical cate~ories 
is a natural tendency. On the other hand, this tendency can-
not be rationally defended. The Christian accepts his thesis 
on faith and appeals to reason., but no matter how comforting 
it may be, it can carry no cognitive wei r;ht. Stated in 
familiar terms: one's conviction of the truth of a thesis. 
7Ibid. A466, B494-A476, B504, (pp. 424-426). 
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does not add any cognit ive evidence to the assertion. There-
fore, Kant's employment of dialectic is ner:ati ve. It is a 
loe:ic of illusion. 8 This illusion is not, Lm'.'ever , a merely 
lo£;ical illusion, for \·;hen attention is brou.~ht to bear upon 
it (the logical illusion) nnd the forr.1al fallacy i~ denwn-
strated, the illusion completely disappears.9 The illusion 
to v:h ich dialectic ad .J. res E." eo itself is, on the contrary, a 
transcendental illusion ~hich 
••• does not cease even aft-er it has been detected 
and its invalidity clearly revealed by transcendental 
criticism (e. ~ . the illusion in the oro~osition: the 
-v:orld must hav e a beginning in time)·. 'i'he cau.se of this 
is that there are fundn:.1ental rules and maxi!J1s for the 
employment of our reason, and that these yave alL the 
appearance of beinf objective nrincioles . 0 
Therefore, t.he dialectic in Kant has a ner,at ive or regulative 
employment. He says: 
The transcendental dialectic \\'Till therefore content 
it_self \'lith exposing the illusion of transcendent judp;e-
ments, and at the sa~e time taking orecautions that we 
be not deceived by it. That the illusion should, like 
loeical illusion, actuaJ_ly disappear and cease to be an 
illusion, is somethin~ which transcendental dialectic 
can never be in a posit ion to achieve--. F'or here '\ole have 
to do with a natural and inevitable illusion, ;·:hich rests 
on subjective principl-es, and foists ti~em u non us as 
objective; 1r-1hereas lor;ical dial-ectic in its exposur? of 
deceptive inference has to do mer~ly wit~ an ~rror 1~ ~~e 
following out of principles, or w1th an 1llus1on ~rtlfl­
cially created in L~itation of such inferences. lhere 
8Ibid ., A293, B350, {p. 297) • 
9Ibid., A296, B353, {p. 299) • 
lOibid. __ , A297,- B354, (p. 299) • 
123 
existsr then a natural and unavoidable Jialectic of Pure 
reason--not one in v-rhich a bun;-1 er mi ~ht e.ntanrle hi:~!'>elf 
through lack of knm·rled;:e, or one \·:hich so:·:f: ~onhist has 
c:-rtificially invented to canfuse U:irrkinr; people, but one 
1nsepa:able from hu.'nan reason, anci v:Lich,. even. aft-er its 
de~eptlv~ness has been exposed, will not cea!~ e to play 
tr1cks \•:J..th :eason and continually entrap it into momen-
tary aberratlons over nn·.~ ar-ain call i:1,r: for c'Jrrection.ll 
The spe-cific. application of the didlectic reaches its culmin-
ation in the antinomies of nure reason, f :n• it ic there that 
Kant refers to t _hem as ttthc dialectic nlay of co.sr.wlor-ical 
ideas." That there are only four basic antinor:1i cs i.s obvious 
since ·there are only four series of syntr:etic presuupositions 
that a priori limit the empirical synthesis: 
Thesis 
The world has a bep;inninr.; 
in time, and is also limited 
as re~ards space.l2 
Every composite substance in 
the world is made uu of s~nple 
parts, and nothinr an)~lhere 
exists save the simple or what 
is camposed of th-e simple.l3 
Causality in accordance with 
laltlS of nature is not the only 
causality from which the ap1_jear.-
ances of the world can one and 
all be derived. To explain 
these appearances it is ne~es­
sary to ascune that t~ere 1s 
als-o another causality, that 
of freedom .. l4 
llibid., A298,B355, ( p.JOO}~ 
13Ibid., A434,B462, (p.402) • 
---
Ant ithesis 
The world has no bep,inninr.l 
and no limits in space; it 
is infinite aG regards both 
tL~e and space.l2 
No co~nosite thin~ in the 
warld is made up of simple 
parts, and there no~here 
exists in the -..·rorld any-
t hinp; s i:n pl e • 13 
There is no freedol"'!1 j 
every<.hinf. in the '.·:o:-ld 
takes Place solely in 
accord;_r.ce \•:itt la\vs o.f 
nature .l4 
12rtid .. , .A426, 3454, ( P .J <;6} • 
l/""Ibid.,A44L,3472, (p.4J 9) • 
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Thesis 
There belon£s to the world 
either as its part or as its 
cause, a being that is abs o-
lutely nece.ssary.l5 
Antithesis 
An_ab solutely neces 0 ary 
b _el:rrg now!H::re cxi ~ts i:1 
tne w~~ld, nor does it 
exist outside tte ~or!d 
as its cause.L~ 
The four antinomies ar·e the centr<~ 1. issue 5 in ··{; i 1 'J.S-
ophy. They are centrGl becc::.use they are tl .c C · n-.c ern 'l f ~ 
predominantly Christian era tha t has woven a fnbric o f 
thought from assumptions derived fro~ thcolo,. ical ·beliefs . 
To admit they ar e the central issues of rhilosonhy i.s but to 
acknowledge the importance of t h is set of theolo_:·· ical h <· Licfs, 
but, to the Platonist, these ouestions are nart o.f t::c· class 
of "likely stories ," 'r:hereas the real philosophical auc~tions 
and problems have a different er.1~h ::sis--tbe dialectical 
treatment of concepts movinp; tov-Jards tLe r emoval o f ir:n J rance. 
Kant presents these conflictin~ systems v:LicL ·are 
mutually exclusive theses , and attempts to de:no n~trate tr.e 
antinomical character of reason. He does not er.r<~ re in any 
midvJifery; rather, he holds up to reason a state::H~nt o f its 
m·m con~lict. Kant has claimed that ·he :r.as der:10n~tr~tcd t~e 
logical character of each of these four antinomies o: ~~ason, 
botl: the thesis and antithesis, and t!:A.t he has t ;: Y.en f :J ll 
responsibility to thereby show the certa inty of tte inevita ole 
l5Ibid., A452, B480, (p. 415) • 
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antinomy of reason.l6 Be that as it may, there are certain 
reservations, since many of the arf-uments are poorly construc-
tect.l6a Nevertheless, the issue is whether this accomplishes 
his end, and if this is dialectic. Let it be assumed that 
these two arguments, the rationalist's and the empiricist ·' s 
cosmological theses, can be held by some hypothetical person; 
·where then is the dialectic? The Kantian framework presents 
these positions formally in parallel columns; both are assumed 
to be formally logical; and Kant argues the incompatibility of 
these propositions rests entirely upon the mistake of extendinp; 
\\•hat is valid merely as regards appearance to things in them-
selves, and confusing both in one concept.l7 The resolution 
of the antinomical character of these theses is quite simpl-e. 
Kant proves they are f.als·e be.cause they are founded upon a 
contradictory concept. It should first be remembered that 
he demonstrates that both space and time are applicable 
only to appearances since they have their origins in the forms 
of sensibility, i.e., objects experienced always are known or 
given within space and time and hence they can be considered 
as the very forms through which, or by which, one conceives 
the very experience of objects. Or stated in another way, 
16Ibid., A421, B449, (·p!J. 393-94) • 
l6aibid., pp. 4S3-499. 
17Ibid., A486, B514,. (p. 43 7); A490, B518, ( PP· 43$-J 9); 
A525, B49-r,-{"p. 443); A506, B5.34, (p. 448). 
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these cone ept s (space and t i.m e) are pres u.ppos ed in experience 
before it can be experienced, but experience does not presup-
pose only the form of the receptivity, hence they are always 
prior to the act of experienae. Or, as Kant says, they are a 
priori. Space and time therefore are nothine in themselves, 
but only modes of representation. Yet, these ar,r~uments--both 
the thesis and antithesis--assume just such an independent 
character for space .and time, and they assume that space and 
time are independent of their representations; but, if they 
are only given throuGh them, why then defend the divorce? 
Assuming they are not s·elf-subsisting apart from their repre-
sentat·ion, it is contradictory to assume they are so for cos-
molo~ical considerations, i.e., the motive or intent of an 
argument hardly can be considered sufficient to change the 
character of the origin of concepts as well as regulate for 
their respective er.~.ployment. At this point, it is -not even 
important whether this is in fact true. The issue remains: 
How does this dialectically demonstrate their untenability? 
True, they are both mutually exclusive propositions and they 
both extend the categories of the understanding beyond their 
legitimate employment, -but this is· onJ.y true if the general 
criticism of reason as outlined by Kant is valid. The attempt 
here (in Kant) is to judge them both guilty and therefore 
invalid aside from their practical, spe.culative, and popular 
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appeal. The solution presupposes the individual accepting 
such a stalematelS as conclusive evidence of their dubious 
character and of concurring that this is in fact an exten-
sion of categories beyond their legislated scope. Hence, 
his conclusion rests upon a higher criticism, not upon a 
dialectic. The arguments have not been shown to be invalid 
by any reductio, merely upon their mutual cancelling· weight 
before reason. The object lesson that Kant wishes to draw 
is that suspicion should be aroused as to the proper use 
of reason, or concepts, in such arguments. However, the 
dialectical encounter need not employ such a form.. It would 
question the asserter, either the rationalist or the empiri-
cist, and draw from him the· premises for asserting ·this 
cosmological argunent, determine the reasons for its accept-
ance, and then judge that--not the thesis--for upon the one 
the other rests. The dialectician would approach Kant's 
dictum of destroying knowledge in order to make room for 
\ 
faith and would examine this in itself. Certainly Kant's 
main claim to fame is not in his anticipation of certain. 
positivistic theo~ies, but in the practical employment of 
lBibid., A502, B5JO,. (p. 446). "It is impossible to 
decide between them," and cf. A475, B503 (p. 430), presumably 
a person can be in a "state of continuous vacillation" 
between the arguments. 
' 
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reason in ord.er to make room for ethics and f a ith. 'l'he issue 
fort he dialectician \".'ould be to ex.:m~.ine if morality has its 
roots in ~ractical reason; why the concept of wil l is central 
to his thoup;ht, or \\'hy, if his inherited t heoloF';ical beliefs 
are sho"''TI to be invalid, should they be saved for r:-ractical 
considerations 'l Or,. a ga in, y..•hy consider m.orali ty in the 
lip;lrt of law or imperatives; ~·Jhat would be abhorrent in 
assuming morality to be a function of man • s im.rard growth? 
Before leavin~ Kant, there is a more eeneral and important 
point to be examined. Granted tha t Kant's use o f dialectic 
is a private usae e and that he does not advJ nce any add itional 
factor~ to tl1is study, stil l his doctrine as such does invite 
another issue o f general importance. It raises t h e ouestion 
of content. Is it to be assumed that dialectic can learn 
nothing t herefore from Kant 7 Hovrever,. since· he mi e;ht have 
employed anoth er tenn than d i al-ectic, the is .s ue can be 
extended to the question:· Of v!hat value are the non-dialec-
tical philosophies frcrn the dialectician's viev1 poi::1t 'i This 
question is certainly a central issue and (!eeds examination. 
Primarily, dialectic as a ph i losonhy beg.ins with the 
individual who is "oree:nant " hence it is an individual ~ . C) , 
process. Whatever the formal grounds for as s erting a posi-
tion, the dialectician ,.rould profit from the r;enera.l knmd-
ed~e that he may have of .some formal Philosophical issue or 
problam, but that does not justify the use of any n i gher 
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critical employment of reason on universal frounds . That it 
has this added factor is certainly i:1terestinr.;, but t!'-1is is 
only to say that it can be attacked from mo~e than one point 
of view. aeturninr_: the question to -Plato, v:c can immediately 
see a basis for a parallel . Theaetetus assumes knovil edge is 
perception and is quite content to pursue the argument 
strictly alone this line, but Socrates adds to this theory 
the implications of Theaetetus' posi:t_ion anon;:, ont::>lot;ical 
and ethical issues. Socrates shows that r·.is (Theaetctus') 
notion of kno1ttledge is in f;].ct Protagoras' doctrine of I~ian 
as the measure of all t h inr:s, and that this as::m .. ':'les that the 
nature of reality is in a state of flux: or Heraclitus' 
thesis. Sot too, the Kantian should be aole to denonstrate 
that the asserter of any position, of either the thesis or 
the antithesis, involves a conception of man, reli .::ion, 
philosoph.y and ethics or morality. Both asserters, the 
Kant ian and Theaetetus, \'Jould suffer more :roD t~e ensuine 
catharsis. On the Platonic analogy, the issue was resolved 
ouite early in the dialogue, out not the cons eouenc cs of t h e 
assumption. Hence the dialectician could effect more far-
reachine· results by the knowledg e of thes e f~rnal !10sitians. 
It could and does act as a matrix from which to dra''' t he con-
s e:quences.. HO\·rever, to demonstrate that tte idea itself is 
at fault by use of a higher criticism without an exa..'":lination 
of the reasons of the asserter or of his pres~poositions, 
I 1 
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indicates skepticism towards the role of ohilosophy as a 
whole. Therefore, from the consideratio.ns of dialectic, the 
issue is always the individual and his encounter durinr the 
midwifery. One can of course raise the ouestion: ~hat then 
would be the final philosophical solution of the major philo-
sophical problems? Or, in other terms, what is the formal 
content of the dialectical philosophy"? I .t is this oue.stion 
that still needs examination, but which must be put off until 
further examinations are made. 
III. HEGEL 
Hegel reintroduces Anaxagoras' Nous and gives a wide 
scope to philosophy. He says: 
The objects of philosophy_, it is true, are upon the 
whole the same as those of religion. In both the object 
is truth, in that supreme sense in \'lhich God and God 
only is the truth.l9 
He also employs dialectic and the problem will b.e to 
determine the usag e and to see if it can advance t ·he concept 
of philosophy as dialectic. 
Primarily, Hegel was the recipient of Kant's c~ncept 
of dialectic and to it he added further elements that in no 
· d taae Hegel was not content 
way made for a qualitat1ve a van b • 
19william \•iallace (trans.), Logic of Hee;el (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1931)' P• 3 • 
... _ 
with the antinomical character of reason he inherited from 
Kant, he added a third term which was intended to blend 
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their mutually exclusive natures into a new thine--the syn-
thesis. He took the name Kant originally gave to this and 
continued what ~ with Kant ~ misappell~tion. He claimed 
for this the name of dialectic~ The essential thing in 
his dialectic is that the apparent opposition between the 
thesis and the antithesis are reconciled in this higher 
union; they are harmoniously joined by this broader concept 
of a synthesis. 
Hegel's dialectic is subsumed under logic and is part 
of a triad of the Abstract, Dialectical, and Speculative. 
Each of these three- corresponds to the understanding, negative 
reason, and positive reason. It is not as parts, however, that 
Hegel views these, but rather as the "'moments' in every logi-
cal entity, that is, of every notion and truth what ever -•" 20 
The abstract side, or thought as understanding, is character-
ized by the distinct, and limits the abstract and treats it 
ttas having a subsistence and being of its own."21 It is this 
20~., par. 79:~ p. 143 • 
21Ibid., par. SO, a), -p. 143 • 
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capacity that is \'tell knm ... 'Tl in the sciences as the soirit of 
classifying: it "is not satisfied with cloudy and indefinite 
impress·ions, but g-rasps the objects in t~:eir fixed charac-
ter.n22 In this activity, understandinp: must not, however, 
r-o too far, as Hegel says, becaus-e it is n~t an ultimat-e, 
nbut orr the contrary finite , and so constituted that when 
carried to extremes it veers round to its opposite. 11 23 Hence 
out of the abuse o:!:' the understanding it sets un its ovm 
opposite; therefore, it becomes negative reason or dialectic. 
If this opposite nep.:ative factor is pr esented, then it is a 
11 lrrere negation, n24 and is dialectical skeptici~in v-:hen its 
anplication is applied to Philosophical theories. It~ true 
employment does not function in this restricted r:1c1.nner for 
Hege l; rather, it has far ~rander ~rounds since it "is the 
very nature and essence of everything Predicated by more 
understanding--the law of thinr,s and of the finite as a 
wr..ole. tt25 Dialectic then is a factor of nature herself, for 
here the 
• . . ind\ve 11 i np: ·tendency out v.;ards by v-:1 li c h the one-
sideness and limit~ti8n of the predicates of the under-
t d . {s seen in its true li~ht, and shown to be the s an 1ng ...._ 
22Ibid., oar . 80 , fl• 145. 
23Ibid., par . $0 , p. 146. 
24Ibid., par. El, b) (I)' p. 147. 
25Ibid . _, par. $1 , b) ( 2) , p . 147 . 
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negation of them.26 
Heeel's dialectic i~ not just logic since there is no real 
difference in his writinrr.s between lo ~ic and· et h · , . m at:: y::acs. 
1)) 
lienee the dialectic is ca;,;:J.ble of oortrayinp the movement of 
life.: 
\'ihe.rever there is movement, •·:herever tLere i5 life, 
1'·rherever anythinr; is carried into effect in the actual 
\•.:orld, ther·e Dialectic is at work . It is ;; lso the soul 
of all kno\·lled.F.e i·:bicl': is trulv scienti:~·ic.27 
. . . 
The understanding may not concur with these findin~s and may 
be reluctant to adrni t tr.e act ion at' the dialectic, b:..1t H e r: e l 
insi.sts the recognition does not r est within the un;1erstand-
ing because the dialectic r-:i ves exnres~ion to a lav1 •·:hicl: is 
"felt in all other r:rades of consciousnesst a~d in r;eneral 
experit:mce. n2 8 Everythinr: finite chanf,es, is forced "to turn 
suddenly into its o-pposi te 11 29 and, 
••• in say-ing so, v!e have a vision of Dialectic 
as the universal and irresistible .po-;ger before ,.,.:~ich 
nothing can stayl however secure and stable it may 
deem itself .30 
Hegel finds traces of the presence of dialectic in tl- ~ e natural 
wo~ld--in the motion of the heavenly b~dies--in that motion 
itself allows for tLe nosr;.ibility of bcin.'!' in another locc.tion. 
:;e finds it in laN and mo.rCJ.lity, in rolitics, o.nd in t lJ. e ethi-
26roid . 27Ibid., -car. 61, b) (2}, (I) t !"· 14S . 
- . 
---
28Ibid., par . 81, b) (2) (I), p .• 150. 
JOibid. 
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cal life and, of c :mrs e, in history .31 Each realm in v:hich 
it operates resolves itself by· its movement into its o;·:n 
O?nosite, its own neF,ative: 
• • • For the negative, which emer~es as the result 
of dialectic, is, because a rc:sult, at tl : e sa:ne time 
the oositive: it contains '·Jhat it rcs·ults fr8m , 
absorbed into it self, Rnd r.-;ade nart of its m·:n nature. 
Thu-s conceived, hm·rever, the dialectical stare has tte 
features characterisin~ the third ~rade of lo~ical 
truth, the speculative form, o~· fom. of r ·ositive 
reason.J 2 -
Understandin~ makes distinctions ruinous to them-
selves as .it nasses into their o"\':n opDosites anci bec.o:-:~·es 
negative reason or dialectic . 13ut this, too, e!~;ere;cs as a 
negative with a positive side because it absorbs into its Elf 
part of its own nature. Thus, it becomes nositive or specu-
lative. It apprehends the unity of pro~ositio~s in their 
opoosition--"the affirmative, "''hich is involved in their dis-
intefration and in t ~ eir transition.n33 Speculation or the 
speculative stae;e of reason or lor,ic neans ti,.'O t.hinrs to 
Hegel. He says: 
••• first, that vrhat is immediately at band bas ~o 
be r:assed and left behind; and secondly,. that the subJeCt-
mat~er of such speculations, thoufh i~ t~c first ~lace 
only subjective, ·· must not re;:"~ain so, but be realised or 
translate~ into objectivity .34 
- - -- -- -
31Ibid., par . e·1, b) (2) (I) 'PP • 150-51. 
< 2rb · · 
,/ __].~., par. r:1, b) ( 2) (I) ' p. 152. 
3.3rbid., par. 82, g) , p . 152. 
'.l4-t "d 
./ ~., par • £2, [. ) ' n. 15.3 • 
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It is not a subjective ~·roce5s tu~ ! ·.:.. ~E·~· ,1 i.J::y.: e: t:.e 
op~; osition of subject and obJ'ect a.s a con~.,...ete, · " ·· 1 ,,... .::.nu ... or· 1: e"e 
has an "all embracinf'" nature." T' · · , · · · , 
. :.1.. ; lS C>:)VlCll~ , . ::.:.(: lc-.n-
!,uaee of mysticism and a speculatl.'ve m~utt h . 
.1.... ~. ,a:• .~ uc.t. this 
reference for Hegel: 
Tf:e myr:;tical, as s~rnonyT.1ous v:i th tll e s -:-Jc cu L:. t 2.. ve is 
the cone rete unit:,: o .f.' t1 : o~ · e r r' o nor: i .t i or.::-. , · ·.::: .i c:·, u.n : ~:r­
standinP' only accepts :.n their se'"'<: l· n ti:•r; .-~::d cr~:~o" i -
tion.35-· 
!Im·rever, t;ds doctrine is ;;!y~~ tical. only in one :-:<.' !:Sr. . It 
does not advance a myt~tici~ ·m rJ.s sue;~, f 'r i:erc t.: :~· t c r r: l:n~ 
only a private meaninr;; it is mytJ tical un ly bcc:u;.~ · (· i L '' ')C ~ 
beyond unc.er:::t .?:ndi nr: .J 6 But b:· t::is ru] e, ~o t o.::: .:..~ · r~ ~. r.t ' r 
c1 ialectic v-:hen se-en throu_P"h Hegel's Lor:Ic. l)n• . £; : ·:::; t ~ : : ,d i.r!.; , 
the abstract activ ity •.-; i. icb .liJnits and isol<:Lc:: ::~o:.:..ir;J ~- , 
becomes dialectical, or ner,<Jtive, and pas~c-:s int o ' x ·. i t ive 
reason, and it is this ;;roce"~: thAt F e [" cl thinks is :r.T. tical: 
It tTOe~ beyond the und ers tand.inf. }i e snys: 
••• But , as "'e have seen, t .he a hs tr;• ct t.tinl·:ir.f" o: 
under~.tanding is so far fror.1 hein!:' ei~r:E r ulti:r:::: Lc or 
stable, that it ~- hovJS a perpetual t€TC.E.£tc;; t o '.~:o,·Y. i t s 
own dissolution and swing round into its opnoslte. 
bl .c..' , - ... • t: ~· · c-..vc-; e._e- l.·n :teasona e;nesE, on une c~ntrctr)·, ,; 11 •. ·- u .. . . -~· v..: 
----·----
35Ibid ... , nar • .S2 , g), o . l5li-o 
3 E ._ l. n ....... r=- ·--- ••• ; c ~· 1 ;Ib id .. , " • there is a riiysl.>cry ~ · - · ·: • L·-. __ , 
onl v however ·ror the understc:.ndim: ,,:r_ ic!t is r~tl c~ o;' t!.C: 
"Gri~cinle o:f' abstract identity; ';:hereas tbe I ·;:,rst:.ca~: .. 8 s .. 
synonymous 1~.•ith the specuL1tive., ic· tr.e C:)r.crctE t.:.r:-;. :::.: 
those pror.)Qsitions which unders tE!ndin£: only o.cce•·:.s J.!': ._ .. e .... r 
separation and opposition .. " 
I 
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embracin£ within itself these opnosites a~ unsubstantial 
elem~nts. Thus the reason-\·:orld may b·e ecually ~tyled 
myst1cal--not however because thourht cannot both reach 
and comprehend it, but .merely becaut~e it lies -beyond the 
compass of under.standinr: .3 7 
Thus it would appear thQt alJ. thourht that iE not 
content v:ith the Abstract is mystical. If so , that includes 
the thour;ht of Karl t.:arx, \·:hich is certainly not \·Jitbout its 
irony . Hence, for Hegel, the laws of lo~ic are in fact the 
1-av-r of being. The consequences of his lop.;ic are bir.dinr upon 
reality. The bare particular cannot be kno~m by tho under-
~tandinr; be-cause of its abstract nature.; so) too, tLc i:uman 
beinr: can only be comprehended ·Hhen he r;i ves up his uni cue-
nFss and is regarded as an aspect of the ~:ole, o~ to the 
State, t.he laq~er Y.rhole to \'.rhich he is a member. ~(cason, 
then, is the Sovereif,n of the Uorld and "History presents us 
v:ith a rational process ."J~ Thus, the drama of History is 
but the other side of the coin of his structure of Lo~ic. 
Nous is the concept of providence39 but not as intelligence, 
\·,rhich would be self-conscious reason, but as \·; isdom "endov:ed 
with infinite pm·1er ,,:hich realizes its aim: the a-bsolute 
rational desi.r;n of t .he •·mrlct."40 This design is t!:c exhibit-
3 7rbid. 
3 8Georg ~Jilhelm Fri.e;tr~ch IJegel, The Ph~losor.hy of 
History (NevtYork : Doverl'uollCtitlons, Inc., 1~: 56) , P• ~ . 
39rbict., pp. 11 and 16. 40 Ibid • , p • 16 • 
' 
l J 
\, . 
. , 
I 
l. 
137 
ing o.f Spirit, "in the process of vwrkin r~ oat the knov;ledp:e 
of that which it is notentiall.y. "41 T'he conce~t cf Spirit 
involves freedom for nit is the freedom of Spirit ldlich con-
stitutes its essence.n42 liep;el then turns to history, the 
r:istory of the world ,,qhich is ':none other th;m the rro_f~ ress 
of the consciousness of Freedom .'1 43 Hep;elian Pbilo;.o:hy, 
then, works with history, and in f3ct rnust comprehend history 
as its proper groun~ of activity. He says: 
The insight then to v.rhich ohiloso~hy is to lead us, 
is, that the real ' 'rorl<i is <:J.s it ou~-:nt to be--thc.::t tbe 
truly good--the universal divine reason--is not a mere 
abstraction, but a vit<.!l prir;ciple ca pable of rcalizin~ 
itself. This Good, this Reason, in its most concrete 
rorm , is God. God e-overns tbet.':orld; t:: e actual \·:orkir.r; 
o;: hiB g overnnent--the carryinr: out of his plan--is the 
History of the vwrld . This plan philosophy strives to 
cornprehend;· for on 1 y that which has been develor.ed as 
the r (~sult o.f it, possesses bona fide r eality .4 ~ 
He says further that: 
Philosonhv wishes to discover the substantial curport , 
the real s:l.d~ of the divine idea, and to justify the so 
much desnised Reality of thjn~s~ for Reason is the com-
prehension of the Divi ne work.4J 
The full force of Hegel 's work is just that--a justification 
of the ways of Goct46--it i .s, as he himself terms it, A Theo-
dicaea. Kant sought to " make room for Faithn and Eer:el 
sou~ht the same end by his criti que--one chose th e ner,ative 
41Ibid., pp. 17-18.. 42Ib :.d ... , p. 18 • 
43Ibid., p ... 19. 4hibid., p. )6. 45Ibid., p. 36. 
46Ibid., p. 15. 
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and the other the- positive, but both saw th emselves as Chris-
·tians first and philosophers second. Tli e ob jecti on:: to this 
system, of course, arc the same as those ·to Kant, hence it 
\'Jould be merely a reduplication to repc~t; r-~ o•'' ever, t-he con-
cept of the synthesis is a ne'\-.' and :J dditional factor. It 
matters little if t h e concept of synthesis is au ~ ~lied to 
history or logic. The same fla\rl is exh ibited. It is an 
appeal to certainty,, r.tade certain by the construction of the 
system itself. It is a reouest to think in these terr.1s and, 
presumably, to profit by the chant:;e. The as s um ption t 'nat the 
Speculative follm .. ls fron the dialectical is merely an asser-
tion justified by an appeal to experience--yet if one does 
not in fact experience it in this manner, then the system is 
rejected. On the other hand, if one does, it does not adva nce 
any additional cognitive merit or evidence, it is merely a 
statement or r e port of hO'\I'I a particular being conceives the 
lt!Orld. It is merely another form of do['Jflatic a!Jpeal. 
These objections to the c oncept of Hegel's synthesis 
mi e::ht be t h oup.ht to be too formal and therefore a doubt mirrht 
be raised, since a synthesis can ir. some way be seen in a 
('Y'enuine dialectic-.. In Flato's ~er-ublic, tte opinions of 
Justice are examined and are defined in numerous v:ays: 
1. To speak truth and pay y~ur debts. . 
2. -The gi vinr-; to each v:hat -ls proper t? hl~. 
3· To be good to friends and harm enem1es. 
4. 'l'l: e interes·t of the stronger. 
5. The greatest Good. 
lJ9 
These first four alternatives are rejected, but n~t because 
they are incorrect, but because the asserter c-~nnot properly 
defend his definition. The final st,atement o.f the nature of 
Justice does not contradict any of t~e ~rev1ous four, since 
it can be seen in them (as the definition is a.h~ays secondary 
to the t0st of the understanding). The first fou~ alternatives 
are not synthesized into a nevi concept wr1ich embraces alJ the 
others, nor does it arrive at a ne'w'l c~nce~t reconcilinr:; tLe.ir 
contradictions: for if the individual kne\': his actur.tl debts, 
knew what was proper, ,·.:hat was ~ to friend~· and ~·:t:at \·g)uld 
harm enemies, and if he kne\·.' in 1•1hat lies tr.c "stronu.:er inter-
est,n he 1-:ould have r-esolved the problem . Hence in the Pla-
tonic dial-ectic, the synthesis, if one can i,P.:nore Hegel ts 
reference, would not be a lo~ical one , but spring from the 
recognition of the object. There is no projlem of resolving 
contradictions into a big-her synthesis--only an appe0l for the 
mind to v rant a deeper understanding of v~:tat is essentially 
the sa"'!l·e definition but in a new way, a more -profound i·;ay , and 
in a ::1ore personal manner . The elements i~ this nr.,.; non-
Her;elian synthesis •;!Ould rr:e:an t! Je resolution of many diverse 
parts into a !".i~:her unity or complex , .... ::ole . The insi r:-ht of 
this hi[her referent vwuld provide an opportunity to see U : e 
same nart in a richer i';hole anc.l, therefore, tbe sar:le defir.ition 
~ 
could be maintained by a richer understandinG. There is 
absolutely no petit ion to the r econciliation of mutually 
' ' 
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exclusive thesis and antithes 1·~ 1·n t·r 1· 5 ~ th · ~ ; "'yn - CS1S. The 
criticism of an apa~oric alternative nn.na' not be "'"' rer-eated 
here. It is far too cormnon. 
The historical sict"e of 
- the system has alree:!dy hecn 
dealt with since this is merely another appec l to hi~tory and 
as such is fraur;ht \'!i th the ~2.:"?28 l·reaknE~ sses . It is ouite 
pos s .ible to read into history any theory of Li~tory one 
assumes as the orderinr, aFcnt. 
The Greek term ''dialectic" (Hhich \·m::-. undC.T!~ Lood as 
a discussion betvresn equal ~artncrs' r !erive'l ~ ·r :);.; t! u.::.al 0n:c"} 
nmr includes or is meant to siP:nify· tl:lc study of o~T , o!_":itcs 
and their unity in either lo{"ic or ;; i~tory. Suc h i~; tl.c rri-
vate use of lanr:ua[, e in ~hilosonhy . l:owc'.:er, t : ~e llc,-elian 
dialectic has no reference to individuals in a rhil oso~hical 
0uest, has no reference to tte catharsis or involvc;nent rsy-
chologically; there is no midwifery , ancl he has no r: o ncent 0f 
tJ-: e removal of ignorance os the c ondition for treat r.ercention 
of the Good. Similar to Kant, it does not extend the C'mcer:t 
of dialectic, and has abrorated the tcr~ for r~i~nte n ~~c~-
clature. Therefore, from. the ooint of vie\·: of its es~ential 
.meaninp; , neither Kant nor Hef,el c0ncerns hiMself \·;it"!"-. a. re ,;_l 
dialectic. There is as little reason to allm-: tf:e ter.J r!ia-
lectic to be lep;itim~tely r.!pplied to t:ant ;:;. ;· t:-·. ere :!.S t. o !:cr-el, 
vrho adopted the concept fror:J Kant, since their use of the terl 
con fuses or hides its ori,r:inal me:Jninp;. This vie--: cioes n0t 
!: 
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assume that a dialectical philosophy cannot profit from the 
study of their respective systems, only that insofar as the 
study of dialectic per se is concerned, it does not advance 
that study one iota. It might be that Hep;el 's syste.'Tl· could 
provide the basis for a religious or mystical ~roup. His 
triad of the thesis, antithesis, and synthesis could, con-
ceivably, support a structure of belief, yet all of this 
would be beside the point, for the only question here is not 
its availability for a discipline, a sadhana, but its contri-
bution to the diale.ctic. The movement from the antithesis 
might be understood as a prelude to the synthesis and the 
struggle to move from the one to the other- could be c onsidered 
as a psychological preparat-ion for the latter--as in the 
nature of a spiritual discipline--but~ even if that were 
granted., the point is whether Hegel can advance the· conc-ept 
of dialectic, and n.ot if he can or cannot become an element 
in a religious or spiritual system. By the same loRic, it is 
not denied that Kant's system might also have a religious 
function in the attempt to save the concept of Christian 
faith, and again it would be foolish to deny that some Chris-
tians arrive at an insight into the nature of reality in their 
vision of God, but the only i .ssue here is what extent they can 
advance dialectic as defined in this dissertation. Hence, as 
with Christianity and Kant, the Hegelian contribution is nile 
· l 
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IV • PSYCI:OLOGY Ol•' .JGJ·;G 
In the past fi.fty year!':, tLc...rc. .• ·.- .-~ ~ 
- '--" ·-- :)CE:n a r'L( : nO~i £:- r.J.l 
growth of literature contributinr t o the: .::ol\lti:m 0 ~~ l':t;.:;: an 
ills and it is significant that psyc:!':olo?"y Las been ru:ron-
~ible for a large share. v t •' '1 t ' . . 
- e , \·.r.l~ e f1~[; 1~ true, it i~ 
equally true thG.t there see:ns to be a rFluct :..:. nce on ti. e roart 
of psychologists to st~r:.te tLe nrinc ipl €'!:; u ~·on \·:: :i cL thci r 
healing art depends .47 It a b t} t t ' f 1 nk ·y e :a :.c O!:'r:-~a st .~.te:-:1er,t 
o :· principles is alv;ays a late d ( velonm cnt of a ~cier:ce :tJ:u , 
hence, one should bide one's tim£ until a r:;ore for.:-~idaole 
bod:; of knowledr,e has beer: a:nassed, tested, and bc·<:n ;-; ade 
respectable by the procedures of science. 
A craftsr:1an, accor<: inr:; to Plato):4f. i.:. one ·.-:h:::J is 
ignorant of tr.e principles upon \':hicL his art de r: cnd!::, \·:l.ich, 
however, does not interfere v.'iti: the execution o: !:-::: art , 
and t his seems true also of tb.e tbera nist .49 Yet this paucity 
of reflection does rnake it dif -:'icult to c ompre:-:end it "Y:ithin 
the clas ~ of other intellectual nursuits. Certainly ttcre is 
no scarcity of material for the rsycholo ~ists; a~ite the con-
tra.ry, for insofar as its ap!Jlica.tion, scope, and teck,icues 
are concerned, there is a vast body of l r arning ar d it !s only 
47c. G. Jung, ~ Practi_c~ of Fsycl:otL~~ar.-y, trans. ~. 
F. c. Hull (New York : ?antheon 3ooks, l95J), XII, par . lEl. 
4BJowett, .Q£• ill_., "Ion," 532, 54D· 
4° •t 
"'Jung, .£E.• £I.._., par. £6 .. 
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when one attempts to examine principles that there appears a 
shortage. Whatever the reason for this condition, undoubtedly 
it is quite valid, the result is that it presents a problem 
for the inquiring mind not formally identified with psychol-
o~y to objectively determine its real contribution along lines 
other than pragmatic.50 The few occasions in whi.c-h psycholo-
gists have allowed themsel-ves the luxury of reflection 
resulted in a kind of provisional set of principles permitting 
only tentative conclusions. One of these men, Carl June, 
found it necessary to extend his psycholop,ical perspective 
beyond the narrovT confines of his oNn "art" into other 
intellectual systems such as primitiv.e psycholo~y, comparative 
mythology, and religion.51 He found this was necessary in 
order to discover a matrix for the resolution of dream s)~-
bols and for their amplification. This wide grasp and 
a-cquaintance with other systems provides him with a basis on 
which to compare and sift the residual produce of his analysis 
and to report his results within the scope of not just his 
special art, but equally well within other intellectual sys-
tems. Therefore, for purposes of this analysis, he is con-
sidered the spokesman for psychology. His acquaintance with 
other systems of thought gives him the bas is for two interest-
50rbid., pars. 86 and 184. 
51~., par. 44 and cf. par. 96 • 
I _ 
I 
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i nr, comparisons. Primarily he acknOi.;led .r:es t r. e role of 
:ohilosophy i~ life and refers to his Oh'n role as tha t of a 
~"~ hi 1 os opher: 
lh4-
I c~n hardly draw a veil over the f :s_ ct thnt we ~sycho­
theraplsts ou~ht really to be nhilosonhers or Dhi losoPhic 
doctors--or r ather tha t we are - alread~ so , thouF~ we ~re 
unwi l.l_i:l..s to adr·1it it bec a use of the r:lar.inf" contr'lst 
between our work and -,..:ha t passes for r· hilo~ or:J·,, r in the 
universities.52 · -
and further, he concludes th . .,_t 1:;estern man doe:> not !)ossess 
any monopoly of human 'visdom. 53 J uns docs mor e t 'r.<J. n acknov.' l-
edGe the philosophical inquiry s ince he considers it 
••• as the mo~t com plex of psychic structure~ , a 
man's philoso:.;hy of life forms the counterpole to the 
!)hys iologically c ')ndi ti :)ned r s -y che, an-:1 , .:s tJ-: e i. i :~ l:es t 
psychic dominant, it ultL"'lately determines the l.c~tter' s 
fate .n54 
For him philosoDhy is not chos en objectively, "it is an 
es ;; e ntially subjective system . 11 55 
The intent h e re is not to present or r es tate his 
theory of psychology, only to exa.11ine t he manner in v1hi ch 
dialectic functions \"Ti thin ' . rllS syst e.-11 . Jun~ characterizes 
the method of ~sychotherapy as dialectic, a dialog ue or dis -
cussion between tw~ oersons56 and in his state~ent of the 
role of the therapist he draws the figure of a dialectician: 
52Ibid., 
5 4rbid., 
5 6Ib id., 
par. 181. 5.3Ibid., par . l fB . 
pars. 180 and 218. 
par. 1. 
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If I rTish to treat an'"'t'her -· '· ·  d , · -
. . • v ~- lDU.~VlrUiL. rsyc::olo·lC3.~Ly 
at all, I uust for Detter or ~orse ~·ve u · ~11 r ~t~ _ 
t- · t · - . ~ '"" - .r\_; ~n ':'l~ns o super_:o~ •~now~~edge, all aut.r:o~ity an-:! desire. to 
ln_luence~ ~ LU~t per1orce adopt a dia~ectica! r·roce-
dure conslstlng ln a comparison o.f ou-r .. -utu..,1 •· 1· ~- d1.' "'!""' 
But this becomes nos::: iole only if I .ri v·~ ti:~- o~L~r ~:~~~on 
a chanc: to play h_i~ hand t? u·.e f~ll ' unha: .: pered 0~' my 
assumptlons. In t~ls 1-!~!Y lus syst e.~1 is : c ;.!~·ed t . 1 :':'!i:'le 
and acts ur.)on it; rny reaction is the on i. 'r tlt:.n1· \·li:..n 
1~'Jhich I as an inclividual can lec:-itimatel~· con :·r ~H:t my 
patient .57 - -
June is cogni·zant of the princi nle tho.t this procedure of the 
dialectic neces: itates that the "theraoist must ab~ndon all 
his preconceptions and technioues and confine l: .Lmself to a 
purely dialectical p:~ocedure, adop':-in;-: the attitude th;1t 
shuns all methods. u5 8 Naturally this involves the tiwr:J.?ist 
in the ·process as much as t: le patient, ti:u!:i ~! : ey bnt:: bcco::1e 
ttfello-.,; particinants in a proces~':i of individual devcloD~:Jcnt ." 5~: 
The mantle of the doctor is r: iven un and he dons ti1c philo-
sophie t;arment , for it is the ancien~ dialectical r ;1lc th."!t 
reason from whatever source must be heeded; it i~ the only 
"doctor11·--dialectic is inconceivable i.: the therapist d ·)es 
k f -.... (:;) not emerge from his usual cloa o anonyr.uvy. 
for Jung consists of the use of dialectic and he is a·,·:arc 
t .hat :the dialectic is not t.o be utilized ,.lith all ratients 
indiscriminately. He ad.rnits that for S -')me a dose of -20IT'..:-.10n 
57Ibid., par . 2; cf. par . 8 . 
58Ibid., pars. 6, 239, and 28~?· . 
59 6C.)Ibid ., par . 23; cf. -::- 3.r • ~ - • Ibid., par . 7-.. 
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sense, a slap on the back and some ~ood advice ~ay be suffi-
cient and, hence, tf::: t not all individuals n e(~d t _.., · 
_ _ ,, cr:;~arc ~n 
t {;e. be\'lilderin,c; nroces~ of tl1e dialectic. 61 He also :-efrains 
from employing the dialectic if the en~~ ~n~_ . c· ·1n ~ ld 
- ..._ : : < :"- \'.'OU 
involve too great a sacrifice on the ?art o:: the ra tient. 6~ 
In these latter caseo, the problem is "eit.her reLwe to treat 
the patient or risk the dialectical nrocedurc _ .. " 63 Further, 
for others, the dialectic may be eTlga,r.: ecl on a limited scule 
until such ti.r!le as the })atient can accent sor:1e collective 
solution; i.e., r-eferrinr; natients t o tt:eir r c s r ective reli-
fions for, he adds, "there iS DO ;J Oint in p.romotinr: inrl.ivid-
ual development beyond the needs of the ratient . n 61..- If, hm·l-
ever, the ·indi vid'.lal refuses this ushering into relj r.ion even 
under the guise of a cure, then JunG finds no other recourse 
than to risk what ·he calls a "major nsychothera oy ." 65 Junr, 
seems some~o·.Jhat reluctant to tc:d~e on these cases, since the 
risk is shared equally-- and not . .;ust carried ":-J:r t!-le ~ atient . 
He says: 
The quE::stion then arises '·:hetr~cr tr.e ":.l-:era0 ist is r:re-
pared to risk havinr: Lis c onvictions dashed. a :1d shc:.:.tercd 
against the truth of the nat ;_ent. If h e ._-:ants ":. ·: ;:" ') on 
treating the r~a ti ent he mi.Ist ab ;3 ndon a~l, r.r~c 0~~ c ei vect 
notions and, f or ~ette~ or ~orse, ro w1~n tDn 1n search 
of the relL::ions am··- ni ;ilo.sorhi.cal ide?.s that '::Jest . cor-res~ond to the patient 1 f.3 -er.:otional states . '1' l.".ese J.de&.s 
6lrbid., par . 11. 
64Ibid., par. 21 . 
62rhid. 63Ibid. 
-
65rbid ., uar . 240 . 
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presen~ themselves i~ archetypal form, freshly sprung 
from tne maternal so1l whence all religious and philo-
~ophical systems originally came. But if the therapist 
1~ not prepared to have his ~onvictions called in ques-
t1on for the sake of the pat1ent, then there is some 
reason for6doubting the stability of his basic attitude.6 
The search, he says, therefore, must be for religious and 
philosophical ideas which almost seems to be a return to a 
philosophy joined with the tool of dial-ectic. If so, it can 
be expected that a new kind of Platonic philosophy will 
emerge. Yet, Jung does not deal with the perplexities of the 
understanding, nor the contradictions within reason as do·es 
the Platonic dialectic f'or Jung's course is different. He 
seeks for the archetypal images that, presumably, represent 
these ideas. Jung has a dialectic, only the object is not 
Platonic since it is the "dialectical development of the 
mythological material which is alive in the sick man himself, 
regardless of history and tradition.n67 Confronted with the 
mythological images of the patient, Jung has to risk treatment 
and attempt to understand these images in a joint effort \<lith 
the patient. This methodology may be pragmatically success·ful 
in psychotherapy, but. it does-n't really matter if it is or 
isn't, for what is of L~portance is: Why he had recourse to 
dream S)'Illbols? Jung says it is because, with these s·pecial 
cases, "all rational therapy leaves them stuck where th~J 
66rbid., par. 184. 67rbid., par. 22. 
• 
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were.n68 It w ld b ou e interesting to diccover just what 
rational techniques he employed thnt fa 1· led. BO\·tever, they 
are not noted. Jun~ w -~ · u r1. .... . es au1.te !'rankly of the orir:tns and 
development of his system so it is possible to retrace the 
steps that brought hirn to choose dream analysis. 69 lie says 
that he is not tied to any mysterious dr-eam theory that dic-
tates the outcome of every dream?O but states,_ quite candidly, 
it derives "quite simply from perplexity. I do not know ":here 
else to go for help, and so I try to find it in drea~•s.n71 
Here in dreams is somethin,; definite \>thatever its nature or 
intelligibility "and that is better than nothinr.n72 In short, 
he nshares all your prejudices aeainst dream-interpretation 
as the quintessence of uncertainty and arbitrariness. n7J His 
choice of the dream rests on ~raEffiatic consideration: 
••• on the other handr I know that if we meditate 
on a drea;1l sufficiently lonr; and thorour,hly, if we carry 
it around \'lith us and turn it over and over, so~1 ethinr, 
almost always comes of- it. 74 
The reply might be that ii one ":ere to neditate on anythine, 
any object at all, the same thin~ would be s aid--the oucstion 
1 " Is it \'rould be to determine ,.lhat is the therapeutic e er.1ent' 
the content of the dream or the proces~ of the meditation: 
Jung does not pursue this line of inquiry. 
68rbid. 
-
72rbid. 
-
69Ibid., par. £6. 
73rbid. 74Ibid. 
70rbid. 
-
The reason r.e 
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holds to this method is that: 
••• I must content myself wholly '\"lith the fact that 
t~e r~sult r;zeans S'.)methinr:; to the r>atient and sets his 
lJ.f~ 1.n motl.on aeain. .I may allow myself on:...y one cri-
terJ.on for the result of my labours: Does it work775 
But just '\'that is it that lr.'Orks"i In ":hnt lies the curative 
factor? Having accepted dreams, he discovers difficulties in 
his choice, for some dreams are "sometimes incredibly strange 
and baffling.n76 Therefore he turns to orL~itive ~sycholor,y, 
mythology, archaeology, and comparative relir:-ion, "because 
these fields offer me invaluable analo~ies with '\'lhich I can 
enrich the associations of my patients.n77 At this point, 
one can only wonder if Jung considers the "merely" loeical 
point that the dreams may be incidental to the rich material 
\-:ith which he analogi.zes and the curative element may simply 
be in forcing the patient to think more profoundly not about 
the dream symbol but with the material Junr, brings to it. If 
so, then why not deal directly through the understanding and 
seek to resolve the op~osition to these ideas as in a genuine 
dialectical encounter~ 
On the other hand,. one mir;ht be led to the belief that 
Jung has a drea~-theory, similar to a lo;,ic machine where 
information is cranked in and the results automatically pro-
duced. But he, himself, does not subscribe to t~is belief, 
75I.bid. 76rbid., par. 90. 77IbJ..d oar. 96. _ , . 
-
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because "the therapist should give u r nl ~ tis t.heorct ical 
ascumptions and should in every ca~e : ,b re~dy ~ v..-;; ... to C"~nstr~ct a 
totally new theory of drearne .u78 Ee amplifies Lis vic\..- 'ft::cn 
he writes79 that the initial dreams arc often lucid, an indi-
cation that analysis has not touched "some i.!nportant layer of 
the personality" and the measure of the depth of the analysis 
is readily .measured by the opaqueness wl':ich at this ti: ~:e, "if 
the truth. be told, the doctor no longer understnnds the situ-
ation as a \'lhole. ttSO He continuer. in a perfect ad hoc arru-
ment: 
• • • that he does not understand is r.roved by the 
:fact that the dreams become incrcasir:r:ly ooscurc, f:)r 
,'fe all kno\"1 that their "obscurity" is a nurely subjec-
tive opinion of the docto::r;:. To the undcrstar.dinr 
nothing is obscure; • • .sl 
and, with an interesting time referencef dreams finally 
reveal their clarity: 
if from a later stage o!: treatmen~ or- fr?m 
a d.ista~ce ~f s~me yearn, "\'le l .ook bnck at t1!ese .. un.l~-~c~: 
ligible dreams, v1e are often astounded at our o ... n o H 1 
ness .• 82 
Jung' s ttconfes~ion" that te does not kno\'T \':!1ere el~ e to r,o--
and so he went ·to the drear.1 Horld--must be ·looked u~'on 
. . on +'or te is cuite knm·:ledr:e;:!b2.e about. 
an element of susp~c1 , ... · . 
4n considerinr tte psycholo~y o~ ttc Indian philosophy, "ar.d .. 
78Ibid_. ,. 
80Ibid. 
- · 
par. 317-. 
flibid. 
79rb :.a., 
-
~ar. JlJ .. 
82Ibid. 
-
self we would do well to have recourse to the treasures of 
Indian wisdom, nB3 and n~te can iearn a great deal from yoga 
philosophy and turn it to pra.c·tical account .. n t.4 
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With these considerations :me mit:;ht still legitimately 
\'TOnder why he did not pursue a psychology alone meditative 
lines. The only reason he gives is that the ideas of Alchemy 
are richer in their extraordinary symbolism$5 and this 
affords Jung an opportunity· to find a resolution of the con-
tent of the dream symbol in the matrix of Alchemy, i.e., 
assuming a value to dream S)~bols, he pursues the same motif 
in Alchemy. He is aware of all the burdens involved in 
reviving the study of Alchemy, .86 is aware of the shortcomings 
of dream-analysis, of the dangers the therapist must risk in 
applying the analysis and of the merely "pragmatic" function 
of his system as a 1·Jhole,_ but he chooses- this rather than a 
formal system of meditation or a straightfon~ard dialectical 
procedure-1-.rhich deals directly with the understandine; ... 
Further, the meditative and philosophical discipline involves 
a relationship between a student and teacher while the Alchem-
ist is a solitary figure 1-rith practically no communication 
even \'Jith other me.rnb crs of his craft. 87 The essential element 
85rbid. 
-
$7c. G. Jung, Psycholo.gy and Alchemy, trans. R. F. C • 
Hull (Val. XII., Bollingen Series, XX. New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1953), par. 301. 
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in the therapy process is the therapist, as is the teacher in 
philosophy, but this is altogether missing in Alchemy. There-
fore, it seems Jung is tied to the medical sciences, to 
European institutions, and to the use of fictions whos-e sole 
value lies in_ their pragmatic usefulness--even though just 
what it is that is "pragmatic" is still open to question. 
His value here is that he has contributed. to the- revival of 
dialectic and posits an end for man similar to other mystics, 
while at the same time does much to offer an alternative to 
Christianity and thereby helps educate the European from his 
narcissistic bent. 
In concluding, then., it is manifestly clear that ·the 
Jungian ·therapist fUnctions as a midwife in the capacity of 
"matchmaker"--sendine patients to others--but not directly as 
the "examiner" sinc-e he does not bring to birth those who ar-e 
pregnant in the soul. He also acknowledges a similar end for 
man as the Platonist and Christian mystic. And it also ~eems 
he, as does the Augustinian,_ misunderstands Plato and the 
scope available for dialectic--or the Socrati-c Method, as Jung 
calls it.88 
Further, the Platonic catharsis is the effect of the 
effective removal of ignorance, the uncovering of half-truths, 
88c. G. Jung, Two Essays on Analytical.Psychology 
trans. R. F. c. H_ull TVol. VII, BOllingen Ser~es, XX. New 
York:: Pantheon Books, 195J), pars. 24 and 2(£). 
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ambiguities, and falsehoods within the ·understandin~ by use 
of the tool of dialectic. To the Jungian Analyst, and to the 
Christian, the concept of catharsis is differ-ent--to then it 
is the result of the confession of past deeds and thoughts 
considered as violations of the m.oral code. $9 These 2cts are 
k~pt secret. Being concealed, they isolate the individual 
from the community--he participates but is in exile. Afraid 
that the secret will be known, he builds v1ithin himself a 
sense of guilt and fear. Hence the dynamics of the confes-
sional:· the fear, guilt, suspicion, and isolation become 
intense and they live on as suppressed feelin~s so that if 
·the "sinner" could only share the secret with someone he would 
thereby give up the very conditions of his own makimr,, i.e., 
the suppressed feelings and secret, and re-enter the moral 
community. The Church acted as the impersonal moral a~ent, 
the confessor, and would, by its own inner laws, keep the 
secret from the community. It is undoubte-dly a fact that for 
some individuals this confessional catharsis does have a cura-
tive aspect and the -results are often astonishing. But such 
a device breeds its o1tm negative aspect: confessinp; ties ·the 
89Junr.r "\-a"ites in The Practice of Psvcbotherapy, on. t"~ - -~ _....." 
cit., however, that "had catharsis proved itself a panacea,_ 
psychology "\•:ould have remained at the l?ve~ o:f tl:e confess~ on • 
oar. 13 7. \'lhich is to say that the Chr~st~an frame1tr~rk ?f 
belief is inadequate to meet the challenge of resolv~ng ~nner 
tensions uncovered during psychotherapy, except for what Jung 
terms merely a collective adaptation. cr. pars. 2 and 21. 
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individual to his confessor which produces the phenomenon 
termed the ""transference-. n Naturally this problem is mini-
mized when the Church is the confessor, but \':hen th.e analyst 
takes on this role he cannot hide his identity and hence the 
serious nature of the burden of the transference takes place. 
Actually this rests upon t\'ro different concepts of man--the 
Platonist vie\'l that man is naturally good and the problem is 
to remove the impediments to that good, while to the Christian, 
man is in a "fallen state of original sin" and salvation is 
the result of an act of faith, a repentance of sins, and a 
belief in the mediator. Hence it can be seen that the thera-
pist has assumed the role of the confessional pursuing a 
catharsis, which does not affect the understanding directly_, 
for the liberation of the suppressed e~otions. Returning to 
the fixation, or the transference, the removal of t .his is 
accomplished by bringing the individual to examine the attach-
ment itself, i.e., educate the individual to see i ·ntelliF;ently 
and emotionally directly th.e pattern of his own projections. 
This accomplished, the therapy may conclude itself, but Jung 
says that it may al.so contir.ue. If so, this next stage he 
calls the transformation, "the step from education to self-
education is a logical advance that completes the earlier 
stages .n90 The reauirement for this stage is the counter-
• 
90Jung, ~ Practice of Psychotheraoy, 2£• cit., 
par. 170. 
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application to the doctor to which "he says. that "as soon as 
psychotherapy takes the doctor hims·e·lf for its subject, it 
transcends its medical origins and ceases to be merely a 
method for treating the sick.n91 Recognizing this basic 
di.fference from the other stages, he nevertheless utilize-s 
the same structure; therefore, it may be termed a philosoph-
ical quest employing psychological tools and methods. The 
critBrion for selection of his technique, rather than 
strictly philosophic tool.s, has been noted previously.9Z 
What is left to be said ·i ·s that he, or others, have yet to 
test cla-ssic philosophic tools, dialectic and reason, for 
this fourth stage of transformation, and only when this is 
done can psychology truly enter into philosophy and Jung can 
lay just claim to Athens. 
9lrbid., par. 174· 
92cr. ante, pp. 147-154· 
CHAPTER IV 
DIALECTIC AND CONTEMPLATION 
I. FOREWORD 
To this point, the shortcomings of the Dialectic have 
not been complemented, or corrected, to produce a more cohe-
sive philosophy. Hence, this section shall deal with the 
classic dialecticians of both Vedanta and Buddhism--Gaudapada, 
Sankara, Nagarjuna, and Candrakirti--to determine the extent 
of their contributions to this problem. 
II. THE ADVAITA-VEDANTA: GAUDAP.ADA AND SANKARA 
European philosophy is as different from the classic 
Greek as it is from the Indian. One of the basic differences 
between European and Indian thought lies in its relation to 
morality. In European thought--witness Kant, Hegel, and 
Kierkegaard--it sought to give morality a basis, a justifica-
tion, and a defense, while in the Advaita Vedanta it is pre-
supposed before the study of philosophy. The philos.ophical 
discipline in the Vedanta has a four~fold prerequisite: dis-
crimination, non-attachment (renunciation), self-control, and 
a l-ove of truth. These four are termed the Sadhana Chatushtaya.l 
lswami .Nikhilananda (trans •. ) , The Mandukyopanishad with 
Gaudapada's Karika and Sankara's Commentary, (Mysore: Sri 
Ramakrishna Ashrama, 1949), Preface, p. xxxvii. 
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In Vedanta, morality needed no defense; rat"her, it was assumed 
to be the very ground of the philosophical quest. The end of 
Vedanta is not the justification of a morality or an ethic, 
but truth, in the sense in which Hegel remarked that God and 
T·ruth were one. It may be that a rational def'ense of morality 
from the philosophical side is in fact extremely deleterious 
in its social consequences since morality is taught and 
defended not by its defensibility, but ·by its presentment 
of an ideal to be imitated for some desired end. 
On the moral side, the Sadhana Chatushtaya is the pre-
requisite for philosophy and it may reflect the social moral-
ity to which the student is a party. It is considered as a 
means, and its ·ultimate usefulness and validity are effective 
as guides to action only as long as the quest has not culminated 
in the realization of Brahman. Morality is essentially an 
external standard and, hence, the awareness o·f its binding 
forc·e is indicative of the presence of a dualistic state of 
mind. But once having realized non-duality, it cannot func-
tion with this externally binding effect. After the non-dual 
is realized, Gaudapada writes, "behave in the world as an 
insensible object.nla 
This non-dual state even precludes the concept of one 
as the knower. Essentially the state provides no evidence 
laibid., Chap. II, Sec. J6. 
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for the belief that one is different, or separate fro~ others. 
Hence Sankara adds, "He does not consciously assume the role 
of knower." He continues his comnentary ·with the observa-
tions: 
• • • In other words, concentrate your memory on the 
realization of non-duality alone. Having kno1tm this non-
dual Brahman which is free from hunger, etc., unborn and 
directly perceptible as the S€lf and which transcends all 
codes of human .conduct,. i.-e ... , by attaining to the con-
sciousness that "I am the Suprem.e Brahman," behave with 
others as one not knowing the truth; that is to say, l~t 
n.ot others know what you are and what you have become .. 
Gaudapada presents the morality of a Sannyasin or, 
more technically, a Paramahamsa Sannyasin--the realized 
person. It is a morality only in that sense in which a spon-
taneous process can be so judged since it has nothing to do 
with f.ulfillin~S external obligations and comnitments. 
• • • He should have this body and the Atman as his 
support and depend upon chances; ie.e •. , he sl;ould be 
satisfied with those things for his physical wants, 
that chance brings him.J 
Sankara comments.: 
••• He entirely d-epends upon circumstances, that 
is to say he maintains his body with whatever !ood or 
strips or'clothing, etc., are brought to him by mere 
chance.4 
The law to which the realized person adheres can be 
2Ibid., Sankara's Commentary, Chap. II, Sec. J6. 
3Ibid., Chap. II, Sec. 37. 
-
4Ibid., Sankara's Commentary, Chap. II, Sec. 37. 
-
159 
considered as a "law unto himself," with the recognition, 
however, that the term "himself" is .not a separate egoistic 
entity, since it is "free from all desire for external 
objects." \'lisdom brings its own internal source of action or 
it would neither be Wisdom nor spring from the non-dual~ 
Therefore, the case with Advaita is not the savine of 
some ethical standard, but to further the quest of Philosophy 
as. a ·pursuit for realization of the non-dual Brahman. 
Again, to restate direction, it should be remarked 
that the issue here- is the examination of Gaudapada and San-
kara from the dialectical perspective. Hence there will be 
no remarks as to \-Ihether Gaudapada or Sankara was a Buddhist·; 
or if Sankara's ·writings are consistent or if they contain a 
contradiction, e.g., in the comparisons of his commentary of 
the Brahma-Sutras and the Mandukyopanishad~ 
In European philosophy, the central question inherited 
from Kant was the concept of a Transcendental Illusion impos-
sible to overcome and a bar ·to any direct kno,·lledge of 
reality. Advaita Vedanta not only resolves this issue, but 
in so doing clears a field for the dialectical philosophy. 
On the other hand, it may be that the proble!!l in understand-
ing Plato's works lies in interpretative insights and an 
esthetic judgement of coherence, and therefore, is always 
open and plagued by interpretative questions concerning "his 
m.eaning." Indeed, an interpretative criterion is ne.cessary 
lCO 
for understanding Plato, but not so with the Advaita because 
there the content is stated without the dramatic staging, 
the play or myths or analogies that have always been a 
source of pleasure and confusion to readers of Plato. In the 
Advaita, the pristine purity of the Mandukya has called for 
a commentary. It is a work of only twelve stanzas., to which 
Gaudapada added the Karika and on which Sankara commented.$ 
In comparing it with the Platonic works, it shows the 
brevity of the wise while the dialogues show the hand 
of the consummate artist conscious of his· talents. 
The Karika of Gaudapada added to the Mandukya has 
often been called the Mandukyakarika. The entire work is 
divided into four parts: Agama--because of its scriptural 
references; Vaitathya--due to its treatment of illusions; 
Advaita--from its concern for unity; and Alatasanti--the 
reduction of alternative views by a reductio. The last three 
parts have little to do with the Upanishad directly and repre-
sent. Gaudapada's thinking. In Sankara's introduction to the 
Upanishad, he adds a c~~entary in which he summarizes these 
four parts: 
The first chapter, then, seeks, by dealing specifically 
with Vedic texts, to· indicate the ffiraditiona17 means. to· 
the realization of the essential nature of Atman and 1s 
devoted to the determination of the meaning of Aum. The 
.sec.ond chapter seeks rationally to demonstrate the 
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unreality of duality; the illusion fduali~YT being 
destroyed, th~ knm'lledge. of x:on-dua.lity ,Lb'ecomes evideny, 
as the cessat~on of the ~mag~nation of snake, etc., in 
the rope reveals the real nature of the rooe. The third 
chapter is devoted to the rational demonstration of the 
truth of the non-duality, les.t it should, in ltke manner, 
be contended to be unreal. The fourth chapter is devoted 
to the rational refutation of the other schools of thought 
which are antagonistic to the truth as pointed out in the 
Vedas and which are opposed to the knm...rledge of the 
Ad.vaita Reality, by po.inting out their falsity on account 
of ·their mutual contradiction.5 
As might be expected, .since the first chapter is a·n 
attempt to reconcile the non-dual concept with traditional 
scriptural sources, it will have little to advance this study 
of dialectic. However, there is much that is revealing within 
this first chapter and therefore it is worth noting its con-
tent. In this chapter, .Sankara forc-ibly states the thesis of 
the Advaita in a most un-Kantian fashion: 
The object is to realize the knowledge of the oneness 
of the name and the thing signified by it. Otherwis·e, 
ffihe explanatio!!l that the knowledge of the thing is 
dependent on the name, might suggest that the oneness of 
the name and the thing is taken only in a figurative 
sense. The purpose of the knm..rle~9e of the unity [Or the 
name and the thing signified2Y i~ is to simultaneously 
remove, by a single effort, Lthe illusion ofl both the 
name and the thing and establish {the nature ofl Brahman 
which is other than both.6 
The intent of this work carries the noblest intentions of 
philosophy in that it is both a statement of the Ultimate and 
includes an epistemological approach to it.s vindication. 
5rbid., Sankara 1 s Commentary, Chap. I, Sec. 1. 
6Ibid., Sankara 1 s Commentary, Chap. I, Sec ... 2. 
162 
The concept of Brahman is c-entral to Vedanta and is 
understood as Nirguna, without attributes, which when known 
the knower recognizes, or rather he is cognizant that there 
is .no difference betw-een himself and the Ultimate Reality 
referred. to as Brahman. In this knowing, the conc-ept of the 
individual takes on a new and more profound meanine and is 
called the Atman. And i .t is said that this Atman is Brahman. 7 
The phenomenal world seen as dual is different from 
the observer and separate from him. This knower of the dual 
is the individual as an ego or Jiva. Therefore, an insieht 
into the non-dual character of reality is dependent upon the 
entire structure of the dual ceasing to affect its particu-
larization: 
• • • That which has no parts fboundles2J, incompre-
hensible LWith the aid of the sense~, the cessation of 
all phenomena, all bliss and non-dual Aum is the fourth 
and verily the same as the Atman... He who knows this 
merges his self in the Self.S 
To gain this insight into reality, the meditation upon the 
symbol "Aum" is used. J.Und is unified with this syllable9 
and results in the knowledge that Aum and Brahman are insep-
arable. The stages of psychological, spiritual, or meditative 
?Ibid., Chapter II, Section 34· 
8Ibid., Chapter I, Section 12. 
-
9rbid., Chapter I, Section 12 (25}, p. $6. "The mind 
should be-llnified with Aum ••• ·" 
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insight are four-fold. They correspond to the waking state. 
dream state, dreamless sleep, and Turiya: 
Turiya is not that whic~ is conscious of the internal 
ffiubjectiv.J world, nor that which is cons-cious of the 
external ffibjectiviJ world, nor that which is cons-cious 
of both, nor that which is a mass all sentiency, nor 
that which is simple consciousness, nor that which is 
insentient. Lit i~ unseen fby any sense oreanJ, not 
related to anything, incomprehensible fby the mind7, 
uninferable., unthinkable,_ indescribab1e, essentiar'ly of 
the nature of consciousness constituting the Self alone, 
negation of all phenomena, the Peaceful, all bliss, and 
the non-dual. This is \';hat is kno'\'m as the fourth 
Lfuriyi!. This is the Atman and it has to be realized.lO 
The insight into Atman being Brahman, the non-dual, is 
realized by meditation upon Aum, and the resultinr.; stage of 
insight is the fourth or Turiya. The ·philosophical justifi-
cation for this, the first chapter, is its consistency wit-h 
the scriptures. There is no attempt to formulate it along 
strictly rational lines, for this is the problem reserved for 
the other three chapters. In Sankara's Co~~entary to the 
second chapter, he begins his critique with the statement 
that: 
It is also eoually possible to determine the unreality Lfllusorines~ of duality through pure reas~ning ; and for 
this purpose is begun the second ~ha£ter wh~ch commences 
'-1ith the 'llords Vaitathyam ffinreal~ty/ etc .l.L 
It is common among religious trad.itions to appeal to 
their own particular sacred scriptures for validation, but an 
appeal to authority- contains no cognitive criteria;- merely 
lOibid.~ Chap. I, Sec. 7. 
lllb"d Ch II s 1 Sankara's Commentary. 
___!....·-' ap. , ec., 
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dogmatism. Hence to find validation of a reli~ious work by 
reason is rare and an indication or the harmonious blending 
of both religion and philosophy. It is c~~onplace to find 
sacred scriptures equatine: their particular insieht witl: the 
predicates of their creed and it is more often the case that 
the cognizer presents the insight within the ter.ns of his own 
idea, i.e., ~athin the accepted traditional relirious con-
cepts. To determine the content of the experience outside of 
these terms- is as difficult as the attempt is rare. Thus, 
when Gaudapada says~ 
He {the inquirei7 co~izes only that idea that is 
presented to him. It LAtmarJ assumes t"he form [Or what 
is cogniz_eQ? and thus protects .Lthe inquirelj. Posse-ssed 
by that [fdei] he realizes it []is the sole essenciJ.-12 
It is an attempt to strip the insir,ht from traditional ideas 
and provide a fruitful transition from the reli~ious content 
of a particular creed t~ universal application by reason 
through philoso_phy. The introduction of reason fr-ees the 
inquirer from the temptin~- possibility of reli~ious dormatism 
in the belief that, since the realization is apprehended 
under the form of his ideaJ it therefore validates the uni~e 
truth of that religion.l3 This also precludes a possibility 
of intolerance of different opinions.14 
12Ibid., Chap. II, Sec. 2_9. 
13 cr. Chap. II, Sec. 20, through Chap. II1 Sec~ 2e. 
Ibid., 
14Ibid. ,_ Sankara' 5 Com!:!entary, Chap. II, Sec. 29, 
Cf. Chap. IV, Sec. 1. 
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If the nature of Brahman or reality is non-dual, then 
the dual, the phenomenal, is unreal. Its unreality would 
constitute no more than dreams and illusionsl5 when seen from 
th.e aspect of Brahman. Again, if there are no valid relations 
then there is no dissolution, birth, and no one aspiring for 
wisdom; nor a seeker after liberationi nor could there be a 
teacher, student, or sacred scriptures .16 If so, and logic 
seems to justify such a conclusion, then does that not also 
·nec-essitate that reality itself be non-real~ Sankara answers 
that to conceive of such illusions· presuppos·es a: substratum 
as the illusion appearing in the rope· as a snake, etc.l7 The 
reasoning involved in thi s central argument also gives evi-
dence of the Indian dialectic: 
L.Qbjectio!J-·-This analogy is not re~eva:r;t as even the 
rope, which is the substratum of the 1mag1nary snake, is 
also an imaginary entity. 
/Ji."eply]--It is not so. For, upon the disappearance of 
the imaginat i on, the unimagined substratum can be reason-
ably said to exist on account of its unimagined character. 
L9bjection7--It may ·be contended that like the imagina-
tion· of the snake in the rope, it [the unimaginary sub-
stratum? is also unreal. 
/lf.epli/--It cannot be so. For it ffirahmanZ is ever 
unimagined, because it is like the rope that ~s never the 
object of our imagination and is real even before the 
knowledge of the unreality of the snake. Furth.e:, the . 
existence of the subject lkfiower ~r witness7 of ~aginat1on 
15Ib"d Ch II .S Jl 16Ib~d., Chap. II, Sec. 3 2 ~ 
__!_., ap. , ec~ • --=-
17rbid., Sankara's Commentary, Chap. II, Sec. 32. 
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must be a~it~ed to be antecedent to the 
Theref?re lt J.S unreasonable to s , th t L~aeination. 
non-exJ.stent. ay a such subject is 
i9bjectiori7--How can the Scripture if it cannot make 
us u~di/erstand the true nature of the belf {Which is non-
dualJ.t , free our mind fr~~ the idea of dualityi 
. ffieply--There is no difficulty. Duality is super-
J.mpos·ed unon Atman throur_:h ignorance, like the snake, 
e~c., u~on ~he rope. Eow is it so& I am haPpy, I a~ 
.mJ.serable, J.gnorant, born, dead, worn out endowed with 
body, ~see, I am manifested .and unmanife~ted, the aeent, 
~he ~nJoyer, related and unrelated, decayed and old, this 
1s m:tnd--these c:nd other such ideas are superimposed upon 
Atman. The not1?n of Atman LSel£7 persists in all these, 
bec~use no such 1dea CRn ever be conceived of without the 
not1?n of Atman. It is like the notion of the rope which 
persJ.sts in .Lall superimposed. ideas, such aif the .snake, 
the water-l1ne, etc. Such be1ng the case, the Scripture 
has no function with regard to the Atman :~;Jhich, beinp; of 
the nature of the substantive, is ever self-evident. The 
function of the Scripture is to accomplish that which is 
not accomplished yet. It does not serve the purpos·e of 
evidence. if it is to establish what has been already 
established. The Atman does not realize its own natural 
condition on account of such obstac-les as the notion of 
happin.ess, etc., superimnosed by ignorance; and the true 
nature is realized only when one knows it as such. It is 
therefore the Scripture_, v-!hose purpose is to remove the 
idea of happiness, etc. fassociated with Atma£7 that pro-
duces the consciousness of the not-happy LI.e.,attribute-
less7 nature of Atman by such statements as "Not this" 
"Not this, n n [ft iiJ' not gross." etc. Like the persistence 
of Atman lin all states of consciousnes~ the not-happy 
[attributelesil characteristic of Atman does ~ot inher~ 
in all ideas such as of being happy and the l:tke. If 1t 
were so, then one would not have su~h specific experien~e 
as that of being happy, etc., superl.mposed upon A tman, ~n 
the same manner as coldness cannot be associated with fire 
v-1hose specific characteristic is that of heat. It is, 
therefore that such specific characteristics as that of 
being hap~y_, etc e., are imai;in:d in Atman -...~hie~ is, 
undoubtedly, without any attrJ.butes •. The Scr1ptural 
teachings which speak of Atnan as ?el.nf. not-h~ppy, etc., 
are meant for the purpose of remov1n~ the n?t~on that 
Atman is associated with such S?ecif~c attr:tb~te~ as _ 
happiness, etc. There is the follow~!lg aph?r~st1c stat~­
ment by the kno1r.rers of the Agama: "Tne val~d~ty of ScrJ.p-
ture is established by its negat1.ng all pos1t1 ve charac-
' . 
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teristics of Atma~ .LW'hich otherwise cannot be indicated 
by· Scripture~.nl8 
It will be advisable to compare this example of dialectic 
~-:ith another case for a joint analysis. The second chapter 
on illusion establishes that duality does not really exist, 
by illustrations of "dreams, magic castle-in-the-air, etc .. ,." 
and in the third chapter the object is to determine whether 
non-duality can be established by reason. The similar func-
tion of reason is employed and therefore the exa~ple prBvi-
ously noted is indicative o:f this third chapter as wd l. In 
the fourth and last chapter, Sankara employs .reason along 
different lines. He says: 
Now is undertaken the chapter styled Alatasanti in 
order to conclude the final examination for the establish-
ment of the philosophy of the Advaita, by following the 
orocess kno\\'11 as the method of disae;reement, which is 
done by sho\"rinr; here in detail that other systems cannot 
be said ·to be true philosoph!. For there are mutual con-
tradictions implied in them. 9 
An example of this usage is quite clear \'.'hen Gaudapada ";rites: 
I1 the world is admitted to be beginningless Las some 
disputants asser:!J" then it cannot be non-eternal. r-:oksha, 
or liberation, cannot have a beeinnine and be eterna1.20 
nnd Sankara adds the corru:1entary: 
18rbid ... , Chap. II, Sec.. 32. 
1 9rbid., Chap. IV, Sec. 1~ Sankara's Commentary. 
20Ibid •. , Chap. IV, Sec. JO. 
I . 
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_Her~ is another defect in the arguments of those who 
ma1nt2. ~n that. the A~man is, in reality, subject to both 
bondage and l1berat~on. If the v;orld lJ. .e., the state of 
bondag-e of ~he Atman7 be without beginninr, or a definite 
past, then 1ts end cannot be established by any logical 
reasonin~. In ardinary experience, there is no instance 
of an obJect "\-Ihich has no beginnin~ but has an end. 
,LObjectio!!l'--'-,; e see a break in the beginningless con-
tinuity of the relation of the seed and the sprout. 
Laepli7--This illustration has no validity; for, the 
seed and the sprout do not constitute a single entity~ 
In like manner, liberat·ion cannot be said to have no end 
if it be as~erted that liberation v:hich is attained by 
acquisition of knowledge has a Ldefinite7 beginnir-g. For, 
the jar, etc., "V-ii.:ich have a beginning have also an end. 
£Pbjection7--There is no defect in our argument as 
liberation,_ not bein~ any substance,. may be like the 
d.estruction of a _jar, ·etc. 
l[epli7--In that case it will contradict your proposi-
tion that liberation has a positive existence from the 
standpoint of the Ultimate Reality. Further, liberation 
being- a non-entit2i like the horn of a hare cannot ever· 
have a beginning. 
The dialectic displayed in the section on illusion, 
chapter two, indicates a hifc:her framevmrk of reference. In 
the reply to each objection, the follm·ling can r-eadily be 
seen: 
1. 
.2. 
3. 
It demonstrates the reasonableness of the premise 
on the basis of a more critical analysis of the 
analogy. 
It shows the acceptable nature of the premise by 
noting the presupposition implicit in the 
assertion. 
This reply is an attempt to acquaint the objector 
21Ibid., Chap. IV, Sec. JO, Sankara 1 s Commentary. 
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wit~ the function of the scriptures in its role 
of ln~tructor, i.e., it points to the moon and if 
one Wlshes_to see! thEn one must follow the finger; 
or t.t.? scrlpture lS .not itself the kno'ftled.r;e in 
t~a~ lt does not reveal the nature of Atman. only 
llrnlts predicates. 
There is no evidence here of dialectic·; not all dialoeues nor 
a ll discussions are dialectical. ~~ather, the evidence supports 
the conclusion of an informant in that sen~e in vhich a posi-
tion is corrected from either prior acce~ted truths or from a 
vantage point of a hi~her learninc. True, there is an appeal 
for reason to exami.ne its state.'!lent.s with more care: i.e., to 
examine the analogy, to be cognizant of the nature of pre-sup-
positions as ~rell as to distinguish betv:een a si p- n and its 
referrent. The acceptance of the repl_ies to the argument, by 
the objector, is dependent upon his o"m faculties. It is 
incumbent upon him to validate the content. It is, as it 
1-1ere, the individual '-Iho has the obligation to accept the 
reply and reject his own objection. The objector either does 
or does not object depending purely upon tLe force of his O\'m 
resources~ This technique, of course, is not new or novel. 
It is the familiar pedagogical approach to knm·Jledge--the 
teacher knows and the student need only come '\ofit!-: cap in hand 
to receive the "correct" teachings. Whatever difficulties he 
might have, either ,,rith the answer or 1·: ith his m·m puzzling 
object·ions, he must accept these "correct notions •" At,ain, 
this is not to say that the answers are not correct, only that 
:I 
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there is no attempt to engar>:e the individual on a- personal 
basis of dialectic·, no tt a empt to dra"1 out his O"L-:n statements 
as a preliminary to the knowing process; no atte.~ipt to draw 
the "correct" notion fror1 him as in Plato's Thea·etetus. T.r.e 
use of reason. is th2.t of a higher truth co!'"rect :i.nr; the asser-
tions of objectors in the same manner as a student's test 
paper is graded. The answer may indeed be corrected, but 
there is still the problem of v1hy the ob.iection W;J.s constel-
lated in the manner in which the error was framed. If the 
cause of the error remains, then presumably it can ar.ain 
reappear in another form. There is no indication that these 
objections are basic in the mind of the objector: If tr.at 
v1ere the case, it '\I'Wuld, of course, be more curativ-e. There--
fore, from these points it is clear that there is no dial·ec.tic 
in operation in this section. 
The fourth chapter, that Fives promise of a dialectic, 
needs analysis and can be rewritten as: 
~tatemen~--As the ~orld has no be[innin~ ~o 
liberation has no b~~inning and tt8refore c~nnot 
finite [r1on-eterna1J • 
too 
be 
ffiommeny--If something has no beginnim:: t.hen it 
cannot be reasonably sr.o"m to have an end. 
lJ5b ·ectio!J--On the contrary look at t~e ex2 .. :~rl_e o~ 
the se~d and the sprout ''~hich, though ~d.·~utted h to ~~e~~­
a beginningless relationship--one turn1n~ on.tde o 
it can be seen to have definite marks or pe·rl..o s. 
· 1 · both c~n be seid to have definite 
ffieply--But 1f t ley res~ably they do not constitute per~ods or m~rks, dth~g P they both have a be~in~ir.~. 
a s1ngle ent1ty an en 
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. 4Pbjectiori7--Sir~ there is no real objection here for 
lt ~s agreed that l~beration is no object that it is no 
substance.and may ~e like the non-entity that results in 
the break1ng of a Jar made of clay. 
ffieply7--Look nov:--if ·it is admitted that it is a non-
ent~ty 11lii:e ~he lnrn of a hare, tt then surely it cannot 
have~ beg~nnln~ •. And~ again, if it is true as you say 
that lt has deflnlte marks or periods, then hm-1 can some-
thing which is aQ~itted to be as an non-entity have such 
d-elineations i 
Aside from the -specific cont-ent of the argument hinging upon 
the unmet premise that a substance, a jar (or i rr:norance or 
bondage, analogically), can be the causative factor in the 
nroduction of a "non-entity, n this nevertheless- does provide 
an example o_f reason or dialectic in operation. It is obvious 
that the causative question permeates this argument and it is 
also clear that it is not treated direc-tly. If it were, then 
th-e argument might have a more far-reaching effect than the 
s ·imple reductio ad absurdum that is here presented. 
However, the issue is not the shortcomings of the 
argument, but only its availability for testing the presence 
of dialectic. First, there is evidence of critical reason, 
as there is throur.;hout the entir-e work, but the question 
remains '\'Ihether this is in itself sufficient evidence of dia-
lectic. The central and most basic distinction that Plato 
makes between the disputer and the dialectician should be 
rec-alled. He defines the disputer as one '\'Tho is only able to 
. ! . 
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draw contradictions from another.22 The disputer's skill is 
an imitation of one phase of the .art of the dialectician. 
The dialectician goes beyond just seeking contradictions. He 
must draw from the student the birth process in his capacity 
of a m·idwi.fe. True, the loe;ical examination for inconsistency 
is one phase of the dialectic. The dialectic, to be completed 
then, must move into the birth process. Further, it is ·to be 
remembered that the logical examination of the student's 
ideas is subs-equent to the dra~1ine out process, i.e., the 
birth process and the examination to determine whether the 
b.orne is a wind-egg or not. There is no birth process here 
in this work of Gaudapada or Sankara, no involvement of an 
intensive dialectic. Rather, there appears only one side of 
dialectic_, i.e-., recalling the passage in the Sophist where 
the value of refutat·ion is discussed. In Plato we found that 
dialectic is coextensive with his epistemology and hence a 
parallel s·tudy is necessary of the epistemological side of 
Advaita Vedanta. There are usually two approaches to episte-
mological problems, but one has fallen into disrepute in 
Europe for some ti~e. Epistemological questions have domi-
nated European thought since Descartes, with the main question 
revolving around the problem of the method and source neces~ary 
22J tt "t "Phaedow 261·, cf. "Sophist" 232, 225. owe , on. c~ ..-, 
""Gorgias" 458. 
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fo.r men in general to acquire valid knowled.~:,e.. The other 
auestion is the way that knowledge can be acquired not by men 
in general, but by philosophers--those that seek the Good, 
Tru~ and Beautiful, or the Absolute in the form of being, 
bliss, and consciousness. Naturally these two approaches are 
different.. Hen in general do not acquire kno\'rledge except in 
the most conventional sense, since their end is seldom, if 
ever, the· quest for knoviledge.. r~en ·in general, in the quest 
for knowledge, are concerned with questions of validity, per-
cention, inference, pos·tulation, theories of error, revealed 
truth, etc. Whereas, the philosopher may be aware of these 
problems, but his concern is rather for a way to achieve 
knoNledge as a direct experience or a way in \vhich direct 
realization o . f truths can be achieved. Primarily, the 
J.iandukya makes the assertion that the mind itself is non-dual 
though it appears dual in both dreams and in the waking 
state.23 In both these states, consciousness is the highest 
reality and is c.ommon to them--common in the sense in which 
mind has superimposed upon a substratum (consciousness) the 
characteristics of deternrination and volition. The concep-
tion of Advaita directly attacks the condition of duality and 
23Ibid., Chap. III, Sec. JO. "There is no daub~ that 
the mind. which is, in. fact, non-dual ap~ears as dual ln 
dream; in like manner undoubtedly that which is non-dual, 
appears as dual in the wakin~ state also." Cf. nost n. 26. 
.., 
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invokes a discipline to restrain the ceaseless activity of 
the mind, for when the mind ceases to function duality itself 
cannot be experienced.24 It could be objected that when the 
mind ceases to act,. it can no longer be properly termed the 
mind since \'.;hen there is nothing cognized, there can be no 
idea of cognition, hence it is illegitimate to invoke the 
concept of mind as non-dual. This is certainly true, but 
only when the mind is understood as a facult.y of a self and 
therefore different fro:n it. This is made clear when Cauda-
pada states: 
• • • When the mind does not imagine on account of the 
knowledge of the Truth which is Atman, then it ceases to 
be mind, and becomes free from all idea of cognition, for 
want of objects to be cognisect.25 
Therefore_, the conc-ept that the mind is non-dual is 
not intended to assert when the mind is no longer functioning 
as a faculty, but as t ·he ground of the mind itselr.26 Duality 
is a function then of the mind's activity for "all modifica-
tions are mere na~es arising from efforts of speech.n27 
24Ibid., Chap. III, Sec. Jl. 
25Ibid., Chapter III, Sec. )2. 
26rhe translator is not consistent in 
term mind is used as c·onscious:1ess (III. 30; 
3 4; III. 3 5; IV. 46) and then cl.early not in 
other se·ctions (IV. )6; IV. 45, etc.) but as 
his usag~, for the 
I, 12. (25); III. 
this sense in 
a faculty. 
27IQi£., Sankara's Commentary, Chap. III, Sec. )2. 
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Therefore, the central task is to control the mind and free 
it from imaginations, since mind itself is the condition of 
duality.2$ The conceot of ignorance bec omes embracive, 
including within it not only the illo~ical but the very 
structure of duality implicit in the activity of the mind. 
To achieve this goal of control, a techni oue of yoga is 
. 
employed which is different from other meditative techniques 
in that it does not resort to any m.echanical devices. The 
paramount tool is dis·cri..-nination. It presupposes the Advaita-
Vedanta teaching of Gaudapada and Sankara and in its applica-
tion, it vindicates the teaching.. Gaudapada. makes this mani-
festly clear when he lvrites: 
The mind should be turned. back from the enjoyment of 
pleasures, ra-nembering that all this is attended witr. 
misery. If it be remembered that everything is· the 
unborn ffirahmariJ, the born [<fuality \>till not be seen.29 
The teaching as a method becomes as ·it were the yoga. The 
simplicity of the teachin~ orovides a control or guide in 
life, and liTe in turn b-ecomes the condition for its emer-
gene e. The achievement o-f this state is i ndeed difficult and 
would require unrelentine; effort .30 Hov1ever, the teaching 
possibly may not be fully fathomed and it might not be 
2$Ibid., Chap. III, Sec. J). 
29rbid., Chap. III., Sec. 43. 
30Ibid., 
-
Chap. III~ Sec. 41. 
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realized that the non-dual .state 1·n 1 of no way i~p ies a state 
oblivion. It is for this reason that proper means are 
stressed_.3l Ironically, the proper means fall back on the 
proper understanding of the 'vork itself .32 
If, ho\'rever, the I:lind does fall into a state of obliv-
ion, or distraction, it is urged to return it to the state of 
tranquillity .33 Onc-e havine; gained this state, one is 
advised not to disturb it. To accomplish this end, the 
intermediate stage of knovTing the desires even in their 
potential form is reauired.34 ~hen these condit i ons are ful-
filled, 
and 
• • • When the mind does not merge in the inactivity 
of oblivion, or becor'les distracted by desires, that is to 
say, when t~ e mind becomes quiescent and does not rise to 
appearances, it verily becomes Brahman.35 
• • • This highest bliss is based upon the realisation 
of Sel.f, it is oeace, identical with liberation, inde-
scribable and unborn. It is fUrther described as the 
omniscient Brahman, becaus-e it is one ~t;~tl: the unborn 
Self which is the object by Kno'lr!ledge.3 
3 libid., Chap. III, Sec. 42. 
3 2Ibid., Chap ... III, Sec. 43. 
JJibid., III, Sec. 44. 34rbid. Chap. 
-
35~., Chap. III, Sec. 46. 
3 6Ibid., Chap. III, Sec. 47. 
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This should not, hovtever, imply that the object is the 
control of the mind. Control of the mind for fearlessness, 
destruction of misery, knowledge of self, and eternal peace 
is d-ifferent from the technique noted above.37 Such a method-
ology is dualistic and would acknowledge that the desired 
state can only be achieved when the cohtrol is effective. 
The technique may not be considered the same, for in the 
Advaita the condition would be permanent since the object is 
to cleanse the mind of the very propensity, or potentiality, 
for such modifications of the mind. If the control, on the 
other hand, were in any way relaxed, the modifications--
vrittis--'\"lould reassert themselves .. Hence the aim is not for 
some psychic state, because the vmrld seen in its t _rue charac-
ter is itself Brap~an. It is from this perspective that the 
student is urged that "Lfhe min£7' should not be allowed to 
enjoy the bliss that arises out of the condition of Samadhi. n3 e 
If Samadhi is desired as a separate object, then it would be 
contrasted--and thus dual--and if sought to be enjoyed, then 
still attached to the opposites of desire and aversion--
'lrrhereas in the perf-ect state, it is not meant to -b-e "enjoyed •" 
Sankara has added an excellent commentary to this last-
mentioned Karika of Gaudapada (Chap. III, Sec. 40), drawing 
3 7 ill.£ •. , Cha_p. I II, Sec. 40 .. 
38Ibid .. , Chap. III, Sec. 45. 
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the distinction between these different approaches to Reality. 
Primarily, he makes the significant point that when the mi·nd 
and sense organs are regarded as "seen apart from their 
identity with the very nature of Brahman, as mere imagination,• 
then it is that these men, 
••• who look upon themselves as of the very nature 
or Brahman, spontaneously enjoy, as quite natural to them, 
fearlessness and eternal peace known -as freedom for ·which 
they do not depend upon. any mechanical effort. 
For this discipline, however, "no duty Lerro~, whatsoeveri 
exists for the Jnani. nJ 9 Sankara acknowledges, on the other 
hand, that those who look upon Atman as separate,. "who possess 
inferior or middling underst-anding·," can experience fearless-
ness and destruction of misery as a result of the dis.cipline 
of the mind.. But, however, "if the mind, /JonsidereQ.7 related 
to Atman, becomes active," then they can never experience these 
states. Sankara concludes with the statement: 
• • • Besides, their knowledge of self is dependent on 
their control of the mind. And similarly, eternal peace, 
known as :Moksha [Or lib.eratio.!ll, in their case, depends 
upon mental discipline.40 
Hence this section ·is consistent with Advaita-
39Jnani, a term used for the yogi who follows the 
discipline outlined in this Upanishad. This yoga is also termed 
Asparsayoga. "N·o salutation is made to the Yoga taught by 
the Advaita Philos·ophy, in order to extol it. The word . 
Asparsayoga in the text means the Yoga.whic~ is.always a~d 1n 
all respects free from sparsa or relat1onsh1p w~th anyt~lng 
and which is of the· same nature as Brahman. Thl.s Yoga l.S 
well known as the Asparsayoga to all Knowers of Brahman." ~., 
Chap. IV, Sec. 2, Sankara's Camn·entary. 
40rbid .• , Chap. IV, Sec. 5, Sankara's Commentary. 
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Vedanta, for the error of the dualistic yop,a lies in the 
assumption of the mind as separate from Br hm a ~ an. But the 
Jnani sees t _he identity of mind and Brahman, hence does not 
seek for control of the mind. This vie\"! is borne out in 
Gaudapada1 s statements: 
and, 
••• L,Thi~ Atman. ii( b~o~d all expression by words, 
beyond all acvs of mlnd, Lit ~il all f;Cace, eternal -
effulg-ence free from activit_y, and fear and attainable by 
concentrated unders~anding Lof the Jiv~.4l 
... • • In that Brahman l'thich is free from all acts of 
mi-nd there is ne-ither any idea of acceptance nor any 
id-ea of giving up [Of anything_7. Estn.bl ished in the 
Atman ffielfl, knowledge attains to the stat-e of birth-
lessness and sameness, that is to say, chanr;elessness.42 
Three elements are joined ·together in Advaita-Vedanta 
and each in turn complements the others. The test of the 
truth of the Advaita-Vedanta is corroborated by scriptural 
evidence, reasoning, and personal experience. If it v:ere to 
rely on the scriptures alone, it would be no more than belief 
or faith and, as often hap~ens, degenerate into dogmatism. 
Reason may arrive at the concept of Atman, but may not lift 
itself above the soeculative. On the other hand, it may 
degenerate into a rationalization of a private set of beliefs. 
Personal experience, as such, with all the certainty· of the 
41Ibid., Chap. III, Sec. 37. 
42Ibid., Chap. III, Sec. 38. 
j 
• i 
'' 
- I ' I 
' . 
i-
I 
. ! 
:·· 
100 
personal experienc-e can offer nothing more than dogmatic pr-o-
nounc.ements and is incapable in itself of correcting the 
tendency to\'tards self-deception. In the three-fold method, 
ho,·Tever, the very notion of dogmatic pronouncements being 
uttered would be contradictory to the thesi~ itself. Or, 
stated in other tenns, the self to ,,Ihich the crime of decep-
tion is being fixed is nowhere in evidence:. The factors that 
nourish deception have been detected and destroyed. (This is 
also vindicated in the morality of the Advaita mentioned in a 
nrevious section.) Christian metaphysics is an example of 
the twin efforts of reason and scripture with priority p;iv·en 
to the scriptures. In the V"edanta, the student is first 
taught the scriptures, to reason upon them and attempt to 
experience the content within the discinltne of his contem-
plation. The student is warned that "the Self cannot be known 
by study of the Vedas aloneAn43 The epistemological side of 
Advaita-Vedanta develops questions that were not even enter-
tained by Plato. In the Symposium, Plato's meditative steps 
or stages involve the use of mechanical or external devices 
,,I:·lich from. Sankara 's view is a disadvantage in that it assumes 
obstacles which later must be resolvect.44 It is not a ques-
43swami Nikhilananda (trans.), The Unanis·hads {Ne1tr 
York: Harper and Brot.hers Publishers, 1949): I, "Katha 
Upanishad," I .. ii. 23, p. 143· 
44sankara does not discredit a dualistic yoga as such 
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tion of which is more. eff'icac-ious, but \•;hich can insure the 
permanent possession of the object- -knO\iledge. Recognizing 
the advantage of the one over the other leads to a major 
issue. Is it poss ible to add to dialectic Sankara's episte-
molo~ical approach and still have consistencyl Can the 
asparsayoga be viewed dialectically and thereby add to it 
t his immeasurable advantage$ To this last cuestion, the 
issue would be Vlhether dialectic can re."!love the conc-eptual 
errors as well as the seeds of future- acts that may either 
restore or add to man's state an additional increment of 
ignorance. But the linkin~ of the Platonic art of contem-
plation with dialectic indicates that it should not be sepa-
rated from it. 
The asparsayoga of Vedanta recuires a continual exam-
ination of dualistic. thought patterns and silences them by 
understanding. The term ·nunders·tanding" is the key· in the 
asparsayoga, for understanding is a result of the prior nroc-
ess of discrimination. "\'ihat we have called dialectic is the 
movement of discrimination in lan~uage, or rather in under-
standing, correcting it and r~oving ignorance, and at the 
same time it is also the belief in reason, tha.t reason 
through discrimination can undercut its m-~n processes. There 
for he is fully aware of the need when it is a function of 
the understanding. Cf. his commentary, in :dkhilananda, ~ 
}!Iandukyopanishad, .£E.• cit., Chap. III, Sec. 40. 
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is no attempt to control the mind, only to allow the under-
standing to discern the identity which lies at its base; this 
is the task of discriminatl·on. Plat d o was un oubtedly correct 
in not separating dialectic and cant en:t!)lation,- but he did 
nevertheless separate it as a consistent activity with the 
dialectic: The retreat into models for the contcmnlative 
!netted leaves the discri.l'!linative role only to the outer dia-
lectic, whereas the role of the understandi~~ ~n this asparasa-
yoga is the ~ararnount employment of discrimination as an inner 
dialect-ic. True, the outv.rard form of the dialectic (verbal) 
and the inner, as contemplation, bear a close structural 
similarity,. but it has a different focus of attention. The 
addition of this technique of the Advaita ~~phasis on continu-
ine discriinination (if on-e can be rash enough to call it a 
technique) to the dialectic \'J'Ould not only make it a consist-
ent system, but would also ha.ve the advantages of a direct, 
uncluttered, and extremely profound carry-over of the very 
same activity into the conte.'!l?Jlative. The concition for the 
direct experience is operative ·in both cases--discrinination--
and by its continual m::)V ement and exercise the realization is 
deoendent upon the total reduction of ipnorance, i.e., d~ality. 
T!:e inner movement of the dialectic vwuld c-onclude in an acti v-
ity beyond words and form, and even the silent monolo~~ue v:ould 
reduce itself to "concentrated understanding," thereby r.;iving 
birth to the intuitive. Henc-e this ,.;rould be a hif,her contem-
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plation and "inner dialectic" because of the question and 
answer quest, though silent, is in fact critical reason con-
frontin~ its own content. The p rocess itself is a catharsis 
that Plato would have considered a blessinp; to have knm·m. 
There is always a ouestion of ho\'r complete the Flatonic 
catharsis actually is, but tb .. ere can be n0 such question 1t:ith 
the Advaita-Vedanta. Gaudapada and San~·: ara formulate a 
method and evolve a teachin~ that is mor e profound because of 
its deeper g rasp of ignorance. 'l'her·efore,. the Advaita does 
not further the explicit use of dialectic beyond further 
exa..'n?l-es of seeking to uncov·er inc ::msistencies, i.e., lor. ical 
analysis, but does provide another conteMplative technioue 
consistent with dialectic and bearinc the same form as the 
"out·Nard d i alectic.'' r:/here the technique o·f Plato 1 s conte..'n-
plation bears an architectonic similarity ' ·:ith dialectic, 
Advaita-Vedanta asparsayoga has closer ties with the r rocess 
as such and therefore an advantage and an i.":lprov em ent beyond 
Plato. 
III. J.~AHAYANA BUDDHIS1~I: l'iAGARJUNA AKD CANDRAKIRTI 
The Vedanta insight that reality is concei 1.red under 
t h e concept utilized in its apprehension car. also be used as 
a m.etr.odoloe;ical key for an a nalysis of the para'nount and 
fo~ative ideas of a system. It is fro~ this Ders?ective 
that ~.~ar.ayana Buddhism shall be examined. The centra l idea 
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there is Nirvana and it is understood as: 
What neither is released, nor is it 
ever reached, 
What neither is annihilation nor is 
. , 
l.t eternality_, 
What never disappears, nor has it 
ever been created, 
This is Nirvana, it escapes precision.45 
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Within Hahayana everything is considered as relative, 
hence no real origination or annihilation is :nossible.46 Yet, 
if this is so, then there can be no deliverance from igno-
rance; therefore, no possibility of Nirvana. On the other 
hand, if everything is real, substance, then neither creation 
nor destruction, nor even Nirvana is possible't7 Thus, from 
both sides it appears that Nirvana is impossible. Therefore 
both sides are denied and termed Nirvana: ttit escapes pre-
cis"ion. n48" Nagarjuna proceeds further in his analysis of 
:Nirvana and denies that Nirvana is a kind of ens, then not an 
ens, neither both and neither together simultaneously: 
45Th. Stcherbatsky, The Conceotion of Bud :.~ hist I-~irvana, 
including trans. of Madhyamika-Sastra O·~ula-1·-:adhyamika Kari-
kas) of Nagarjuna and the l'ot!adhyamika-vritti (Prasafolnapada} 
(Leningrad: Publishing Office of the Academy of Sc1ences of 
the U .s.s ... R., 1927), 25th Chapter of l·Iadhyamika-Sastra, .Sec. 
III. 
46Ibid., 1st Chap., Sec. I--XIV. 
47rbid., 25th Chap., Sec. XXIV. 
48rbid., 25th Chap., .Sec. III • 
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and, 
The Buddha has declared 
That Ens and non-Ens sh~uld both be 
rejected. 
Neither as Ens nor as a n0n-Ens 
Nirvana therefore is conceived. 
If Nirvana were both Ens and non-Ens 
Final deliverance would be alEc both ' 
Reality· and unreality together, ' 
This never could be possible. 
If Nirvana is neither Ens nor non-Ens 
No one can really understand 
This doctrine which proclaims at once 
Negation of them both together. 4-9 
This standpoint carried through to its limit would 
na turally assert no difference between Nirvana and Samsara, 
or Reality and the Phenomenal. If no distinctions, then no 
dema rkation of ends or ideals can be contrasted. \'Jith this 
Nagarj_una concurs:. 
There is no difference at all 
Between Nirvana and Sarnsara 
There is no difference at all 
Between Samsara and Nirvana. 
1Nhat makes the limit of Nirvana 
Is also then the limit of Samsara, 
Between the two we cannot fi·nd 
'l'he s l i ghtest shade of difference .• 50 
The terms in this analysis are suspect themselves and, 
if a conviction can be had on a suspicion, not even this much 
can be said. To speak in any valid sense of "difference" 
49Ibid., 25th Chap., Sees. X, XI, XII, PP• 75-76. 
50rbid., 25th Chap., Sees. XIXF XX, P· 77· 
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assumes a distinction between identity and difference and 
assuming this, then even if the above comment of "no dirfer-
ence at all between Samsara and Nirvana" can be affirmed_, the 
terms of comparison must therefore be said to be valid. But 
even these, the terms of identity and difference, are finally 
reduced to absurdity. Nagarjuna concludes his twenty-fifth 
chapter of the I'.'J:adhyamika--Sastra with the lines: 
\'!hat is identity, and what is difference? 
vlhat is eternity, and what non-eternityt 
vlhat means eternity and non-eternity together, 
What means ner,ation of both issues? 
The Bliss consists in t he cessation of all 
thought, 
In the Quiescence of Plurality. 
No L5eparati7 Reality was Ptrached at all, 
Nowhere and none by Buddha-.) 
In the Advaita-Vedanta as well as in the ~1adhyamika, 
concepts like origination, annihilation, deliverance, creation, 
destruction, eternality-~' non-eternality, death, de-cay, cause 
and effect, independency, phenomenality, and any ~redicate of 
reality that can be said to uniquely qualify or particularize 
Reality, is- rejected. Hence, both systems have a share in 
t h e profundity of their grasp of the critical side of reason. 
Gaudapada and Sankara are the basic thinkers of Advaita 
while Nagarjuna and Candrakirti are considered_ to b e the 
foundation stones of the ;L:ahayana with the1r "mrks of the 
5lrbid., 25th Chap.,- Sees. XXIII, XXIV, p. ?B. 
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r~·:adhyamika-Sastra (Hula-:r.Iadhyamika-Karikas) and the Jli:adhya-
mika-vrtti (Prasannapada). 
Candrakirti provides a commentary on Nagarjuna's work. 
The Nahayanistic concept of Nirvana based on Nagarjuna fur-
nishes an excellent occasion for a Candrakirti commentary. 
This can be seen in Candrakirti' s ansvJer to the question: 
••• Now if the Universe is really suc-h fJ. Unity, if 
it is no pluralit-y, how is it then that our ~mnp.;ination 
has built up defilers, LI.e., an illusion of personal 
identity and desires7 through a suppression of which 
Nirvana is supposed to be attainedl Or how is it that 
our imagination. has built up separate elements throur:h 
the annihilation of which Nirvana reveals itself?52 
Candrakirti states that "as long as these constructions of 
our imagination exist, Nirvana cannot be reached, si·nce it .is 
reached just through a suppression of all Plurality. n53 An 
anonymous objector recognizes a g.ood point and replies that 
"it may be as you say, but surely the defiling elements or 
elements in general do not exist when Nirvana is reached--but 
before Nirvana is reached they must exist and Nirvana is only 
possible through their annihilation.n54 (The objector returns 
and there appears a form of dia1ogue capable of analysis for 
dialectical content.) 
52rbid., 25th Chap. Sec. II, 521.14, p. 167. 
53rbid., 25th Chap. Sec. II, 522. 2, p. H~7. 
54-rbid., 25th Chap., Sec. II, 522.,3, p. 187. 
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A~ objectio~ is_raised. If this is so {Will it not be 
possl.b;e tc: ma1nta1.z: thay Nirvana has been denied by the 
Bud~ha. vJ.1.~l not h1.s doctrine be absolutely useless, 
L£h1.s doctr~ne \'Jhic!V establishes correspondi·ne antidotes 
f?r every k1.nd ?f worldly career· in order to enable· man-
kl.nd. to re~ch l'hrvana. \'l e ans\ver. This critic ism would 
?e r1ght, 1.f there were any absolutely real doctrine, or 
1f there were an~{ ,Labsolutely rea1] beinp;s v.;i:ich ,,..m1ld 
attend to th~s.law, or if there were any -absolutely real 
teacher, a d1.v1.ne Buddha. But [Since in a monistic 
Universe that does not exist, we are not hit by your 
accusatiori/! 
Our bliss consists in the cessation of all 
thoueht, 
In the quiescence of Plurality. 
To nobody a-nd nowhere no doctrine Labout 
separate element27 
By Buddha ever has been preac-hed·! 
In this case how can the reproach wade above affect 
us ! Our vi e"\'1 is that Nirvana. represents Qui esc enc e, i • e., 
the non-applicability of all the variety of names and 
ffion-existence o!l particular objects. Th-is very quies-
cence, so far it is the natural zgenuine7 quiescence LQf 
the world7, is called bliss. The quiescence of Plurality 
is a1so a bliss because, by putting an end to all defiline 
agencies, all individual existences are stopped. It is 
also a bliss because, by quenching all defiline; forces, 
all instinct Land habits of though!! have been extirpated 
without residue. It is also a bliss because, since all 
the .objects of knm•rlede;e have died a\-ray, kno.,.,:ledge itself 
has also died. 
'.tlhen the divine Buddhas have entered blissful r.;irvana 
in which all Plurality has vanished, t~ey are like reeal 
swans. soa:ing in ~he sky \-Iithout any. sup,.Eort, ~r.ey are 
hover1.ng 1.n tl:e w1.nd produced by then" Ltwo7 w1nr.;s, the 
wing of accumulated virtue and the wing of accumulated 
v:isdom, or they are hovering in the vlind of Space~ E_hat 
Space whichl is the Void. 'l'hen [from this elevat1.o!!7 
all separate objects having become. indistinguisi;a?le, the 
Buddhas have not preached neither about the de-f1l1nr: 
elements L0f life7, nor about its purifying elements, 
neither in the divine worlds,. nor in tr~e hur.lan. vwrl~~ nei-
ther to e;ods, nor to men. Th1.-s s·hould be real1zed. 
55Ibid., "25th Chap., Sec. XXIV, 5JB.J-5J9.2, PP• 208-209. 
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Here in this quoted passage, "·'e find th_e same distin-
~uishing marks that \'Tere apparent in the Advaita-Vedanta. It 
is es_sentially a higher criticism, from an analysi-s of the 
opponents' argument, tracinr out misunderstandincs of their 
doctrine and correcting interpretations. The feature of dia-
lectic present in other sections is the renderine explicit 
the inconsistencies and contradictions. In this section, as 
it is in th-e entire Nadhyamika-sastra and r:Iadhyamika-vrtti, no 
original arg~ent is advanced, only a basis for a systematic 
criticism of the -understanding of an opponent. 'i;iith Nagar-
juna and Candrakirti,. this is formulated into a systematic 
method. Candrakirti; : in a sec-tion titled, "The r.Iadhyamika 
1-'I ethod Explained," makes the follov-ring methodolo,:-;ical points: 
Ordinarily, when someone is assertinG some position, it is 
his desire to convince the other party... He attemnts to prove 
his areument in the manner in which he hLI!lself arrived at his 
conclusion, i.e., just as he c ~nvinced himself. Hence the 
respondent pursues a line of argument in order to prove his 
ovm thesis and thereby convince another. But the I·Iadhyamika 
proposes a different technique: 
w •• He does not vindicate any assertion in orcler to 
convince his opponent. He has no reasons and examples [Or 1-vhich he himself i~ convinced/. ·!-!e se~s forth a 
thesis of his o1rm and undertakes to prove 1.t only so far 
as it runs ~arallel {and destroyi! tte ar[ument lQf his 
opponent?. He thus brings assert i ngs which cannot be 
nroved.- Ee i ·s in conflict even wit~ himself. Ee cer-
tainly cannot con vine e ~1 is opponent [Of his imagin~d thesi~7. 3ut can there be a more elo~uent refutat1.cn of 
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an opponent than the proof that he is not capable of 
establishin~ his own thesis? Is ·there r~ally any 
necessity to produce counter arr,uments~5b 
190 
Therefore, we have in this dialogue a clear stat€~ent that 
the reductio ad .absurdum arr,ument is central to the Jl.1adhya-
mika and, by their own admission, is "The ~·iethod of tte 
1•-1adhyamika. 11 The Madhyamika repudiates argwnents from the 
·principles admitted as valid by the opponent while claiming 
not to advance any original arguments of their own. However, 
i .f, in fact, some orieinal thesis is advanced, then "all our 
arguments will also be wronp, , because the rea.s ons which will 
be adduced will eitl:er be non-entities themselves, or they 
Nil l represent something appertaining to a non-entity.n57 
Ca ndrakirti does note that some I•ladhyamikas, like Bhavaviveka, 
do assert independent theses and to them he says that, if so, 
then the same criticism should be applied: 
But we, fh€ says?, do not resort to ·proof by syllogism. 
Our arguments can have only the result of repudiating the 
tenets of our opponents, for us they are not valid by 
themselves. 58 
The :Madhyamika asserts that separate entities are not 
caused, but such an assertion equally allows the converse-- . 
that every single thing is caused and exists. If the argument 
5~bid., lst Chap., Sec. XIV, 19.J-lS'.6, pp. Cf-OC• ./ ..,.., 
5 7rbid ., 1st Chap., Sec. XXIV, 34.1, p. 117. 
5Srbid., lst Chap., Sec. XXIV, 34-4, p. 117. 
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of the denial o.f causation is founded upon an argument., then 
the following factors are pertinent:59 
1. How many are the sources of knowledge their 
ess ence, scope, origin, and ' 
2. Have they arisen out of themselves, out of 
something -extraneous, both, or out of 
nothing. 
On the other hand, if it is not founded upon argument, 
1. It must be rej ected. 
2. "Cognition of an object deoe.nds uoon the method 
cognized, if something is not kiwwn it cannot 
become known othervlise than by appropriate meth-
ods.. If no .t.::~ethods then neither ·v;i l. l there be 
cognition.nuv 
7hus, it appears the controversy rests upon the validity of 
logic and its employment. The point is acknm'lledeed fu-lly 
and Candrakirti'~ answer discloses a fine grasp of logical 
engagement~- The issue i s really the other side of the major 
contention \'lhich underlies t he entire I-ladhyamika. Included 
in this would be the solution to the auestion of the content, 
if any, of the ~.~ahayana dialectic as found i n both Nagarj'una 
and Candrakirti. . The objection is stronely put by the 
"anonymous logician" in the l":adhyarnika-vrtti when he raises 
the issue: 61 
59Ibid., lst Chap., Sec. L\.XIV, 55.11-55.12, p. 1)6. 
60Ibid., 1st Chap., Sec. XXIV, 55.12-56.0, p. 1)6. 
6libid., lst Chap., Sec. XXIV, 57 .4, p. lJ ?. 
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• • • You thus insist that you make no assertion 
whatsoe~er. But . ''~'? hear from you a proposition which 
looks l1ke a defln1te assertion, viz. that entities a~ise neither out of themselves, nor ~ut of something 
d1fferent, nor out of both, nor at random. How is it 
to be explained? 
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The point is ansvv-ered by an illustration that c ammon people 
••• impute to entities a reality which they do not 
possess, a reality which for the saint does not exist at 
all. It then happens that these ordinary men are tor-
mented by some particular thing which they somehow 
imagine to exist. Then the saints try to rouse the-ir 
skepticism by some argument that would appeal to them. 
The general and more central issue still remains. It is 
continued in the reply: 
If our answer did allow assertive judgments, L~plying 
the transcendental reality of a substratum, the question 
would then_ arise whether these judgments are founded on 
sound m-ethod or not. However, there is no LP'lace for 
them in a sy-stem of universal Relativity. The reason 
for that is just t h e follm·.'ine one. If problematic judg-
ments regarding reality '\':ere admitted as possible, we 
would be obliged to ad~ it the counterpart, the possibility 
of problematic judgments, regarding the transcendental 
reality of a substratum, h0\'1 could we make the correlative 
assertions, -since they \'Iould not be correlati-ve with the 
other unexisting member of the relation. Land as a con-
clusionJ} It is not our business to anS\oJ"er all these 
questions162 
Therefore, quest i ons are only entertained as part of a tech-
nique to educate and, on the other hand, they are repudiated 
apart from this !Jedagogical device. Candrakirt·i says: 
We first assume the reality of something impossible 
62Ibid., 1st Chap., Sec. XXXVIII, 62.4-63.8. Candra-
kiriti's quotation is from the "Questions of R.atnacuda" of 
l~agar juna. 
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and then condemn it.63 
However, the criticism is often raised that this method is 
itself impos s ible. Tr..e denial of a t h esis i.r.Jplic_s the acce.pt-
c>.nce of another and ·therefore it is imp os ~· ible to have a 
system that is critical and yet not advance a theory of its 
o•.-m. It may be that the Madhyamika assumes it has no position, 
but in order to deny a thesis, t!'-.ere must be some vantar:e 
point from ~1ich this itself can be as s erted. Hence, a care-
ful examination of this syste!'1 1:1ill r.1ake expl icit the irr.plicit 
assumptions of the r-1adhyamika. It matt.ers little if the 
l'·';adhyamikas are not cognizant of this. The point is simply 
that it must assume such a pos-ition. In the repudia.tion of 
the t :,eory of causation by a reductio ad absurdum, does it 
involve the acceptance of the opposite theory, or does it 
necessitate the ex&uinaticn of the reductio for premises that 
can be seen to be a part of another theory and therefore pre-
suppose it for the very criticism of the reductio? But this 
is itself putting forth a theory that must be rationally 
defended by evidence and example. Without documentation, it 
is a theory without substance,- another cry of the dogmatist • 
:- ~adhyamika replies: 64 
63Ibid._, lst Chap., Sec. XXXVIII, 56.4, P• 136. 
64Ibid., 1st Chap., Sec. XVIII, 23.3, p. lOJ .. _ 
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and, 
\ve have declared we have no theory of our own. lJle 
therefore cannot be accused of contradicting our o\in 
principles. 
The only result of our deduction is to re nudiate the 
theory o·f our opponent. Our acceptance of the converse 
theory is not at all therewith im pliect.65 
There is a difference between asserting that the 
Nadhyamika maintains no "position" and a~.sertinr; that the 
1>-~adhyamika contains no ontology. It would be more exact to 
adva nce the theory that. thou~h they do not admit any onto-
lop;ical theory (because they find none defensible b-efore 
critical reaFon and \I'Ihich ca nnot be vindi·cated by an intuition 
of reality), nonetheless they still have an ontological .refer-
ent in the sense that the intuition is not of anything but 
sunyata whic-h is equal to "tat hat a," thusness, the unique 
reality of the universe. If it >:-:ere of ·nothing , it "'ould 
characteri.ze r eality as non-existent, but: 
Now, if Nirvana is a non-Ens, 
How then can it be independent? 
For sure, an indepcndent 6non-Ens Is nowhere to be founct.b 
An intuition of nothing is hardly an i n tuition and undoubt-
edly much of the difficulty can be trac-ed to t -he tra.nslation 
o f "sunyata" as nothingness \'Jhen the referent i ·s understood 
65Ibid., lst Chap, Sec. XVIII, 24.6, P• 104. 
6~bid.,25th Chap, Sec. VIII. 
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as a non-Ens rather than the re£erent of non-predicatin~ or 
qualifying reality. It is interesting that Stcherbatsky 
translates the term as "relativity" thereby · ....... escan~ng tue 
literal translation. There is quite obviously a logical 
jump from recognizing that Nirvana "escapes precision" to the 
assertion that it is "nothin . n:." The task is lessened v-:hen 
the focus is on the perception rather than the universal 
aspect for then it takes the tathata rather' t _hcn sunyata. 
When experience is ~iven precedence over speculation, 
when logic is silenced by logic and reason asked to reflect 
unon itself, there is ahmys a value given to self-disci~!line 
and here in the l·iahayana the sarne thing is true. It takes 
the form of introspection, the discipline of meditation. An 
outline of the 1••1adhyamika discipline is stated as a practice, 
which presumably parallels the dialectic, and also includes 
its final intuition and realization: 
Considering consciousness he i[he 3odhisattv~ inves-
tigates the stream of thou.r(ht and asks v:herefrom does tt 
come. The follo\'.'ing occurs to him. Consciousness arises, 
if there is an Limr.1aneny object does that mean that can-
sciousness is one thing and the object another, or that 
they are identical? In the first case \'le have a double 
consciousness. But if they are not identical, how is 
then consciousness to be cogniz-ed through consciousness"i 
Consciousness cannot apprehend -its O\'ln self. T~Le trench-
ant of a sword cannot cut its trenchant. The t1p of a 
finger cannot touch that very tip. Similarly this, con-
sciousnesc cannot be conscious of its own ~elf. 
Thus it is that \'Then [5. sain1]' is thorour.h~y at~en-
ti ve, then it appears to him as undefinable, 1 t ne1.:-h-e: 
has an end nor a beginning. It is not change~ess, 1.t l.S 
not causeless, it does not conflict with the 1nterdepend-
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ence ~f the elements?, but it i .... ne 1·ther "'d t · 1 . . . - ., ..... en lea nor non-~ ent~cal ne~ther with itself, nor >·rLth othe-rs., He 
then cogn1zes a stream of thou~ht Las thin as7 a 
·the thou~ht element, indefinite thou~ht non=ma ·rcretepder, 
th ht . . . ·' t · I n1 es e 
. oug , ll1lp~rcept 1ble. thought, thou.~ht as a thinP-; in 
1tse~f. He 1~tu1ts th7s fUnspeakable thought? as "this-
ness fth: ug~que Real~ty of the universi7, he does not 
suppress 1t. ·r 
Such is the analysi.s of thou r~ht which he realizes and 
intuits. This, 0 noble son, is the "Bodhisattva' 5 exer-
c~se of.a~plication.of mindfulness consistinp in the con-
Slderat~on of \'rhat 1n our consciousness represents its 
[essencif. 68 
This exercise: of th-e "application of Mindfulnes:s" 
clearly s ~:O\·.rs the movement of an inner dialectic. The re jec-
tion of the duality or subject and object presented as con-
sciousness and its object, however. does not of itselr insure 
the intuition. There is a vast difference bet ween acknm'lledr,-
in.r; the distinction to be \'Tithout foundation on t h e basis of 
a learned response, a teaching, or so~e revealed scripture; 
and another thin~ to actually realize it. Hence the "recol""-
nition" of the illusion does not of itself automatically 
dissolve its form, merely loosens its claim for atten~ion and 
c onsideration. Attachment to the objects of L'!lap;ination 
depend upon an unreflective, unques tioninf. acceptance o: its 
externality, desirability (or repulsion), and reality. The 
doubt cast is more than a mere "as if," for the repeated 
67Tathata • Sunyata. 
6$Ibid., 1st Chap, Sec. XJ.).~II, 61.10-64,PP• 145-6. 
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questioning insures a dimini·shing tie to the object relative 
to the success of the proces~. Therefore, this nrocess strips 
the essential element of the object--its apparent inteeral 
reality. This could be termed a procedure of unattaching the 
object. Not being attached to the imagination, it is pos~ible 
to sit attentively but not before. The increasing recognition 
of its unreality shifts the focus of consciousnes~ fro~ the 
seeming-objects to the process itself. Of course, the 
imaginative process has little hold on the individual •:1hen 
its claim is se-en to have such a provisional basis. 
The success of this exercise comes \':hen the "thusness" 
is not suppressed but allowed. It is- further interestinp, to 
note that the inner-dialectic functions not merely in a 
negative capacity as in a formal "Not this, not this, tr but in 
an analytical manner mirrorinr: th-e outer movement of the dia-
lectic. Throu.f,h this exercise, the student intuits the unique 
reality of the Universe and the technique is a thorour,h-rr,oing 
dialectic. 
Dialectic is the cleansing faculty, the prcltminary 
discipline to the insight, and the ~rounds for its activity. 
The technique of "The l'•·lethod of the Madhyamika," noted. previ-
ously, is utilized here in the exercise. The student's own 
thought process· is the material; the premises and methodology 
follow the sa11e lines as the outer dialectic. The method is 
the use of the reductio ad absurdum techni~ue in both the 
,. 
I 
:· 1 
i: · ·, 
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outer and inner dialectic. The experience of Nirvana is 
dependent upon dialectic functionin~ as a catharsis, as a 
purifier of the de:filin£7 eleT'1ents. In the l<adhyamil:a, the 
catharsis is thoroup:h and exhaustive. 'l'he catharsis as an 
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ac·ti vity ·is formulated by both Candrakirti and Nagarjuna 
and is central to their thought. Candrakirti states that 
neither suppression nor annihilation really takes place in 
the experience of Nirvana. Actually it c~nsists "merely in 
the suppression of absolutely all the constructions of our 
imar.;ination. 11 The term -nsup:oressi .:m11 could more nrobably be 
coined "cessation" as in the stateracnt of NaE,arjuna from the 
Ratnavali: 
Nor is Nirvana .non-existence 
How can such an idea come to you~ 
We call Nirvana the cessation 
of everv thou~ht of non-existence and existence.69 
~ <...; 
The essential ele.<-ncnt is that the phenomenal \·:orld can be 
ca1led Nirvana when the conceptual freme\·.·ork is silenced. 
Nagarjuna writes:70 
Coordinated here or caused are [separate th .-Lng.§_7 
VJe call this i\I'Orld Phenomenal 
But ;ust the same is called Nirvana 
\'!hen"' vie\-;red without causality, v1.ithout coordination .. 
Therefore Nirvana is merely the ~eeing of the Phenomenal world 
-..·:hen the imaginatiore cease their play. Candrakirti ex~resses 
69rbid., 25th Chap., Sec. II, 524.5-524.9, P· 190. 
?Orbid., 25th Chap .. , Sec. IX, p. 195. 
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this negatively when he writes:71 
. • • • as lone as con~tructions of our L~a;.ination exist 
N1rvana cannot b9 reached, since it is reach~d just 
through a suppression of all plurality. 
The experience of Bliss is coincidental with the cessation of 
all thought, "Our Bliss consists in the cessation of all 
thought. n72 The claim is not for a m.omentary abandon of 
thoughts and instincts but rather for a permanent ~tate:73 
•••. It is also a Bliss because, by qu£nching all 
defiling forces, all. instinct {and habits of thour,hy 
have been extirpated without residue. 
The as~umption at work here in the exercise is the 
concept of the Prajna ( intuitior.}. This term, -,.~ith its close 
affinities with Plotinus 1 parallel concept, is translated by 
the same term--Intellectual Intuition. The concept of the 
Prajna is tha.t t..;hen t~1 e entire conceptual frar:J e,·.'ork a.nd 
activity loosens its tie or l: old on the mind, only then does 
the Intellectual Intuition natur2. lly ft:.nction. It is not 
thought of as a separate faculty, but is understood as opera-
tive only when the obstructions arc re~oved. The obscurine 
elements removed, intuition reveals itself. It \':ould be a 
mis understanding not to ac }:n o;,-!l edge thfl t this intuition is 
thouzht of as a direct experience, not mediat i n~ between 
71Ibid., 25th Chap., Sec. II, 521.14, p. lf~7; cf. 524-5,. 
p. 190; 522 ... 10' p. 188. 
72 . ' Ib1o.., 25th Chap., Sec. XXIV, 53 e .3, p. 209. 
73 Ibid., 25th Chap., Sec. XXIV, 53 E. E, f'• 20S. 
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objects, and thour:;hts for it are termed "thusness," non-
manifested thought, .indefinite thout:ht, and the uns~eakable 
thouf,ht. 
The method of the I.~adhyamika, the reductio ad ab~urdurn 
technique, or as they call it, the Prasanca.padanam_, is carried 
to a limit that Plato would have been proud to have encountered. 
True, this sar.;.e element is :>resent in Platonic thour;ht_, but 
not carried to its limit as it is in the J''::adhya;nika, nor was 
it ever considered as the exclusive tool of the dialectician. 
And balancinp; the scales, tr.e Eadhyam.ika has no parallel con-
cept for the mid·wifery of Plato. The conceDt_ of i _r;norance in 
Platonic thou~ht is thought to be the barrier to true knowl-
edp,e~ but on the other hand, it is certainly not developed 
into its more specific form of 11 the cessation of every thou&:ht" 
as the condition of Nirvana. To this insi.o:ht, bot h the 
Advaita and l--Iadhyamika are in agreement and botl-: !:ave direct 
tec-hniques for the removal of this veil to intuition. The 
Platonic- technicue does not ~roceed as dir-ectly as does the 
A..dvaita and }\·iadhyamika, nor- is it as consistent v;ithin its 
system as they are v:ithin theirs, -..-.·hen taken as a '.-:hole. 
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CHAPTEi~ V 
CONCLUSION AND SYNTEESIS OF THE POSITIVE Ai-:D I~EGA TIVE DIALECTIC 
I. FOREVWRD 
In the Platonic '.'rod::~ , the nee<It·ive dialectic "ras nei-
ther extended to its limits nor 11as tbe method rendered into 
an explicit methodolocy as in the kadhyamika. 'l'h-e Flatonic 
catharsis was a function of the negative dialectic but the 
l-atter never was the sole and paramount tool of both tl1e 
catharsis and the insir:ht into the Good, or Reality. Plato 
usee the neeative dialectic to initiate the ~rocess of reflec-
tion and self-criticism. On the othe-r hand, the hadhyamika 
accepts the negative dialectic and extends it to the limit of 
self-reflection as an epistemolor,ical tool to remove al .1 the 
impediments to the vision of reality. 
The recognition of the Asparsayor,a as the inner dia-
lectic extends it beyond the boundaries of Plato and offers 
more than merely the acquisition o_f another contemplative 
technicue because it ~rovides a r.1ore profound gr-asr of the 
concept of ienorance and, therefore, bri~gs ~ith it a more 
concise content. Thus, the addition of both the conte~Fla­
tive technique of the Advaita-Vedanta and the negative dia-
lectic of the Nadhyamika t"J the Dialectic is certainly a 
decided advantage ior its development as a ph~loso~hy. 
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It is interestine that both the Advaita-Vedanta and 
the 1-Iadhyamika have developed those elements that were \':eak 
in the Platonic dialectic, and yet neither of these schools 
added to the positive dialectic-...;vthat Plato refers to as the 
"noble birth.n The three aspects of the Dialectic--positive, 
negative, and inner dialectic are the elements of the Pla-
tonic concept of Dialectic. The positive dialectic is exem-
?lified in the quest for unity as it f -eels nev1 strenr.;th i .n 
fresr. discoveries and intuitions of relationships, ha~ony, 
and order, all the '''hile seckinp; its object amonr; the True, 
the Good, and the Beautiful. The essential feature of this 
positive dialectic is that these notions are brour,ht to birth 
by a special technique of auestion-and-ans\",rer by a trained 
dialectician who is, himself, restrained from either dictating 
solutions or offerinf, positive answers ... 
The negative dialectic is not a separate and distinct 
part of the positive dialectic, for it assumes some conclusion 
from the positive dialectic. Its function is to expose contra-
dictory assertions which claim some certainty, and is essentially 
a neg~tive nrocess in the reductive orocesses. Locic is 
employed and an examination of the asserter's tf:esis is made 
to determine if the birth process, the positive dialectic, has 
been a true birth or if it must be aborted. Sir..ce· it prefers 
explicit non-contradictory propositions with clear and precise 
meaning, it is suspicious of metaphors and analoeical thinking. 
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Inner dialectic 1 the contemplative, is an interior 
orocess of dialectic that has as its end the vision, or 
experience, of reality. 
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The dynamics of the positive dialectic is a function 
of "its use of analor,ies and metaphors that as~umes a differ-
ent set o :f presuppositions than the negative dialectic • The 
analysis of these presuppositions \•:ould demonstrate ·the 
mechanism of both the positive· and the negative diRlectic and 
also reconc-ile a curious problem . The r-roblem can be re.1.dily 
se en if these two activities are considered separate . Then 
t h e nroblem is obvious, for each seems to contradict the 
other. The positive sees the negative a s unable to say any-
thing since a thorough criticism must also cancel itself. 
The negative dialectic sees the positive as a system of 
analoeical assertions and discoveries which, adr.1ittedly, can-
not be the basis for any literal truth. Hence, what is needed 
is an analysis of the analogical and relational form of judg-
nent within each of thes e tools of the Dialectic. 
II. ANALOGY AND POSITIVE DIALECTIC 
The positive dialectic does not examine languar,e with 
any degree of severity; it accepts it and prefers to utilize 
the structure it assumes for its philosophical ends. The 
characteristic feature of the positive dialectic is its 
acceptance of the use of relational terms, or ter!:.s v:hich 
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assume some relational matrix for their meaning. An example 
of this can be .seen in Plato 1 s quest for the nature of the 
Statesman and Sophist. It must first be granted that both 
terms are relational. It must be further assumed that there 
is a position of authority and a populace in whose interest, 
or against such interests, this authority c2n exercise some 
c')ntrol or exert some influence. \'lhatever issue or ques-
tion is pursued, if it assumes a relational character, then 
the positive dialectic seeks to uncover those relations that 
are necessary for the t -erm to be meaninr;ful by seckinp; the 
essential relations. The ability to discern relations vTOuld 
be the pre-requisite .far this employment of the positive dia-
lectic.! On the other hand, the distinctions found, dis-
cerned, perceived or conceived depend in t~eir turn upon 
either an arbitrary discovery or there actually being rela-
tions to cognize. \'lithout order, there ce>n only· be an 
arbitrary concept of relation and, therefore, merely arbitrary 
definitions. Analogy and relation both depend upon the exist-
ence of some order, and to communicate by analor:ies involves 
lcr. Cornford, Plato's Republic, QE• cit.~ II. 25$. 
(A term can, of course, be both a relational term and a.non-
relational term, depending purely upon the extent to w~1ch 
the term is examined. An interesting example to note 1s the 
concept of Justice in Plato's Republic: this ~erm has ~ :ela-
tional referent in respect to its soctal funct1on [Cr • 1bld. • 
VI, 50~, and a non-relational character in respect to 
Justice itself £Cr. ibid., VII, 259;7) 
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a perception of their connection and also presupposes an 
acceptance of .some conceot of order. It is essential in 
analogical thinking that the. terms involved in the analoe;y 
are actually ''seen" in the relation indicated. To actually 
perceive them in this way is in itself a discovery--an 
insight. 
It miP,ht be argued that these orders and relations 
e·xist--but only in language and within a conceptual frame-
·~:mrk. The argument would vroceed to ass-ert that it is an 
analogical leap itself, and hardly legitimate, to move from 
rel~tions in language to relations in reality. All the 
available. evidence points, to ·continue the argument, to 
meaning in language -and nothing else. 
The reply would be to agree entirely with this con-
tention and extend it a bit beyond those narrmr.; confines. 
The assertion that the nerceived order is in lang~a~e and 
within concepts vrould certainly be ad..11itted, but if the 
assertion were to add that it is "merely" and "only•' in 
lanp:uage and concepts, then the line '\'·iould be drav.:n. On the 
.other hand, the assumr::tion that this order, asserted by some 
analogy, is "actually" the order of reality \·muld also be 
going beyond the bonds of respectability. Both of these 
r::ositions are excluded and yet both usBd. The analogical 
thinking as;umes that the relation indicated is in some way 
in reality--perhaps totc.lly mysterious, but it ne·ither 
I 
l. 
i. 
' 
1
: : ·: l'i 
,. 
!; ; 
'. ~ ' j 
. ! 
I 
I ~ 
I : 
206 
qualifies it uniquely nor exhausts it. The assunption of the 
analogy is that two terms are related to t"TO others--''as, n or 
"as if"--and this is not meant to indicate that it "is" some 
oth.er rel-ation. Hence \vhat is: being assert:ed ·is really only 
a possibility and not a unique tie or identity. In strict 
usage it should be called a poetic tie or identity-~ Analo-
gies invite the participator to detennine. if indeed it is 
"like" the other terms, and to see if it does seem to bear-
similar relations. To assert a strict identity is totally 
missinr the point of analogical thinking. 
The reason that the analogical function in lanEuage 
is not often acknov-Jledged \vith the credit due it, is that 
analogies and metaphors are often looked down upon as indica-
tive of an undeveloped reason that is incapable of expressing 
complex and profound thought patterns. -This is, of course, 
merely an example of raruc prejudice. The case is ~uite the 
contrary. Logic is actually one special case of analogy, 2 a 
novel is an expansion of a metaphor_,3 and mathematics is 
anot-her example of a systematic use of analogy that is often 
disguised by the Latin term proportion, rather than the Greek 
2scott Buchanan, Rhetoric (manual used by St. John's 
College, Annapolis, Maryland, n .d.), (Jo.iimeographed.) 
3weller B. Embler, "The Novel as l"ietaphor," Etc •, 
Vol. X, No. l, ~utumn, 1952), PP• 3-12~ 
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equivalent--analogy. Again_, the scientific method itself, in 
its statements of relations between thin~s and their math-e-
matical properties, can be seen as -a sys-tem of analor:ies .4 
The mathematical descri ption of the Keplerian astron-
omy ·will illustrate this usage in matJJemat i cs. In the state-
ment of the Eart h and its path:. 
• . • • the earth revolves around the heav-ens 
trac1ng the path of an ellipse while the sun is 
at one of the Foci. 
The elements needed are: 
1. The orbit of a Planet. 
2. The Sun. 
3. The circumf-erence of a conic section, 
i.e., the ellipse. 
4. The foci of the ellipse. 
\"lhat the proposition can be really reduced to would be: 
The orbit of a planet is to the sun as the circum-
ference of the ellipse is to-rhe foci.5 
Which of course holds t o the basic form of analog y with the 
classic type: 
A is to B as C is to D 
4scott Buchanan, The Doctrine of Sienatures (London: 
Kegan "Paul, Trench, Trubner ~-:. Co., Ltd., l~JS), p p . 2~-50 . 
5This is itself a shortLand form of a mathematical 
process because the ellipse is derived from by-_ a ~rocess of 
oas ~ in~ a olane throu~h a conic section at a p,1ven anF,le. 
T_he rat-er ~athematici~ns may fail to recoe:nize that t h e 
alg ebraic form of the ellipse is a special c~se_of the 
analogical use of e eometry and algebra when 1t 1s seen 
through the Cartesian coordinate system. 
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or simply, 
Planet's Path : Sun .. .. 
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Ellipse the Foci 
The only difficulty l'tould be if this becnme an asser-
tion that this is really the way the earth moves. Hence the 
conclusion should at this point be anticipated: that tbe 
dogmatist, in any of his many disguises, is sim0ly a person 
who confuses a language problem with his convictions and 
feelings. He insists that a particular analo~ical ex~rcssion 
uniquely characterizes some "x" and no other and, therefore, 
he believes his assertion is literal, self-evident, and 
indubitable fact. 
In everyday usage,_ the metaphorical or analocical 
function of language is .not obvious. Usually the literal 
statements have a very definite and non-analo n·ical int-ent, or-
so it is believed. When a person shouts, nr hate John Smith!" 
is it hardly intended as a metaphor or as the statement, 
!:something like hate I experience for John Smith." i~cvcrthe­
less, it can be seen as such in the analysis of its str,tcture: 
1. I hate John Smitho 
Objection: ~hat does it nean for the "I" to hate? The 
grammatical first person sinr;ular, does it hate? 
2. I have a hatred for John Smith. 
Objection: :~ ow does one have it? Like an arm,- the moon, 
a spoon? 
3. I feel an emotion which I call hate, which I 
feel for John s~ith. 
Objection: How can one feel for Johh Smith'? 
or 
' . I 
I 
__ _j _i 
4. I feel an emotion which I call hate, wnich I 
project upon John Smith as the objEct of my 
feeling. 
Objection;- Project? How? Carry it over? Place it upon 
hi..-n? 
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5. I feel an emotion which I call hatred which 
causes a feeling of tension within me; as a 
result I seek its resolution by reactin~ to 
an object that appears to threaten my p~evious 
nlacid state. 
Naturally, this process could go on to further explore 
the content of the terms "call," "seek," object," and 
flappears," for these are all heavy terms that te-nd to obsc-ure 
the metaphoric content that they possess within this context. 
The more complete the analysis, the rno~e the investieation 
would tend to define the basis for the hate; hence, the easier 
its resolvement, but only if our activity were not entirely 
intended to disembowel poor John Smith. 
The analogical structure for Mr. I and John Smith 
mi0ht be viewed in this form: 
tranquil state : turbulent state 
a non-threatened matrix a threatened matrix 
the understanding of the matrix 
the blind and immediate acceptance of the natrix 
understanding action emotionally base action 
. . 
.. 
.. 
. -· 
'!'he dialectic would explore just what it is that is threatened. 
The uncoverinr: of this content would brinr, light unon "Hr. 
I's" behavioristic natterns and account for the ambiguous ele-
ments. 
It is not often recognized that language can be seen 
within this scheme, but this is simnly because of a predisposi-
r -~,, 
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tion to view them within a structure that langua~e seems to 
provide. Language presents a model but it has its ov:n 
implicit metaphysics as a linguistic structure which, if one 
is not caref:1l, vlill be dictated to the unsuspectinp:: . 6 Our 
linguistic model stresses "static" thin~s and their relation-
ships, or relations~ips and the thinr,s related. Thus, the 
question arises; Could there be an alternative conception 
,...J=h ich '-muld then offer entirely different conseauences? 
The basic factor in the model is the proposition, and 
it is agreed to have the ele.11ents of a subject-v-erb-object. 
The subject-noun is isolated, the verb imputes some aspect of 
motion, while its determination becomes the object. This is 
the customary manner of treating this division but it is. not 
at all n.ecessary to assume. Ernest Fenollosa :presents an 
alternative in his request that if we ~et back to the basic 
etymology of words they would reveal rich metaphorical con-
-tent. He ar.!Tiles from. the case of the Chinese ,·,-ri tten charac-
ter to draw conclusions for other languages, and clains for 
Chinese the " purest" meaning in that it has retained its 
ancient origins intact. He says of t he sub~ect-verb-object 
relation: 
6i3enjamin Lee ''Jhorf, Lanpuage, 'Thou"'ht and Reality, 
ed. John B. Carroll (New York: Published jointly by the 
Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
and John vliley &·. Sons, Inc., 1956), P• 252. 
I ! 
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A true n~un, an isolated thinr,, does not exist in 
nature •. Th1ng~ are only t~e term i nal points~ or rath.er 
the_meet1ng po~nts, of 1a~t1ons, cross-sections cut through 
act;ons, snap-s~ots •. Ne1ther can a pure verb, an abstract 
mot1on, be :pos.:-·1ble 1n nature. The eye sees noun and verb 
as one: th1n~s in motion, motion in things and so the 
Chinese concention tends to represent them.? 
It is. often argued that it is only when words lose their 
archaic reference that exactitude can be had throur,h laneuage. 
Fenollosa counters that, on the contrary, tr.e Chinese lan-
~uage in its ~~itten character retains the meta~hor and, he 
points out, that the intellectual and philosonhical ";orks of 
the Chinese are evidence of the ability of metaphors to com-
municate complex thought patterns : 
You \<till ask, how could the Chinese have built up a 
great intellectual fabric frarr the mere picture writing': 
To the ordinary ~Iestern mind, which believes that thought 
is concerned Nith lor;ical categories and \·rhich rather con-
demns the faculty of direct imap:ination, ·this feat seems 
quite impossible. Yet, the Chinese lan,:,uage '\·rith its 
peculiar materials has passed over from t he seen to the 
unseen by exactly the sam-e process '\'Ihich all ancient 
races erroloyed. This process is m-etaphor, the uge of 
material images to sur;?; est imnate~ial relations. 
The conscious use of analo.p;y can furth-er understanding and 
create conditions for ne\·I insights. It can also limit under-
standing if its proper er.tployement is not understood. 
~ecently, an effort has been made to determine its proper 
function in mathematics and in reasoning, and G. Polya has 
?Ernest Fenollosa, The Chiner.e Written Character {New 
York: Kasper & Horton (Square$ Series), n.d.), P· 60. 
8.rbid., ·p. 72. 
i 
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authored. a work coverin~_- th1."s fl."eld.9 p 1 ' 
_ o_ya s work argues 
for the use of analogical thought in mathematics and ·reason-
ine rather than the deductive method because it is his claim 
that the truly creative mathematician must be a ~ood r.uesser 
fir~>t and a r,ood prover a fter. Both the guess and the idea 
of the proo ~ , he points out, rest heavily unon tr.e· utilization 
of analogy: 
• • • And the layman is not surprised to hear that the 
naturalist is EUessinr. like himself . It may appear a 
little more surprising to the la)~an that the mathemati-
cian is also guessing . The -result of the mathematician's 
creative work is demonstrative reasonin~, a proof, but 
the proor is discovered by plausible reasoninf , by 
guessing.lO 
The deductive method only can be -employed after both the 
euess and the idea of the proof are first grasped . Polya is 
aware of the dangers in the use of analogies and begins by 
stating that in "discussinp.; analogy, we tread on less solid 
~round.nll He lists several points of interest: 
The essential difference between analopy and other 
kinds of similarity lies, it seems to me, in the inten-
tions of the thinker. Similar objects agree with each 
other in some respect. If you intend to reduce the 
aspect in which they agree to definite concepts, you 
regard those similar objects as analogous. If you suc-
ceed in gettinf> down to clear concepts you have 
9a Polya Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning (Princeto~: Prin~eton University Press, 1954) • 
lOrbid., v·ol. II, p. 158.. llrbid., Vol. I, P· 13 • 
. i 
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clarified the analogy.l2 
He defines the concept, or condition, of analo~y as follows: 
. . • tw? systems ar? analogous, if they agree in 
.clearly def1nable relat~ons of t i~ eir res r-ective !)arts .l3 
The only difficulty in the analogical method is when it is 
not clarified: 
. • • And rer:: ember, do not neglect VJ p:ue ana1o.ries. 
Yet, if you wish them respectable, try tc; clarify 'them.l4 
The role that analogy plays, to Polya, is clear in his 
statement: 
••• There is perhaps no discovery either in elemen-
tary or advanced mathematics, or, for that matter, in 
~ other subject that c .Juld do \·Jithout these operations 
u,ene.ral.i~ation and specializatio_!!7 especially without analogy.l::~ 
Hence, here is further evidence t .hat analogy has a 
large share in the intellectual processes. The positive dia-
lectic finds in the analoe ical tool a way of analysis and also 
a way of discovery. The keen eye. for analoe:ical relations 
marks the d·ialectician and the almost playful u~e of them 
80m€times makes it hard to distinF,uish him from the dramatist 
in the concern for plot structure. Hence, a critioue of 
analogy assumes the value of a relational matrix. 
The development of a relational matrix in vihich a 
value is given presupposes that similar relati0ns can be 
predicated of totally different things. Without this facility 
12Ibid. 13 Ibid. l4Ibid., p. 15. 
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there could be no assertion of this s~~e or similar relations 
between the last terms. In the example, 
or, 
or, 
King is to Subject as Father to Son 
Father to I-Iother as Heaven to Earth 
Heaven to Earth as the Generative Prin-
ciple to the Creative Principle. 
An examination of the~e analogies presupposes another 
concept which must be prior to the structural similarity con-
cept. If the relation between a Father and Mother, a King 
and his Subject, or a Father to tis Son is in na~e only~ then 
QQ relationship can be asserted and the consequence--for the 
related terms--would be invalid. (The only relationship that 
could be asserted would be merely nomenal .... :hich 1.·:ould be the 
absence of any effective relationship.) That is to say that 
if the Father and Mother were not functionin?; within each 
realm in respect to their relational capacities, then nothin~ 
further could be deduced and the other terms--Heaven to Earth--
\·:ould have no explicit relation and the analo~y 1.·:ould further 
the cause of ambir.;uous and misleadinp- relations. Clearly, 
the ~elation in the analogy must assume the ordered elements 
of the first part before any "is to" can be deduced. The 
Drinciple of a structural .similarity presupposes an ordered 
relational system, hence it should be termed a pr-inciple of 
I : 
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the Integrated Unit System. \~hen the terms in the analogy 
are ordered sufficiently to function in related capacities, 
then similar structural similarities can be asserted in other 
equally related units. Once the units, or te~s in the 
analogies, are suff iciently distinguished by their order,_ 
then a corresponding structural syste~ appears in the rela-
tion of these similarities to other eoually distin";uished 
terms of any other order. 
It would be profitable to return to the basic analory 
for clarification, 
A is to B as C is to D 
or, as in our example: 
Father >:other Heaven Earth 
The conditions for this analogy therefore are: 
1. 
2. 
J. 
A particular function must be assit.ned to father 
and metter, or such other terms in the analor;y • 
. A corresponding structural relationship be.t,o;een 
both father and mother should emerge as a unit. 
And sufficient evidence of this order, (1) and (2), 
must be g iven l•rhich i s transferred ''as" or "as if" 
to the latter terms, Heaven an~ Earth. 
Even thoue;h these terms differ in respect to both ouantity 
and quality , for as long as t h ey are actually ordered, tl1e. 
relationsi:ip can be sought in the latter terms. ~:h en this 
is established, an integrated system is in evidence.l6 
16rhese t'li'!O principles necessary for th? analogy are 
also the major principles of the Chinese· Class~c--The Book of 
--
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The concept or principl€ of the repetition of the 
integrated unit system is hierarchial and also justifies the 
Chang es, or the I Ching .. In fact, ·the entire Book of Changes 
can be seen as. an analo r:;~cal system in l·rhich tr.e relational 
pa~te::ns arc g~ve~ a basJ.s and :orovided v.:iti1 a field. 'l'he 
~r1nclple of the ~ntegrated unit system and the nrincinle of 
.structural .similarity are the key and paramount concepts 
underlying the Book of Chang es, and also as-sumed for an 
an.:;logy, or system of analogies. Professor Gi-!-:inr;· Shien 
l'.'r1 tes: 
The principle of structural similarity is the key 
principle of the Book of Chang es. If '\•Je do not under-
stand this princi ple, we shall never understand tbe 
es~en?e of the Book of Chang es. f_Gi !:Iing Shien, "Key 
Pr~nc1ples of the Book of Chan~es: The Principle of 
Structural Similarity and the Principle of the 
Inter;rat ed System" ( Paoer read at the r·-Iew School of 
Social Research, New- York, October 29, 1954). (Kimeo-
graphed.l7 
and , further, he adcis: 
The key principle of the Boo~: 0f Chanc es is the 
principle of structural similarity_,and repetition of 
the integrated unit system. /Ibid.; 
In order to see this ~reces s i n a rn o~e detailed manner, the 
following is offered: · Beginning \·rith the first ti'!O terms, 
Father Hother 
! . .'hen these terms em-er? e v.·ith suf:ficiE·ntlv ordered functional 
activities·, then. an integrated s yst e1J results. T!-: is ·.-:ould 
al s o be true of terms as c.: if.fcrent as 1' father r.·:otherr: to 
tt}:.ea.ven : earth," hence a common structural condition is 
as s umed to underlie t h is emer r; ence. Naturally, tr_ere are 
certain structural relations .V:rhich are as r. um·ed to be more pro-
found or hierarchical than otters, an.d the Book of Chang es is 
based upon these deeper relati ons: both the eight trigrams 
und the sixty-four hexag r ams are imac;es of such functional 
differentiations. Professor Shien writes : 
Acc-ording to the .i:loo~: o.f Chan[:es, the eight trir,r ams, 
as ~Jell as the sixty-four hexae rams, are i:ma[:es of the 
I 
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!)roeressive concepts of the Good that characterizes the Pla---
tonic positive dialectic. The structural inteeral assunes 
the integrated unit and the accepta~ce of units sufficiently 
functionally developed to permit hi~her units of inter,rated 
unities, as-: 
Father to I-Iother - The family, tbe clan, th-e small 
community, the t m:n, City, State, 
Nation, and 1:Jorld. 
8ertainly there is here a progressive unity and also an 
increas€d complexity and ma~nitude, but since the sw~e prin-
ciples are operative, one c:m see the same principle and 
therefore the same relations can be predicated. The Saee 
intuitively perceives these interrelations, hi~ actions fol-
loi"I from this kno.,Jledge, and he thereby attains tranquility. 
5. Therefore it is the order of the changes that the 
suPerior man devotes himself to end that te 
attains tranquillity by. 
and concludingthis section: 
• • • Thus our actions are set in order, and the mind 
is also satisfied, for ,.,hen "'e meditc::te u=~ or. the judcments-
on the individual linesi \ore intuitively perceive the inter-
relatians in the world. 7 
Professor Gi-i·-:in,c->; Shi£n notes: 
functional differentiations v-1hich are .shaped. by all tl;.ings; 
moreover they are symbols of the structurc-~1 relationships 
1-1hich exist be.tv-1een great things such as. hec:ven. and. ear~h, 
but also tl--.e :--elationships vrhich exist \·.•::..thln r.:lcrocosmlc 
systa~s. /Ybid.7 
17H.ichard Wilhelm (trans.), The I Chinp; .2£ Book_ of 
Chanr;es, render-ed into Enr.;lish by Cary F. Baynes (Bo~llngen 
Se!"ies XIX. Ne\·! York: Pantheon 3ooks, Inc., 1950), lol. I, 
Chap. II, pp. 311-312. 
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As implied in the philosophy of the Book of ChanFes 
because the structural similarit:· a'Ilon~ al l structural, 
s~st~s, if we. can unde~~tand one st~uctural system 
w~th~n a certa~n area o.r phenomena £either the small one, 
such as the family, or rreat one, such a~ the world7, 
then we can apply concLusions to all the structural 
systems in that area.lE: 
This concept provides a princi~le missinr, in the Platonic 
movement of the Republic justifyinp the movement of the 
analogy fro~ the nature of the individual soul to the State·; 
and in transferring qualities bindin~ upon one ucon the 
other. And in the Chi~ese Classic of the Bo ok of Changes, 
the "trigrams of Ch'ien and K'"un are applied to the unit of 
the nation. They are the symbol of the Kine; and his vassals;_ 
if applied to the family--husband and wife." 
On the other hand, the hexagrams, Ch'ien and K'un, are 
the fundamental princinles of the I Chin~ and as principles 
- ,_ -~= .... 
they are not the elements of a basic dualism. In the same 
-.,;ay as Yin Yang are complem-entary, so, too, are Ch' ien and 
K 'un. In the Great Commentary (Ta Chuan, or, as it is some-
times called, Hsi Tz'u Chuan) it is noted: 
These two cardinal nrincinles of all existence are 
then symboliz-ed in the- two funda111 ental hexae:rllms of the 
Book o~ Changes, t he creative and the receptive. In 
the last analysis, this cannot be called a dualism. -The 
two principles are united by a relation based _on homoio 
r;eneity; they do not cor,Jbat but complement eacL other • ..,. 
In his concluding remarks .on the Key Principles of the Book 
lBshien, 2£• cit., P~ 2. 19\·:ilhel.m, oc. cit., p. JOJ. 
' 
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of Changes, Professor Gi-I(ing Shien writes: 
So we can see that every integral struct-ural system 
is structurally similar to every other inter;ral struc-
tural system. The eight trigrams and ti1e sixty-four 
hexagrams contain a principle ernbracinr; all thinr:s. In 
its _fullnes_s, they can be a nplied t::> the nf:cnornena of 
nature as a whole; in its partialness, th~· can be applied 
to the phenomena of individual thinrs. Likcwis e, the 
symbols, rules and relationships represented by tl:e tri-
~rams and hexagrams can be applied to the physical world, 
the social world, and the animal world. The ap~lication 
of the eight trigr-ams and the sixty-four hexaerc.r.ts vdll 
lose any appearance of confusion or arbitr~riness (e.e., 
the trigrams Ch t·ien and l~ 'un simultaneously symbolizing 
heaven and earth in nature, kin~ and ministers in the 
nation, father and mother in the family) once the prin-
ciple of structural similarity and repetition of the 
integrated unit system is firmly grasped. It is throu~h 
this principle that the Bobk of Chan~es tnkes the chan~ing 
rules, laws, and symbols of the chan~inp: pr.enomena and 
transforms them into an all-embracine principle which 
nothing escapes.20 
The concern for the relations and their relatedness to other 
relations rather than to things and their properties or rela-
tions lies at the base of the system. The concept of order 
is not dependent upon perception but upon conception of 
s L"TTilar relatio-ns bet-...reen vastly dissimilar thin:;s. 
It is said in the 3ook of Chanr;es that "th-e Tao as 
expressed there can be applied to what is for (the. 
inoreanic or macrocosmic \-rcrld), and at. the ~ame tJ.m~ 
it can be applied t:J v.rhat is near. (the Imned1ate. so~1al 
l·rorld or individual things). It 1s proper and fttt1nt;, 
v1hen one speaks of snace between heaven and earth, it 
embraces eve-rything.21 
The Book of Chanees therefore adds to the positive 
dialectic a set of prir.ciples \·:hich can clarify much that 
20shien, 2£· cit., p. 4. 2lshien, 12£· cit. 
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would be left to doubt, and also expl-icitly fonnulates much 
o-r the inner movement of the positive dialectic. Primarily., 
the following principles have been noted: 
Principle of Order 
Principle of Struc-tural Similarity 
Principle o-f the- Integrated Unit System 
Hence these become the categories or postulates of an 
ontology from the aspect of the positive dialectic. It 
assumes -a structural unity rather than a non-dual reality. 
However, the concept of order itself assumes a hierarchical_ 
class of principles but this is not explicitly formulated 
within the Book of Changes. 
The concept of Nothingness in Lao-Tzu's philosophy can 
fill the gap in this problem. Lao-Tzu provides the missing 
element since his system assumes a hierarchical system from 
order to nothingness. The concept of Nothingness is one of 
the central concepts of Lao-Tzu and the Taoist philosophers, 
and it is, again,_ Professor Gi-1-ling Shien who has advanced 
this concept, as well as demonstrating its interrelatedness 
to order. 
O.n the side of the I·~adhyamikas-, as, too, with the 
Buddhists in general, there is a great reluctance to discuss 
the concept of Sunyata1 but not so with the concept of non-
being in Chinese thought. The Taoists have thought it most 
important to lend it more substanc-e than a mere negative 
! -
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concept as in Buddhism. 
Primarily, the concept of nothinenesE is based upon 
the concept of spontaneity, with both spontaneity and nothing-
ness being knmm by direct "intuition. 
Investigatine;- the structure, or content, of t·:othinr;-
ness, Prof-ess-or Gi-Iviing Shien says: 
• • • Then again, v:-c may find the sarne principle [Of 
spontaneity? in our breathing. ~'Je are a\·:arc, if \"le stop 
to notice, that there are inhalation and e}~alation in 
alternation. It is a reflex action in which no conscious 
effort is exp-ended. The pushing out of air in exhalation 
brings about a condition of vacuum in the lungs; \rrhen this 
becomes great enough it starts the inward movement of the 
air to fill the lungs. This inhalation continues until 
the pressure of the inner expansion is rreat enou~h to 
start the cycle again in the outward move."Tient of air. 
That isy there is a continuous cycle of pressure from 
positive to negative and back a~nin. As long as it is in 
complete balance and all parts of the cycle have their 
equivalents, there are symmetry and harmony and complete 
return, in \'.rhich the inhalation moves directly into the 
fallm.;ing exhalation over a smooth course, as it were. 
This is a condition of comPlete spontaneity and, of course, 
it is nothingness, beint: completely belO\'J tl':e threshold of 
consciousness.22 
The example of breathing supnlies an analogy to shov! the prin-
ciples of proportion, symmetry, and harmony. Tr.ese princinles 
in their turn demonstrc.te the elements of spontaneity and pre-
suppose (·the concept of) ;.:othingness. Professor Shien clearly 
makes this connection between spontaneity and nothineness when 
he writes: 
22Gi Ming Shien, "Nothingness in the Philosophy of 
Lao-Tzu," Journal of Philosoohv East and \'lest, Vol. I, No. J, 
p. 2. 
2"22 
We may gen~ra~ize to show the several parts of spon-
·taneity. It ~s lmportant to have proportion {analo~i7 
symmetry~ and harmony. Then, too, each force must be • 
countered by an eauivalent force , and tl:e whole system 
must return upon itse1f in such a manner that it will 
continue in its cycle with self-suf:iciencv. In such 
a system there will be the spontaneity which is tr.e 
result23 of obtaining a complete null point, or nothinr,-ness. 
A class of principles in an hierarchical order sug-
gest this amended form: 
The Principl-e of Nothin?;ness 
The Principle of Spontaneity 
The Principle of Equivalence or Equilibrium 
The PrinciPle of Proportion--Analogy and Symmetry 
The Principle of Order 
A principle of order is assumed and this in turn rest·s 
upon the notion of the Principle of Proportion, or analor,y, 
and Symmetry. This latter principle must accept the existence 
of a Principle of Equivalence, or Equilibrium, or else it ,.;ill 
not be symmetrical or proportioned... Again, this principle of 
eouivalence, being at equipose, or a point of eouilibrium, 
must in its turn assume a principle of spontaneity for ·its 
existence. Spontaneity and equivalence assume no outside 
force or power acting upon it, directing it, or forcing an 
external pattern upon it. A system without this element of 
spontaneity continually needs adjusting in order to function, 
but with spontaneity, it must be cyclical because it returns 
upon itself. In a cycle, it is self-sufficient. "In such a 
23rbid., p. 3. 
I 
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sys-tem, there will be the spontane.ity which is- the result of 
obtaining a com pl et e null point or nothingness • n24 Thus, all 
of these principles in turn rest upon the concept of nothing-
ness: Each in their turn depend upon nothin~ness; it is the 
ultimate simplicity and the generati.nr; princifJle of all 
things: 
If we ask where the order, proportion and symmetry 
come from, we shall notice a principle of ecuivalence. 
From this we can find the presence of spont:ineity and 
nothingness. Thus, we see the prime importance of 
these two. When they are present~ the others follow 
by necessary order of the universe or the Tao. They 
represent a principle of inteeration by which every 
part ha_rmonizes vlith every other part. This principle 
is_ in every part a-nd at the same time transcends every 
part because through its spontaneity and nothin~ness 
there is generation and completion of' the univers e . 
And this is the true meaning of the pr-incinle of 
nothingness in the philosophy of Lao-Tzu.25 
The concept of Nothingness has a twin aspect, for it can be 
seen as the final expression of a structural unity since it 
"represents a principle of integration by which every part 
harmoniz-es \·lith every other part," and also as a non-dual 
reference since it fftranscends" those very parts. 
The tr:0nscendental reference from the metarhysical to 
the epi st e!!l ol or,ic al 1,·10uld 'ue equi va 1 ent to the adm is r ion 
that the positive dialectic transforms itself by the denial 
of even an nas if" assertion v.rhen it reaches towards the 
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Principle of Nothingness. It is not that it suddenly is 
transformed into a neeative critique, but that it goes beyond 
its O'lftn boundary, its own analogical form, to a concept \vhich 
is no longer analogical or metaphoric, but can be clearly seen 
to outstrip them both in the intuition o-r the non-dual insi .sht 
~~ich transcends the analo~ical, because it is beyond rela-
tions and things in relation. "The Tao tha t c~n be named is 
not the eternal Tao.n26 
-This is of course a different understanding of nothing-
ness than that of Fung Yu-la~ for in his History of Chine~e 
Philosophy, he ignores the prohibit~on against the Tao being 
named when he says that the Tao has existence because it per-
meates everything and can be one thinr: and another. And, he 
further argues, it can, thus, be callert an "-all embracing 
principlen27--but this cannot be the meanine of nothingness 
because it is named. It is clear that ·the true meaning of 
nothingness is beyond existence 1r:hen Lao-Tzu says ·in the Tao 
Te Ching that "Heaven and Earth and the ten thousand thinr,s 
come from existence,_ but existence comes frm'l non-existence."28 
Z6Lao-Tzu Tao Teh Ching., trans. P. Carus ( Chicap:o: 
Open Court, 1945), Chap:-r, p. 73. 
27Fung Yu-lan A History of Chinese Philosophy, trans. 
Derk Bodde (reprinted:-Shanghai:North China Daily ~ews, 1949), 
po. 177-179; and Fung Yu-lan, A Short History of ~h1nese 
Philosophy, (Ne'Vt York: The r·-:acmillan Company, 1940, PP• 94-97 • 
2BLao-Tzu, 2!?..• cit_., p. 102. 
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III. THE PROPOSITION AI\fD NEGATIVE DIALECTIC 
To the negative dialectic the entire course of the 
positive dialectic appears to be a system of ambi~uities. 
The negative dialectic, bein~ a severe critic of the propo-
sitional form of judgement, sees its mm suecial task to be 
the exposure of metaphoric and relational content in \·lhat is 
apparently a literal assertion~ Therefore, the transition 
from the positive to the negative dialectic is a shift from 
the acceptance of the relational to its denial. 
The mechanism of this denial needs analy~is, as does 
the assertion that a consistent critic can say nothinp and 
from silence nothine can be deducen. The nec~tive dialectic 
is a severe critic and therefore the mode and mechanism of 
this critical technique will be examined. This is of course 
equivalent to an analysis of the u·s -e of Ian~uap;e, or more 
correctly, the analysis of the use of the relational proposi-
tion compared with the ner,ative dialectic. 
The proposition performs a twin object--it predicates 
difference and sa~eness of some given referent. But if the 
proposition is limited to tne cone ept of sameness, it ,.,- ::mld 
be a tautology and, therefore, it is the other more major 
conce_pt of dif:'er •o: nce th~t needs analysis. If all the nhilo-
sophical problems were to pass by in sinele file, they could 
be .seen as attempts to make an assertion of some difference 
-- -, .. , 
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between things and concepts. 
·The solution to th.e philosophical que.st.ions, sue:: as 
the relation between the nhenomenal and noumenal, dvaita and 
advaita, appearance and reality, maya and. 3rah"!lan,_ ignorance 
and wisdom, cause and effect, jiva and Drah~an, etc.~ must 
first assume that an underlying concept is valid. It assumes 
the concept of difference can have more than an arbitrary or 
praf,matic employment in propositions. If, however, this con-
cept cannot be rationally defended., then all of these so-called 
0hilosophical problems rest upon a spurious distinction. It 
is obvi.ous that. this is· the fundan.ental notion and if it fails, 
then by the same analysis, so do all the derivative cate-
gori es and concepts .. 
Nrsimhasramin, an Advaita-Vedantist followinr- the course 
of Sankara, 1.-ras an extremely capable lohical disputer ,,,:ho 
authored a "Critique of Difference" known as "The Bhedadhi-
kara.''29 He examines the concept of difference and provides 
additional evidence of the methodolop,ical a~ployment of reason 
as 11 disputationtt rather than as dialectic. 
The first part of the work indicates a clear, consist-
ent em-ployment of reason in handling the proposition that the 
Jiva and Isvara (the individual and the Lord) cannot be 
2 9s. S. Suryanarayana Sastri and T. N. P • .l':Iahadevan, 
A Critiaue of Difference (Bul ~ etins of the Department or 
Indian Philosophy: No .• 2. University of !IJ:adras, 1936) • 
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predicated as different, since difference is not real nor can 
it rationally be defended. (This is not to say that they 
deny the seeming differences perceived, but only that apparent 
difference can have no ultimate· validity.} The argument devel-
ops in the recognition that the terr;ts, Jiva and I.svara, pre-
clude difference, for the one is not perceived and the differ-
ence of the counter-correlate cannot be conceived. The 
Advaitan ackov-rledges the pragmatic , or empirical, "difference" 
due to nescience, stating that it would advance nothinr, to 
deny its inrerential character since it was merely nominal in 
nature from its very beginning .JO Inference cannot establish 
any· evidence of absolute difference simply because of the 
definational character of logical inference. Inferential 
evidence is "just that,n and is incapable of establishing any-
thing but this tenuous tie by logic. It is derived from logic 
and postulates no more than what it assumes from the matrix of 
logic. It is at best a secondary means of cognitive evid-ence 
which must alvmys await further analysis to substantiate it .• .3 1 
The Critioue next turns to the question of condition-
ing as a source for the establishment of difference. Sut the 
adjuncts \vhich are the conditioninr.; ar,ents cannot establi sh 
difference without the adjuncts. If it is on~y kno~TI t hrough 
them, then the concept of difference cannot be assumed ~dttout 
JOibid., pp. 1.3 and 14 •• 3lrbid., p. 15, par. IV. 
-
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them.. (The Critioue examines the conseouences of this conclu-
sion by testing its coherence, harmony, and interpretation 
\-lith scriptural writin:::::s.32 But this has value only to 
adherents of the tradition and therefore falls outside of 
this work. The next issue taken in the Bhedadhikara , namely, 
the proble.'!l. of .presumption, also assumes a scriptural inter-
pretation and by the same token \·!ill be i['"nored. )3.3 
The more germane issue to this paper is Nrsimhasramin's 
treatment of individuals: If two apparently different indi-
viduals can be asserted to exist, then the concept of differ-
ence must have validity. Tne previous point (of differenc.e 
being unintelligible if dependent upon s.e.nse-contact) is 
further pursued in this areument. Among different individuals 
there is no evidence for difference apart from adjuncts, such 
as egoity,, body, and senses. Hence the Vedantist 's conclusion 
follows that the individual is only an adjunct-conditioned 
part of the universal Self, Brahman.34 Differences and the 
concept of difference heine thus not valid except in an 
apparent way, the propositi.onal form ·which has a state.r:1ent of 
difference as to major content suffers in its car.acity to 
r.lirror reality. '•ihen Bradley 1-"Trites: 
The conclusion to \"lhich I am broue;ht is that a rela-
tional way of thought--anyone that moves by the machin-
ery of terms and relations--must eive appearance, and not 
32rbid., p. 16. 
-
JJrbid.,_ p. 21. 34~., p. 22. 
; j_} 
truth •. It is a makeshift, a device, a mere practical 
comp:oml.s~~ most necessar-y, but in the end most inde-
fens lbl e • .J :1 
t r. ere are clear echoes back to Nrsimhasramin. 
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In Bradley' s philosophy, he c ont·inues t his analysis 
along other lines in his criticism of things and their rela-
tions, qualities, space and time, causation, change, motion, 
and the Self, \'lhich snows remarkably similar features to 
that of the lvladhyamika and Advaita-Vedanta schools. Bradley 
further develops the problem of dif 7'erence and also provides 
an elaboration o£ the mechanism of dialectic by his analysis 
of the proposition as a form of judgement. The essential 
issue is the nature of the proposition itself~ ~hether this 
hc. s contained within it, as a linguistic structure, the very 
ele:n.ents antithetic to reason \'!hich, ironically enough, r ·eason 
employs as its matter. The basic Problem is the valid use of 
the subject-verb-object combination. It can be stated as: 
X is in relation 1·Tith some Y 
Bradley fore efull y shO\·ls that: 
• • • our conclusion briefly will be this~ delation 
presupposes quality and qaality r-elation. Each can be 
something neither together with, nor apart from, the 
other; and the vicious ci:r;cle in vrhich they turn is not 
the truth about reality .J o 
35F. H. Bradley 1 Auoearance and Reality (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1930) J p. 33 • 
J 6rb id., p. 21. 
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The point that he makes, and not without a sha d ed wit, is 
that qualities are supposed to be isolated a~d, hence, r iven, 
but if t ~lis be assumed t han an operat i nn of the ~n ind i s !Jre-
supposed. What is "different must be di~tinct, and, in c an-
seouence, related, n37 and this relation, .havine existence 
only to the observ·er, can hardly be "9redicated of rea1i ty. 
It is sugRested by Bradley thRt this is the price for bein~ 
able to render finite the Y.Iorld. The issue is v:hether rela-
tion is essential to 0ifferBnce, for upon one the other 
depends. His arp;ument is as subtle 0s it is simple. It 
assumes two qualities diff erent from one another; hence, l'rhere 
shall one relegate the difference? 
• • • If it f a lls, in any degree or to any extent, 
outside A or 3, we have relation at once. But, on the 
other hand, how can difference and otherness faTl inside? 
If we have in A any such otherness, then inside A w e must 
distinr;uish its own quality and its other-ness. And if. 
so, then the unresolved r roblem b reaks out inside each 
0uality, and separates each into two ~ualities in rela-
tion. In brief, diversity wittout rel ati on see~s a word 
without rn eaning.38 
Within the d i ~tinction of substantive and adjective, he 
employs the same analysis (as he does vdth al1_ the concepts 
that he brin,ss before his critical eye), and they r:: eet the 
same conclusion. Realizing that adjectives are said to 
qualify a subject, a substantive, his argument can be dia-
37rbid., pp. 22-23. 
38~., p. 24. 
....-
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f';ra."!led for ereater clarity as,39 
A lump of sugar 
Adjectives 
\'Thite 
hard 
sweet, etc. 
Assmnntions 
1. Properties are di s tinct. 
2. A substantive i ~ not any one 
of its ouali ties. 
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It is obvious that the thing is not the unity of its adjec-
tives, since it cannot be, if it is t a ken severally. This is 
the issue--it is the ancie.nt problem of the one and the many, 
or in Bradley's terms, unity and multiplicity. The properties 
are obviously in s ome .relation ·r:ith t h e sub,::ect, "wh en \'.'hite, 
hard, sweet, and the rest coexist in a cert~ in way, that is 
surely the secret of the thing.n40 The irony is reintroduced 
\·:hen it is realized th8t the adjectives are no\·/ suddenly sub-
,i ects. Clearly the problem has a simple solution: ~·;hat ever 
ouality A, it is simply in a relation with B. Bradley 
counters: r,IJhat does "is" mean here'i Certainly not "in rela-
tion with B," for that ·would hardly leave roon en ouz h for B. 
Clearly t his is an exhibition of so :;histry when \·:ords not 
intended literally are e nployed as such. If s o, t h en ho~t! is 
the relati on to be saved': Tr~ e argument usually proceeds alonr: 
t~e line tha t the relati ~n is not identical with the thinf but 
is an attribute which adheres or belonrrs to the thi n~:;. This, 
of course, cannot escape detection, for if it adheres and 
39Ibid., pp. 16-18. 
-
40Ibid., p. 16. 
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belongs, or if the thing has it, the ~uestion remains to be 
c ~nsidered: In which way or sense can a thin~ have it--
a -dhere to it or have possessions 'i As Bradley ac curately 
reflects, "Apart from metaphors not t a ken seriously, there 
c.ppears really to be no ans\'ler. n 41 Tbe ancient dilemma 
reasserts itself, for in predicatinG ''"ha_t i~ difi'erent you 
say what it is not, and, if not, then nothin,r~ is said at all .. -
In spite o£' ·this,_ Bradley admits t -hat even thour.;: terms and 
their relo.t i rms cannot exist top, ether r.ar:noniously , there 
must be 11a v.rhole e:nbracinp: \·:hat is reL?,ted, cr there i·;ould be 
no differences and no rel2tion.n42 For everyday use, includ-
ing a pragmatic, terms and relations are co~patible only 
because they are not analyzed--nor is there any such need. 
But when these same dilemmas are transferred to the reaL'll of 
metaphysics, there occurs a major difficulty. 
Bradley C.ilploys his same method ology throut;hout his 
1.-zork and he c oncludes his third chapter 1r:ith: 
The reader 1trho has follo.,..red anC. ha~ ,r.;re.s ped the prin-
ciples of this chapter , v.•i ll h a ve little need to ~ rend 
hi~ time unon those which succeed it. He will have seen 
that ~~r e;~erience, wtere rela tional, i ~ not true; ard 
he \'i'ill have condemned, almost ' ·:ithout a he aring, the 
great mass of r.henoQena.43 
'Taking his suc;gestion, v;e car: leave him for- other considerc:..-
t ions. 
4lrbid.-, p ... 17. 43 Ibid., p. 29. 
' 
I 
:j I ~.J 
233 
It should be noted that a very c-urious fact r l:.ould 
become quite obvious: that literal st.-:: te~-.ents only seem 
explicit when the metaphoric content is i~nored. Critical 
analysis consists nearly entirely in ex~osine the meta~horic 
content th~t was ignored or v1 r.ich we.s not inter:ded to be a 
subject for analysis because of its obviously non-litera1 
reference. On the other hand,_ it he.s al·ways been the asf.umn-
tion of the syste>.m builder and dogmatist that :t~e can present 
Cis truths in the most precise and non-metaDhoric lanr,uaee--
the critic merely points to the metaphor and asl:-s: ',:hat do 
you mean? or, Is it possible to exrress this element in other 
non-metaphoric terms? Looking back ·to 3radle:'l'-s assertions, 
it is eaually clear that his entire criticism is cothin~ more 
than this and, as a matter of fact, hiE conclusion ~hould have 
been that he had found in t~e proposition an analo~ical form 
that can never be taten a.:' literal because lani"_Suage is itself 
hig.hly metaphorical and analoz, ical in content and strtAct•,;. re. 
The basic asst.<nr;Jtion that this concer::tion attacks i~ 
that language mirrors the structure of reality and therefore, 
by invoking meaningful state~ents, you a~e also characterizing 
reality. Bertrand :tussell 1-vrites: 
•• Our confidence in languaGe is due to the fact 
that it shares the structure of th e physical ~orld, and 
the:.-e-fore it can express that structure. '3ut if there 
is a ""-'or.ld. that is not in space-ti.'lle-, it nay !:ave a 
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structure \'.'hich we can never hope to ~~nm•' .. 44 
A more careful assertion l \10Uld be--tl 1e extent to •::hich reality 
can be understood within a space-time structure is a direct 
function of the space-time structure of our lanr.uage, and it 
is to that extent that we feel a confidence for la-nruar,e. 
This is a far cry from predicating the linr;uistic s-tructure 
to the physical world, or as \'Jittgenstein predicates to 
Reality: 
••• The proposition constructs a world with the help 
of log ical scaffoldin[, and therefore one can actually 
see in the proposition all t h e lo,o; ical features possessed 
by reality if it is true.45 
Dogmatism, in any of it~ diverse forms, assert~ mu: L the .:: c:m e. 
It is a tacit a greement thot the proposition is not meant 
metanhorica-lly nor is it an e:>..."tension by an analor.ical leap. 
It is the belief that it has an exact referent ~hich uniouely 
characterizes Eome particular referent. It rests in the 
belief that. literal ste:ltements are ir.. tr.enselves defensible. 
Certainly this theory has convenient uses in everyday life, 
but, as it ha~pens, this opinion becm~es the b ~sis for the 
literal rendering of feelings, and moreover, tte:: feelin .r::s 
often seem to add an interpretation \dthin the literal sci-.eme 
44nertrand Russell, Philosonhv (Ne1·; York: W. \·l. I":orton 
&:. c 0 • ' 193 6) , p .. 20 6-.. 
45Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus-Lo~ico-Philosonhicus 
(New York: Humanities Press, 1951), Sec. 4.cn. 
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of the linguistic structure. This has become the source of 
much of the wealth of the osychologist and nsychoanalyst. 
On the other hand., it should be adr.litted that th..e 
orocess in general is, on the surface, an aoparently justi-
fied one. Bradley makes this clear when he justifi-es his 
contention that every prooosition necessarily embodies a sub-
ject which is ultimate reality~6 A proposition asserts exist-
ence of a thing and isolates this ultimate reality by pr-edi.-
eating to it certain attributes,. yet by that process it 
cannot be valid '\o!hen divorced or taken apart from the reality 
which lies at its basis. The proposition asserts a static 
matrix within a certain space-time configuration, which by 
the linguistic structure seems separate but cannot be so con-
sidered after the sli!~htest scrutiny. The heart of the prob-
lem ~ms seen by both r·.:ahayana and Advaita thinkers ":hen they 
asserted the same truth in the principle that nothinr, is 
intelligible when. taken apart from th·e '\>Thole or from unity. 
Hence, the negative dialectic can be se.en as a proces·s in 
v!hich the thinr-: asserted is shown as relative and therefore 
not capable of providinr, a basis for do['}Jlatic· metaphysical 
assertions. An assertion taken literally needs a non-:Yleta-
phoric or non-relational character; without this form, it 
46r-. H. Bradley Log·ic (second. edit ion;. London: Oxford 
University Press, 1922), pp. 49, 50, and 66. 
) ~j 
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loses precisely the elements it sought for its certainty, 
yet ironically enough it cannot separate itsel.f from the 
relational. 
2)6 
In Vaihinger's classic work,47 his entire analysis of 
theoreticalr practical, and religious fictions is based 
entirely upon finding the hidden metaphor within a system 
which would cause -embarrassment should its presence become 
known. The demand for literal or non-m-etaphoric understand-
ing involves the expansion of linguistic oatterns to uncover 
their hidden. content. This critical examination is very 
similar to the negative dialectic in its pursuit of fictions 
and ambiguities. The neeative dialectic, not content with 
u·as if'T relations,. attacks directly the metar-horic content 
and fi-nds that it cannot be predicated of reality. But 
Vaihinger does not ext end his concept of "as if" to tl:e 
limit \'.·here he .,,,ould have to admit Bradley's thesis of a 
concept o£ non-determination or non-predication. 
Therefore the final assertion of the non-dual tradi-
tions, or schools of thought, takes the non-relational form. 
It might apoear as a tautology except that its meaning 
reflects the entire teaching which precludes that identity. 
The Advaita-Vedanta ·"That thou arttt or "Brahman and Atman are 
47H. Vaihinger, Philosophy of nA§. If", trans. C • K • 
Ogden (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner (.: Co., Ltd., 1932) • 
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one" is not intend.ed either as a tautology or a relational 
proposition. It is an attempt to express an ontological fact 
in which the totality is itself. non-relational and beyond 
r-eason.48 The ass-ertion that it is beyond reason simply means 
that an intuition of the non-dual gives a non-relation con-
tent that cannot be expressed in any dual, or relational, 
proposition.. Hence from the aspect of the negative dialectic, 
a metaphysical solution harmonizes the functions of reason by 
recourse t .o a synthesis that is actually its inclusion in a 
total picture. The extension of reason beyond itself leads 
to a non-relational form of the proposition. Again, this 
form is not meant to characterize either a specific thing 
nor is it intended to be a tautology, but a proposition of 
non-relations: "That thou art." The negation of difference 
and yet the statement of the .real being both universal and 
identical lies at the basis of the Advai ta ontology. The 
1~ad.hyamika, on the other hand, does not offer any ontological 
ass·ertion, yet does advance the identity between Sunyata and 
Tathagata. The denial of all doctrines, or the advance~ent 
of the "no-doctrine about reality" is not equivalent to the 
philosophical nihilist, since that is clearly reject-ed as well 
as all po.siti ve assertions. The ·intent of the l·Iadhyarnika is 
4Bsurendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosoohy 
(Cambridge: University Press, I, 1922; II, 1932), I, 439-440, 
cf. II, 13-16. 
2)8 
clearly ·the re-jection of the conceptual tendency, but both 
traditio.ns--the Nadhyamika and the Vedanta--do acknowledge a 
reality which is non-dual and outside of all empirical 
determinations. Thus the non-relational form of the proposi-
tion provides a type of statement which precludes empirical 
determinations and relational attributes. 
i ) _) 
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